23-753 Thomas v. Mason et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 23rd day of December, two thousand twenty-four.
PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., MICHAEL H. PARK, ALISON J. NATHAN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________
Adrian Thomas,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 23-753
Adam R. Mason, Ronald Fountain, and Tim Colaneri,
Defendants-Appellees. * _____________________________________
* The Clerk’s office is directed to amend the caption as reflected above. FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: MAX RODRIGUEZ, Pollock Cohen LLP, New York, NY (Brett H. Klein, Brett H. Klein, Esq. PLLC, New York, NY, on the brief).
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: RHIANNON I. GIFFORD, Pattison, Sampson, Ginsberg & Griffin, PLLC, Troy, NY.
Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York (Stewart, M.J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff Adrian Thomas filed a complaint against Adam R. Mason, Ronald
Fountain, Tim Colaneri, Michael Sikirica, Rensselaer County, and the City of Troy,
bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious prosecution, denial of the
right to a fair trial, failure to intervene, and conspiracy related to the malicious
prosecution and fair trial claims. The district court granted in part and denied in
2 part motions to dismiss by the defendants. The remaining claims were for
malicious prosecution, denial of a fair trial, and conspiracy. The individual
defendants moved for summary judgment on Thomas’s remaining claims. The
district court granted summary judgment on the merits of the conspiracy claim
and granted qualified immunity on the malicious prosecution and fair trial claims.
Thomas now appeals. 1 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying
facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Whelan, 732 F.3d 151, 154-55 (2d
Cir. 2013). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Thyroff v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins., 460 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 2006).
Thomas argues that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on
the malicious prosecution and fair trial claims. Officers are entitled to qualified
immunity “if either (a) the defendant’s action did not violate clearly established
law, or (b) it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that his action
1 Thomas “does not pursue relief as to Sikirica in this appeal.” Appellant’s Br. at 2, n.1. As such, we dismiss Defendant Sikirica from the appeal.
3 did not violate such law.” Anderson v. Recore, 317 F.3d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 2003).
“Summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is not appropriate when
there are facts in dispute that are material to a determination of reasonableness.”
Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 1999).
In the context of a malicious prosecution claim, “an officer is entitled to
qualified immunity if he had either probable cause or ‘arguable probable cause.’”
Dufort v. City of New York, 874 F.3d 338, 354 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Martinez v.
Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2000)). “Arguable probable cause exists if
officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause
test was met.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Even if a dispute of fact exists as
to whether an officer acted in bad faith or with malice, an officer is entitled to
qualified immunity if there is arguable probable cause. See Escalara v. Lunn, 361
F.3d 737, 744 (2d Cir. 2004) (“If there remains an objective basis to support arguable
probable cause, remaining factual disputes are not material to the issue of qualified
immunity and summary judgment should be granted to the defendant on the basis
of qualified immunity.”).
As to Thomas’s malicious prosecution claim, we affirm on an alternate basis
4 supported by the record. Even if we set aside the allegedly coerced confession
obtained during Thomas’s second interrogation after the break, there was
arguable probable cause here because it was either (1) “objectively reasonable for
the officer[s] to believe that probable cause existed” or (2) “officers of reasonable
competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.”
Escalera, 361 F.3d at 743 (internal quotation marks omitted). The following “facts
and circumstances,” described by defendant Ronald Fountain in the search
warrant application he prepared on September 22, 2008 (which represent what the
defendants knew or thought they knew prior to the second interrogation) “would
lead a reasonably prudent person to believe the plaintiff guilty,” Boyd v. City of
New York, 336 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2003): (1) The examinations at Albany Medical
Center indicated that M.T. had suffered a bilateral subdural hematoma to the
brain, had brain swelling, had both new and old blood on the brain, and was
completely brain dead; (2) Dr. Walter Edge described M.T.’s injuries as those
typical of a high-impact injury possibly caused by shaking or severe acceleration
and deceleration onto a hard object; (3) Thomas stated in his initial interview
before the break (before the purported fabrications) that M.T.’s injury had
5 probably occurred in his care and that M.T. had smacked his head on the crib about
ten days before, which could possibly have caused the injury; and (4) M.T.’s older
sibling said in an interview that she witnessed Thomas throwing M.T. into the crib
and saw M.T. go limp, and that Thomas had repeatedly beaten the older sibling.
For similar reasons, the district court correctly determined that Defendants
were entitled to qualified immunity on Thomas’s fair trial claim, which alleges that
Defendants fabricated evidence. Specifically, Thomas argues that Defendants
fabricated his confession by coercing him into agreeing to a version of events that
they pushed on him during his second interrogation. But it was objectively
reasonable for Defendants to conclude, based on the undisputed evidence of what
Defendants were told prior to the second interrogation, that their “working
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23-753 Thomas v. Mason et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 23rd day of December, two thousand twenty-four.
PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., MICHAEL H. PARK, ALISON J. NATHAN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________
Adrian Thomas,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 23-753
Adam R. Mason, Ronald Fountain, and Tim Colaneri,
Defendants-Appellees. * _____________________________________
* The Clerk’s office is directed to amend the caption as reflected above. FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: MAX RODRIGUEZ, Pollock Cohen LLP, New York, NY (Brett H. Klein, Brett H. Klein, Esq. PLLC, New York, NY, on the brief).
