Thomas v. Marshall

169 S.W. 615, 160 Ky. 168, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 420
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedOctober 8, 1914
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 169 S.W. 615 (Thomas v. Marshall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thomas v. Marshall, 169 S.W. 615, 160 Ky. 168, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 420 (Ky. Ct. App. 1914).

Opinion

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Carroll

Reversing.

The appellant Thomas and the appellee Marshall were contending candidates for the office of County Clerk of Green County at the November election, 1913, Thomas being the Republican candidate and Marshall the Democratic candidate.

The return of the election as certified to by the election officers showed that all of the Republican candidates for county offices had been elected and that Thomas had received a majority of thirty-one votes over Marshall. Accordingly all the Republican candidates, including Thomas, were given certificates of election by the election commissioners.

Within the time prescribed by law Marshall filed his petition in the Green Circuit Court asking for a recount of the vote in North Greensburg precinct upon the ground that the officers of election in that precinct had made a mistake in certifying the vote received by him and the vote received by Thomas in that precinct. He averred that the returns of the officers of election showed that Thomas had received 152 votes and Marshall 139 votes, when in fact he had received in that precinct 159 votes and Thomas 132 votes, as the ballots, if recounted, would show.

After the issues had been made up, depositions were taken by both parties, and on a trial of the ease before the circuit court, oral evidence introduced by both parties and preserved in the form of a bill of exceptions, was heard by the court, and upon the conclusion of the evi[170]*170dence, the court, over the objection of counsel for Thomas, recounted the ballots. According to this recount, Marshall had received in this precinct 159 votes,' the number of votes he averred in his petition had been cast for him, and Thomas had received 132 votes. This recount changed the Republican majority of 13 in this precinct into a Democratic majority of 27, and resulted in the election of Marshall by a majority of 9 votes.

From the judgment of the circuit court holding that Marshall had been elected and was entitled to the certificate of election, Thomas prosecutes this appeal.

The only question in the case is, should the court have recounted the ballots? The solution of this question depends on how the ballots and box in this precinct were preserved between the time of their return to the county clerk by the election officers and the time when the box was opened and the ballots recounted by the court.

There is no difficulty about the law applicable to this case. The rule announced in Edwards v. Logan, 114 Ky., 312, which was adopted with elaboration from Bailey v. Hurst, 113 Ky., 699, had been adhered to in a number of cases. In that case it was thus stated:

“The rule may be stated to be that, where the ballots are preserved so that their identity is assured, they can be counted during a contest; and they are undoubtedly better evidence of the vote cast than the returns, and should prevail where there is a difference. But before a recount of the ballots should be allowed to rebut the presumption of the correctness of the official returns, it should be proved satisfactorily that the ballots had not been tampered with since the election, and that those offered in evidence are the identical ones cast.

* * * Every consideration of public policy, as well as the ordinary rules of evidence, require that the party offering this evidence should establish the fact that the ballots are genuine. It is not sufficient that the mere probability of security is proved, but the fact must be shown with a reasonable degree of certainty. If the boxes have been rigorously preserved, the ballots are the best and highest evidence, but, if not, they are not only the weakest, but the most dangerous evidence.”

After citing a number of authorities, the court further said: “From these authorities this court holds: That the ballots cast in an election are the primary and best evidence of the voters ’ will as expressed therein, and that in case of a contest, as between the certificates of [171]*171the officers of election and the ballots, the ballots are the best evidence, but that this is conditioned strictly upon the fact that the integrity of the ballots is clearly established; otherwise the certificate of the officers of election should prevail. That when the ballots are produced from the custody of the officer, whose duty it is to preserve them, are shown to have been preserved from inter-meddling from unauthorized persons, and are apparently unchanged, they will be received as evidence of what they may show upon their face; but where they may have apparently been tampered with, or where opportunities have been afforded to unauthorized persons, or to persons interested to tamper with them, then the burden is upon the party producing and relying upon such ballots to establish their integrity clearly and satisfactorily by the evidence.” Hamilton v. Young, 26 Ky. L. R., 447; Galloway v. Bradburn, 119 Ky., 49; Scholl v. Bell, 125 Ky., 750; Browning v. Lovett, 139 Ky., 480; Baker v. Dinsmore, 138 Ky., 277; Powell v. Horn, 159 Ky., 532; Snowden v. Flanery, 159 Ky., 568; McEuen v. Carey, 123 Ky., 536.

The law being thus so well settled, it only remains to determine whether the difference between the number of votes certified by the election officers to have been cast for Marshall and Thomas and the number of votes found on a recount of the ballots by the court to have been east for them, was the result of a mistake on the part of the election officers or the result of the ballots being tampered with between the time of their delivery to the county clerk by the election officers and the time when they were recounted by the court.

It might be here observed as worthy of notice that the recount by the court of the ballots in all the races in this precinct showed that in the other contested races for county officers, and there were several of them, the election officers had not made any material mistake in certifying correctly the number of votes cast for each candidate as shown by the ballots. But in this particular race the recount showed, as we have stated, that Marshall had received 159 votes when the election officers only gave him 139, and that Thomas had received only 132 votes when the returns of the election officers showed that he had received 152 votes. Or, in other words, the recount showed that the election officers, returned that Marshall had received 20 votes less than the recount [172]*172showed and that Thomas had received 20 votes more than the recount showed. This discrepancy in the return of the election officers and the recount, confined as it is to one race, is so great as to create at once the suspicion that the error if made in the return of the election officers in this race, was the result of design rather than mistake, or that the ballots were tampered with between the election and the recount.

Of course, election officers often make mistakes. All honest men are liable to make mistakes, and it would not at all follow that the election officers were dishonest because a recount of the ballots showed that they had made a mistake in certifying the vote. But this presumption of honesty cannot well be indulged in when the mistake is confined to a single race and is so large as the one here appearing.

It therefore becomes important to inquire what character of men these election officers, including challengers and inspectors, were; how they discharged their duties and what influences, if any, were operating to produce a mistake like this.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
169 S.W. 615, 160 Ky. 168, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 420, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-v-marshall-kyctapp-1914.