Thomas v. Patterson

61 Colo. 547
CourtSupreme Court of Colorado
DecidedApril 15, 1916
DocketNo. 8407
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 61 Colo. 547 (Thomas v. Patterson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thomas v. Patterson, 61 Colo. 547 (Colo. 1916).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Hill

delivered the opinion of the court.

An action was brought by the plaintiff in error, Thomas, against Patterson as County Treasurer of Weld county and ex officio treasurer of The Henrylyn Irrigation District, the object of which was to compel Patterson, as treasurer of the district, to pay certain interest coupons clipped’from a first issue of bonds of the district, held by Thomas. Within a short time thereafter, the defendant in error DeKemer com[548]*548menced a similar action against the treasurer, to compel the payment of certain interest coupons of the district, which she held, clipped from a second issue of bonds issued by the district. The plaintiff in error, Bancroft, intervened in the Thomas suit, to eompel the treasurer to pay interest coupons of the first issue held by him. The cases were consolidated for trial. Judgment was in favor of DeRemer, from which Thomas and Bancroft prosecute this writ of error. 1

The record discloses, that The Henrylyn Irrigation District was organized under our Irrigation District Act of 1905; that on September the 1st, 1908, the district authorized an issue of bonds; that bonds' of the face value of $99,000.00 of this issue were sold, and the remainder can-celled; that on February 1, 1910, a second issue of bonds was authorized by the district, of which a large number were sold; that the coupons held by Thomas and Bancroft were" attached to the first issue, and those held by DeRemer, to the second; that all of these coupons were due and payable June 1, 1914; that in December 1913, the Board of County Commissioners of Weld county, by resolution, levied a tax which the resolution states was “to raise the amount of money required to pay the interest which may become due during the year 1914 on the bonds of the said district”; that this was the only levy made for that purpose for the year 1914; that when the County Treasurer opened his office the morning of June 1, 1914, representatives of all three of the owners of the coupons involved were at the door and, when opened, entered the treasurer’s office, and presented to the treasurer, practically simultaneously, these coupons for payment; that the treasurer recognized the representatives of the owners of the coupons in the following order, De Remer first, Thomas second, and Bancroft third; that he refused to pay any, because of a temporary restraining order which had been issued in the Thomas suit; that the [549]*549coupons presented aggregated as follows: DeRemer, $1,080.00, Thomas, $765.00 and Bancroft $1,230.00; that the total amount in cash in the hands of the treasurer June 1, 1914, received from the tax levy to pay interest maturing on bonds in 1914 was $509.89 ; that the total levy to pay interest, if paid in cash, would raise the sum of $26,760.00; that the amount of interest which became due during the year 1914 upon the first issue was $5,940.00 and upon the second issue about $210,000.00.

The plaintiffs in error contend that being the holders of coupons clipped from the first issue, they are entitled to have all the interest money applied to the payment of their coupons, before the holders of coupons clipped from the second issue are entitled to receive any. Their reason for this is the proviso contained in section 15 of the 1905 act which reads:

“Provided, further, That when the money provided by any previous issue of bonds has become exhausted by expenditures herein authorized therefor, and it becomes necessary to raise additional money for such purposes, additional bonds may be issued submitting the question at special election to the qualified voters of said district, otherwise complying with the provisions of this section in respect to an original issue of such bonds; Provided, also, the lien for taxes, for the payment of the interest and principal of any bond issue, shall be a prior lien to that of any subsequent bond issue.”

In order to ascertain what was intended by this proviso, it is proper to consider its history. Our first Irrigation District Act was adopted in 1901; it was taken in part from the so-called Wright law of California and .the Nebraska act, but a part of it is different from either. It provides for the formation of irrigation districts for the purpose of acquiring by purchase, construction or otherwise, canals and reservoirs, etc., for the irrigation of lands therein. These [550]*550districts were to be managed by a board of directors to be elected by the people. Under certain conditions, for certain purposes, it authorized the issuance and sale of bonds, but the first act only authorized one issue, and although insufficient for the purposes intended, there was no authority for any further issue. Section 13 was amended in 1903 to provide for a second issue, by submitting it to a vote at a special election, and otherwise complying with the provisions of the act, the same as required for a first issue. The proviso concerning the prior lien of the first issue was for the first time inserted in this amendment. In 1905, the act under consideration was adopted.- It repealed both the 1901 and the 1903 acts, but section 15 thereof included a similar provision for a second issue, and likewise contained the same clause that was in section 13 of the 1903 amendment concerning liens. From a careful study of the entire act, in connection with its history, and the proviso which gives a prior lien for taxes to the first issue, we are of opinion that it was intended that there should be separate levies made with which to pay the interest and principal of each issue of bonds, otherwise the language is not susceptible of enforcement by any practical method that has been pointed out or that we can think of. -

It will be observed, which is material, that this proviso reads “the lien for taxes” not “the lien on taxes” as counsel would seek to have it applied. In Vol. 37 Cyc., at page 1138, it is said:

“Tax lien is statutory. A tax levied and assessed upon specific property is not a lien on that or any other property of the owner unless expressly made so by statute, and an intention to this effect must be clearly manifested in the statute, as the lien will neither be created by implication nor enlarged by construction.”

This appears to be the general rule, with the exception that when, considered as a whole, there are statutes that [551]*551call for a construction which creates a lien by necessary implication without express language to that effect. Sections 17 and 22- of this act have this effect, but in order to recognize a prior lien there must be authority for a levy to become such a lien. This act recognizes this by, in substance, providing that so far as a second issue of bonds is concerned the same procedure, must' be gone through as is provided for the first issue. This means everything concerning them.

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Bluebook (online)
61 Colo. 547, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-v-patterson-colo-1916.