Thomas v. Riverside County Dept. of Child Support Services CA4/2

CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 11, 2023
DocketE076372
StatusUnpublished

This text of Thomas v. Riverside County Dept. of Child Support Services CA4/2 (Thomas v. Riverside County Dept. of Child Support Services CA4/2) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thomas v. Riverside County Dept. of Child Support Services CA4/2, (Cal. Ct. App. 2023).

Opinion

Filed 5/11/23 Thomas v. Riverside County Dept. of Child Support Services CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

DENISE THOMAS,

Plaintiff and Appellant, E076372

v. (Super. Ct. No. CSIN1900260)

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OPINION OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES,

Plaintiff;

GARY EVERETT THOMAS,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Kristi Hester, Judge.

Affirmed.

Law Offices of Ernest Calhoon and Ernest Calhoon, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.

No appearance for Plaintiff.

1 I.

INTRODUCTION

Denise Thomas appeals from the family court’s Order After Hearing (the OAH) 1 denying her ex-husband’s request to reduce his child support. Denise contends the

family court erroneously ended the case by issuing the OAH without ruling on her

various discovery requests or her request to increase her ex-husband’s child support. We

affirm.

II. 2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Denise and her ex-husband, Gary, have a young child. In 2017, Gary was ordered

to provide child support to Denise. In 2019, the Riverside County Department of Social

Services (the Department), on Gary’s behalf, initiated this case by moving to lower his

monthly child support payment to Denise due a change in the parties’ financial

circumstances. Denise opposed the request on several grounds, including that Gary’s

earning capacity had not changed, he had not paid previously ordered child support

payments, and he had not complied with Denise’s various discovery requests. Denise

also requested that Gary’s child support obligations be reconsidered and additional

1 Because the parties share the same last name, we refer to them by their first names. We mean no disrespect. 2 We provide only a brief overview of the facts and procedural history given our resolution of the merits below.

2 discovery ordered to determine his income. Around the same time, Denise subpoenaed

Gary to produce discovery.

The Department’s motion was set to be heard on December 12, 2019. At the

hearing, however, Denise’s attorney, Ernest Calhoon, requested and was granted a

continuance until March 2020. The hearing was continued several times until October

15, 2020, due to the superior court’s closure caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

In March 2020, Denise filed a motion to compel discovery from Gary. But

because the superior court was closed, the motion was not docketed and the hearing on it

was not scheduled.

A day before the October 15, 2020 hearing, Denise filed a request that the family

court hear her motion to compel. At the hearing, the family court denied the

Department’s motion to modify Gary’s child support. In a written order after the hearing,

the family court stated it denied the motion because it did “not have sufficient

information to grant a modification at this time.” Denise timely appealed from this order.

III.

DISCUSSION

Denise contends the family court erred during the December 12, 2019 and October

15, 2020 hearings by failing to enforce her subpoenas, failing to hear her motion to

compel, declining to order discovery or receive testimony to determine whether Gary’s

earning capacity had changed, and failing to rule on her request to increase Gary’s child

support.

3 We first must ensure we have jurisdiction. (See Harrington-Wisely v. State of

California (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1494, 1498.) The Department’s motion on

Gary’s behalf formed the basis for this action, and Denise argues the OAH denying the

motion “end[ed] the case improperly.” Given “the conclusive nature of the [OAH], we

construe it to be a final and appealable judgment.” (Laws v. County of San Diego (1990)

219 Cal.App.3d 189, 196, fn. 8.)

But that does not mean Denise has standing to appeal the OAH, which is another

jurisdictional prerequisite we must consider on our own. (Conservatorship of Gregory D.

(2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 62, 67.) Only an “aggrieved party” has standing to appeal an

appealable order or judgment. (El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources

Control Bd. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 937, 977.) Although the family court denied the

Department’s motion in Denise’s favor by declining to reduce Gary’s child support

obligations, the court did so without ruling on her request that his obligations be revisited

with additional discovery and that his payments be increased. Denise was therefore

aggrieved by the OAH because it ended the case without resolving her outstanding

request to increase Gary’s child support payments.

In any event, we lack a sufficient record to review Denise’s arguments. As Denise

notes, there is no reporter’s transcript from the December 12, 2019 and October 15, 2020

hearings, because the court reporter no longer works for the superior court, she did not

make a transcript of the hearings, and her notes from the hearings were unintelligible.

The minute order from the December 12 hearing states only that “[i]ssues” were

4 discussed and argued by both sides and that Calhoon requested and was granted a

continuance. There is no indication that Calhoon raised issues about the subpoenas, and

Denise had not yet filed her motion to compel. In other words, we cannot tell from the

record what transpired at the hearing. We therefore cannot and do not find any reversible

error occurred at the December 12 hearing. (Estrada v. Ramirez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th

618, 620, fn. 1 [appellant’s failure to provide adequate record “precludes an adequate

review and results in affirmance of the trial court’s determination”]; Ballard v. Uribe

(1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574 [“a party challenging a judgment has the burden of showing

reversible error by an adequate record”].)

We reach the same conclusion as to the October 15, 2020 hearing for the same

reason. There is no reporter’s transcript from the hearing. The minute order states that

“[i]ssues” were discussed with the family court, the parties presented argument, the court

denied the Department’s motion to modify Gary’s child support, and the family court

directed the Department to prepare an order. The family court then issued the OAH

stating that it denied the Department’s motion because it did “not have sufficient

information.” We cannot tell from the minute order or the OAH whether Denise raised

her discovery concerns or request for Gary’s child support payments to be increased. Nor

can we tell whether the family court properly denied her requests or simply refused to

consider them, as she asserts on appeal. In short, the record is inadequate for us to

determine whether the family court erred for the reasons Denise asserts. We therefore

must affirm.

5 We affirm for the additional reason that Denise has failed to meet her burden of 3 showing reversible error in her opening brief. (Bianco v. California Highway Patrol

(1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1125 [appellant must affirmatively show prejudicial error

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