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: RHIANNON I. GIFFORD, Pattison, Sampson, Ginsberg & Griffin, PLLC, Troy, NY.
Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York (Stewart, M.J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff Adrian Thomas filed a complaint against Adam R. Mason, Ronald
Fountain, Tim Colaneri, Michael Sikirica, Rensselaer County, and the City of Troy,
bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious prosecution, denial of the
right to a fair trial, failure to intervene, and conspiracy related to the malicious
prosecution and fair trial claims. The district court granted in part and denied in
2 part motions to dismiss by the defendants. The remaining claims were for
malicious prosecution, denial of a fair trial, and conspiracy. The individual
defendants moved for summary judgment on Thomas’s remaining claims. The
district court granted summary judgment on the merits of the conspiracy claim
and granted qualified immunity on the malicious prosecution and fair trial claims.
Thomas now appeals. 1 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying
facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Whelan, 732 F.3d 151, 154-55 (2d
Cir. 2013). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Thyroff v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins., 460 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 2006).
Thomas argues that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on
the malicious prosecution and fair trial claims. Officers are entitled to qualified
immunity “if either (a) the defendant’s action did not violate clearly established
law, or (b) it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that his action
1 Thomas “does not pursue relief as to Sikirica in this appeal.” Appellant’s Br. at 2, n.1. As such, we dismiss Defendant Sikirica from the appeal.
3 did not violate such law.” Anderson v. Recore, 317 F.3d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 2003).
“Summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is not appropriate when
there are facts in dispute that are material to a determination of reasonableness.”
Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 1999).
In the context of a malicious prosecution claim, “an officer is entitled to
qualified immunity if he had either probable cause or ‘arguable probable cause.’”
Dufort v. City of New York, 874 F.3d 338, 354 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Martinez v.
Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2000)). “Arguable probable cause exists if
officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause
test was met.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Even if a dispute of fact exists as
to whether an officer acted in bad faith or with malice, an officer is entitled to
qualified immunity if there is arguable probable cause. See Escalara v. Lunn, 361
F.3d 737, 744 (2d Cir. 2004) (“If there remains an objective basis to support arguable
probable cause, remaining factual disputes are not material to the issue of qualified
immunity and summary judgment should be granted to the defendant on the basis
of qualified immunity.”).
As to Thomas’s malicious prosecution claim, we affirm on an alternate basis
4 supported by the record. Even if we set aside the allegedly coerced confession
obtained during Thomas’s second interrogation after the break, there was
arguable probable cause here because it was either (1) “objectively reasonable for
the officer[s] to believe that probable cause existed” or (2) “officers of reasonable
competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.”
Escalera, 361 F.3d at 743 (internal quotation marks omitted). The following “facts
and circumstances,” described by defendant Ronald Fountain in the search
warrant application he prepared on September 22, 2008 (which represent what the
defendants knew or thought they knew prior to the second interrogation) “would
lead a reasonably prudent person to believe the plaintiff guilty,” Boyd v. City of
New York, 336 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2003): (1) The examinations at Albany Medical
Center indicated that M.T. had suffered a bilateral subdural hematoma to the
brain, had brain swelling, had both new and old blood on the brain, and was
completely brain dead; (2) Dr. Walter Edge described M.T.’s injuries as those
typical of a high-impact injury possibly caused by shaking or severe acceleration
and deceleration onto a hard object; (3) Thomas stated in his initial interview
before the break (before the purported fabrications) that M.T.’s injury had
5 probably occurred in his care and that M.T. had smacked his head on the crib about
ten days before, which could possibly have caused the injury; and (4) M.T.’s older
sibling said in an interview that she witnessed Thomas throwing M.T. into the crib
and saw M.T. go limp, and that Thomas had repeatedly beaten the older sibling.
For similar reasons, the district court correctly determined that Defendants
were entitled to qualified immunity on Thomas’s fair trial claim, which alleges that
Defendants fabricated evidence. Specifically, Thomas argues that Defendants
fabricated his confession by coercing him into agreeing to a version of events that
they pushed on him during his second interrogation. But it was objectively
reasonable for Defendants to conclude, based on the undisputed evidence of what
Defendants were told prior to the second interrogation, that their “working
theory” was “accurate and not a fabrication.” SPA at 68. Thomas’s spouse told
Defendants that Thomas had “anger issues when dealing with the kids,” App’x
44, and both Thomas’s spouse and M.T.’s older sibling said that Thomas
previously beat the older child. M.T.’s older sibling said that she saw Thomas
throw M.T. onto a bed. Treating physicians told Defendants that M.T.’s bilateral
subdural hematomas and apparent skull fracture were trauma injuries typically
6 caused by high-speed impact or by slamming very hard into a hard object. We
therefore agree with the district court that reasonable law enforcement officers
would not have thought that the version of events Defendants’ pursued during
the second interrogation was a pure fabrication in light of the information
available to Defendants at the time of the second interrogation.
Thomas points to no questions of fact that would be material to the objective
reasonableness analysis. We thus affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for Defendants on the malicious prosecution and fair trial claims based
on qualified immunity. It follows that summary judgment was appropriate as to
Thomas’s conspiracy claim, which depends on the other claims. See Droz v.
McCadden, 580 F.3d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Because neither of the underlying
section 1983 causes of action can be established, the claim for conspiracy also
fails.”).
We have considered all of Thomas’s remaining arguments and find them to
be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court