Thomas v. Standard Accident Ins. Co.

7 F. Supp. 205, 1934 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1592
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedJune 15, 1934
Docket13188
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 7 F. Supp. 205 (Thomas v. Standard Accident Ins. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thomas v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 7 F. Supp. 205, 1934 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1592 (E.D. Mich. 1934).

Opinion

LINDLEY, District Judge.

Plaintiff, receiver of the First National Bank of Detroit, brings this suit against defendant upon a certain blanket fidelity bond claiming that, because of the dishonest acts of one or more of his employees, plaintiff has lost the amount of a certain check for $2,326.-20.

The bond was executed on the 13th day of March A. D. 1933, in favor of Paul C. Keyes as conservator of said bank, and continued in force in favor of Mr. Thomas as conservator, upon Ms appointment in lieu of Mr. Keyes. On or about the 12th day of April, A. D. 1933, plaintiff, pursuant to an order of the Comptroller of the Currency, prepared to pay to the depositors of the bank for which he was receiver dividends of 40 per cent. A newly formed bank, the National Bank of Detroit, occupying the same premises as plaintiff, agreed to provide the funds to pay the dividends by buying certain assets from plaintiff and using certain moneys loaned to plaintiff by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. These funds were deposited to the credit of Mr. Thomas in the National Bank of Detroit.

There were over 800,000 dividend checks to be delivered, and plaintiff devised a type of cheek drawn upon the National Bank of Detroit by plaintiff and executed by one of his authorized agents payable to the depositor. Blank cheeks so prepared were placed in the files of the individual accounts of the depositors. The customer was required to present his passbook to the plaintiff's teller, who would thereupon procure from the file a work sheet, which the customer would sign. The teller then compared such signature with that on the signature card. If the signatures compared favorably, the teller then procured from the file the blank cheek executed by the plaintiff. The customer was then required to place Ms signature on the face of the check in the space designated “specimen signature of payee.” It was the teller’s duty then to sign his name in the space designated “signature verified by.” Thereupon the check was delivered to the customer with his passbook. Armed with such check and passbook, the customer would then present Ms cheek to the National Bank of Detroit and procure payment thereof upon signing Ms name once more.

The customers whose names began with “M” were notified to appear on April 28th. Some time during that day a customer by the name of Samuel McAdams presented his passbook. The blank check which should have been in his file could not be located. He was told to return later and came back on the 4th day of May, when a new check was issued to Mm and paid. In the meantime, it was discovered that the original check issued for Mr. McAdams and placed in his file, No. 657539, had been previously cashed by a teller in the National Bank of Detroit by a party who signed the name of Samuel Mc-Adams in the space provided for the specimen signature. It was apparent that the name of the teller appearing thereon had not been written by said teller but had been traced from his signature. Some third person had presented the check to the National Bank of Detroit, properly executed by plaintiff bearing a purported signature of Samuel McAd-ams and an apparently authentic but traced signature of the teller to verify same, and had again placed his signature upon the check when presented to the National Bank of Detroit and received payment.

No one had access to any of the' files or records of the bank or of the receiver or to the cheeks, except employees of the plaintiff covered by said bond. While the identity of the perpetrator of the fraud was never discovered, the evidence shows conclusively that it would have been impossible for anybody to have accomplished what was done unless he had been one of the employees of the receiver with access to the checks.

The provisions of the bond are the usual ones in such instruments. This contract purports to insure plaintiff in an amount not to exceed $500,000 from and against any loss sustained by him caused by any loss through any dishonest or criminal act of any of the employees. The liability .is elaborated in certain other provisions.

Defendant contends that no proper proof of loss has been made and that no loss has *207 accrued to the plaintiff, that the acts aforesaid constitute forgery, and that forgery is not covered by the bond.

On May 12, 1933, the agent of plaintiff forwarded to defendant a letter setting forth in detail the facts and circumstances surrounding the loss. Thereafter numerous conferences were had between the parties with reference to the loss and certain other matters covered by bonds in which the parties were interested. The agent of plaintiff had formerly represented the First National Bank in a similar capacity and had frequently made settlements with defendant. He testified that the parties agreed that without further preliminaries a suit at law should be instituted to determine the question of liability. Apparently the parties were dealing in good faith with one another, and the course of action was such that the court finds it to be a fact that defendant intended to and did waive the necessity of a formal proof of claim.

Defendant contends with much earnestness that the cheek in question was a forgery, that payment by the National Bank of Detroit was therefore unauthorized, and any charge to the account of plaintiff on its books on account of the payment of said check wrongful, and that accordingly no loss has accrued to plaintiff.

The question is not free from doubt, and the decisions from various jurisdictions lending light upon the subject seem to be in considerable discord.

Upon careful analysis of the facts, however, I am of the opinion that plaintiff has incurred a loss for which it has ntf recourse against the National Bank of Detroit.

The cheek in question was a duly authorized one so far as the signature of the plaintiff is concerned. It was in the custody of the plaintiff’s employees. The only thing essential to its payment was the delivery to the proper depositor. Some one or more of the employees of plaintiff fraudulently and as a breach of trust procured the issuance of this cheek to a third person or to himself, signed the name of the payee in two places, and traced the signature of the supposedly verifying teller. The National Bank of Detroit had no signature card of the payee. It had presented to it a check regularly issued by plaintiff and apparently verified by the teller. In this situation it seems to me that, where two innocent persons must suffer, it must be the one who made possible the loss. The National Bank of Detroit could have done nothing to prevent the perpetration of the fraud; that perpetration came solely out of the fact that the plaintiff had put it within the power' of his employees to commit the fraud. I cannot conceive how in this situation the plaintiff would have any right of recovery against the National Bank of Detroit.

Plaintiff contends that section 17 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of Michigan (Comp. Laws Mich. 1929, § 9264), as follows : “Where an incomplete instrument has not been delivered it will not, if completed and negotiated, without authority, be a valid contract in the hands of any holder, as against any person whose signature was placed thereon before delivery,” invalidates the check in question. But I have been unable to discover in any of' the precedents any line of reasoning which would warrant this conclusion.

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Bluebook (online)
7 F. Supp. 205, 1934 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1592, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-v-standard-accident-ins-co-mied-1934.