Thomas v. Shoe Machinery Manuf'g Co.

23 F. Cas. 971, 3 Ban. & A. 557, 1878 U.S. App. LEXIS 2090

This text of 23 F. Cas. 971 (Thomas v. Shoe Machinery Manuf'g Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Thomas v. Shoe Machinery Manuf'g Co., 23 F. Cas. 971, 3 Ban. & A. 557, 1878 U.S. App. LEXIS 2090 (circtdma 1878).

Opinion

CLIFFORD, Circuit Justice.

Reissued patents are presumed to be for the same invention as the original, and will only be adjudged to be void, because for a different invention, where it clearly appears that the reissue contains some new feature of a material character not described, suggested nor substantially indicated in the specification, drawings or patent office model.

Improvements in sewing-machines were made by Albert F. Johnson, for which letters patent were granted him in due form. Those improvements relate to an improved mechanism for the operation of the awl and needle in such a machine, and conbist in the employment of a driving-shaft below the supporting-plate for the operation of the needle, and a shaft above the plate for the. operation of the awl, the two shafts being connected by means of suitable intermediate mechanism. Rocking levers, it seems, were formerly used, and the patentee states that the shaft is much better than the old device, as the whole strain on the awl, when piercing the material, is conducted to the goose-neck of the machine, instead of the awl, which is sufficiently strong to prevent its breaking or bending when the awl enters the material. Experience showed that the specification was in some respects defective, in consequence of which the patent was surrendered and reissued in the form described in the bill of complaint.

Service was made, and the respondents appeared and filed an answer setting up the defences following: (1) That the original patent is still in force, and that one of the respondents is an owner of an undivided share of the original patent, and has the right and liberty of making, using and vending the invention. (2) That the reissued patent is not for the same invention as the original patent. (3) That the invention is not new or useful, nor has it been of any advantage to the complainants or the public. (4) That the machine described in the reissued patent is not new, and had been previously described in the several patents mentioned in the second amendment to the answer. (5) That they have not made, used or vended the invention described and secured in the reissued patent, nor in any way violated the rights of the complainants, or deprived them of any gains and profits.

1. Authority to accept the surrender of an original patent and to grant a reissue is conferred upon the commissioner, and, in a case arising under the patent law then in force, the supreme court, more than thirty years ago, decided that where an act was to be done or a patent granted upon proofs to be had before a public officer upon which he was to decide, the fact that such officer had done the act or granted the patent was prima facie evidence that the proofs had been regularly made and that they-were satisfactory, even though the patent did not contain any recitals that the prerequisites to the grant had been fulfilled; and such continued to be the rule until the question came up under a later act. when the supreme court held that the granting of a reissued patent closed all inquiry into the existence of inadvertence, accident or mistake, and left open only the question of fraud for the jury. Railroad Co. v. Stimpson, 14 Pet. [39 U. S.] 458; Stimpson v. Railroad Co.. 4 How. [45 U. S.] 384. Since that time it [972]*972has been definitely settled, that neither reissued nor extended patents can be abrogated by an infringer, in a suit against him for damages or profits, upon the ground that the letters patent were procured by fraud in prosecuting the application for the same before the commissioner. Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. [76 U. S.] 797. Where the commissioner accepts a surrender of an original patent and grants a new patent, his decision in the premises, in a suit for infringement, is final and decisive, and is not re-examinable in such a suit in the circuit court, unless it is apparent upon the face of the patent that he has exceeded his authority, and that there is such a repugnancy between the old and the new patents, that it must be held as matter of legal construction that the new patent is not for the same invention as that embraced and secured in the original. Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. [78 U. S.] 543. Both the original and the reissued patents were granted in the name of the same patentee, and it is settled law that the suit in such a case must be brought, in the name of the patentee or his assignee. Goodyear v. Rubber Co. [Case No. 5,583]. Suppose the rule was otherwise, still it is clear, from the evidence in the case, that the legal title to the invention was in the patentee, both at the date of the original and of the reissued patent; but, in view of the circumstances, it is not deemed necessary to reproduce the details of the evidence.

2.Power to accept the surrender of an original patent and to grant a new one in its place is conferred upon the commissioner, but the act of congress giving that power expressly requires that the reissued patent must be for the same invention as the original. Patents may be surrendered to be corrected, and the power to surrender implies that the specification may be corrected to the extent necessary to cure the defects, and to supply the deficiencies, to render the patent operative and valid; but the patentee may not interpolate new features not described, suggested or substantially indicated either in the specification, drawings or patent office model. Interpolations of the kind, if material, show that the commissioner exceeded his jurisdiction, and, where that is done, it cleaily becomes the duty of the court to declare the patent void. Courts of justice will avoid such a conclusion, if they can reasonably do so by a proper application of the maxim that patents are to receive a liberal construction, and, if practicable, be so interpreted as to uphold and not destroy the right of the inventor. Turrill v. Railroad Co., 1 Wall. [68 U. S.] 491; Ames v. Howard [Case No. 326]; Blanchard v. Sprague [Id. 1,517]; Milligan & Higgins Glue Co. v. Upton [Id. 9,607]. Slight changes will not sustain such a defence, nor will the court in any case declare the patent void on that account. if. by the true construction of the two instruments, the invention secured by the two instruments is not substantially different from that embodied in the original patent. Inquiries in such a case are restricted to a comparison of the terms and import of the two patents in view of the drawings and patent office model. If from these it results that the invention claimed in the reissue is not substantially different from the one described, suggested or indicated in the specification or drawings of the original patent or patent office model, the reissued patent must be held valid, as all other alterations and amendments plainly fall within the intent and purpose of the provision in the act of congress which allows a surrender and reissue; or, in other words, if the reissued patent does not, upon the face of the instrument, embrace anything not substantially described, suggested or indicated in the specifications, drawings or model of the original, the defence that the reissued patent is not for the same invention as the original must be overruled. Apply that rule to the case under consideration, and the court is of the opinion that the second de-fence is not sustained. Alterations and new explanations are made in the si>eeification, but they are not of a nature to change the character of the original invention when tested by that rule.

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23 F. Cas. 971, 3 Ban. & A. 557, 1878 U.S. App. LEXIS 2090, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-v-shoe-machinery-manufg-co-circtdma-1878.