Thomas v. Perales

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Thomas v. Perales

202 A.D.2d 322, 609 N.Y.S.2d 786

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 22, 1994

StatusPublished

This text of 202 A.D.2d 322 (Thomas v. Perales) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Thomas v. Perales, 202 A.D.2d 322, 609 N.Y.S.2d 786 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1994).

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Opinion

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Edith Miller, J.), entered August 14, 1992, granting, upon reargument, petitioner’s application for attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,250 as against the State respondent, and denying the respondents’ cross-motion to vacate their default and dismiss the petition, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

While the State respondent may have had a reasonable excuse for defaulting on the motion, its actions evidenced an intent not to have the controversy decided on the merits since it did not seek relief from the default until petitioner sought attorney’s fees on reargument. (See, Matter of Glenbriar Co. v New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 93 AD2d 510, 513.) The imposition of attorney’s fees was proper where petitioner challenged the State respondent’s determination which only granted her a new appointment to reapply for food stamps although she contested the initial denial as improper (CPLR 8601). Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Wallach, Ross, Asch and Tom, JJ.

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—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Edith Miller, J.), entered August 14, 1992, granting, upon reargument, petitioner’s application for attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,250 as against the State respondent, and denying the respondents’ cross-motion to vacate their default and dismiss the petition, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

While the State respondent may have had a reasonable excuse for defaulting on the motion, its actions evidenced an intent not to have the controversy decided on the merits since it did not seek relief from the default until petitioner sought attorney’s fees on reargument. (See, Matter of Glenbriar Co. v New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 93 AD2d 510, 513.) The imposition of attorney’s fees was proper where petitioner challenged the State respondent’s determination which only granted her a new appointment to reapply for food stamps although she contested the initial denial as improper (CPLR 8601). Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Wallach, Ross, Asch and Tom, JJ.

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202 A.D.2d 322, 609 N.Y.S.2d 786, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-v-perales-nyappdiv-1994.

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