25CA0203 Thomas v ICAO 12-04-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0203 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 31871-2024
Immanuel Thomas,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado,
Respondent.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division A Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN* Román, C.J., and Bernard*, J., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 4, 2025
Immanuel Thomas, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondent
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 Immanuel Thomas appeals the denial of his claim for
unemployment compensation benefits. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Thomas worked as a concrete installer for approximately five
months before Thrasher, Inc. (Employer) terminated his
employment. Shortly thereafter, a deputy for the Division of
Unemployment Insurance (Division) denied Thomas’s claim for
unemployment compensation benefits. Thomas appealed that
decision, and the Division scheduled the matter for an evidentiary
hearing regarding the reasons for Thomas’s job separation.
¶3 Upon reviewing the evidence, the hearing officer found that
Employer terminated Thomas “because he failed to report to work”
and did not notify Employer of his absence. As a result, the hearing
officer found, Thomas “failed to meet the established job standard of
calling out if he was not going to report to work.” Thus, Thomas
was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation
benefits under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX), C.R.S. 2025
(disqualifying claimants terminated for failure to meet “established
job performance or other defined standards”). Finally, the hearing
officer found that Thomas was “responsible” for his termination and
1 was thus not otherwise entitled to benefits. Thomas appealed to
the Panel, which affirmed the hearing officer’s decision.
II. Discussion
¶4 Thomas argues that the Panel erred in affirming the hearing
officer’s decision because (1) insufficient evidence supports the
hearing officer’s factual findings; (2) the hearing officer erred in
determining the cause of Thomas’s job separation; (3) the hearing
officer mischaracterized Thomas’s reason for missing work; and (4)
the hearing officer did not consider circumstances mitigating
Thomas’s unexcused work absence. We consider, and reject, each
of his arguments in turn.
A. Standard of Review and Legal Principles
¶5 Under section 8-74-107, C.R.S. 2025, we may not disturb
factual findings “supported by substantial evidence” and may only
set aside the Panel’s decision if (1) the Panel acted without or in
excess of its powers; (2) the decision was procured by fraud; (3) the
factual findings don’t support its decision; or (4) the decision is
erroneous as a matter of law. Substantial evidence is “probative,
credible, and competent, of a character which would warrant a
reasonable belief in the existence of facts supporting a particular
2 finding.” Rathburn v. Indus. Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App.
1977).
¶6 Section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX) disqualifies a claimant from
receiving benefits if his “failure to meet established job performance
or other defined standards” caused his job separation. To evaluate
cause, the hearing officer considers the totality of the evidence and
determines the motivating factors in the employee’s separation.
Eckart v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 775 P.2d 97, 99 (Colo. App.
1989). “All that is required to establish a disqualification pursuant
to § 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX) is that claimant did not do the job for which
he was hired and which he knew was expected of him.” Pabst v.
Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 833 P.2d 64, 64-65 (Colo. App. 1992).
¶7 The disqualifying provisions of section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX)
“must be read in the light of the express legislative intent . . . to
provide benefits to those who become unemployed through ‘no fault’
of their own.” Cole v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 964 P.2d 617, 618
(Colo. App. 1998) (quoting § 8-73-108(1)(a)). Thus, even if the
hearing officer’s findings may support a disqualification under that
section, a claimant may still be entitled to benefits if the totality of
the circumstances establishes that the job separation occurred
3 through no fault of the claimant. Id. at 618. In this context, “fault”
requires a volitional act or “the exercise of some control or choice by
the claimant in the circumstances resulting in the separation such
that the claimant can be said to be responsible for the separation.”
Id. A claimant’s responsibility or “fault” for his job separation is an
ultimate legal conclusion based on the established findings of
evidentiary fact. Id. at 618-19.
B. Application
¶8 The hearing officer found (and the Panel affirmed) that
Employer’s performance standards required that employees notify
Employer before missing a scheduled work shift. Substantial
evidence in the record supports this finding. A copy of Employer’s
Employee Handbook, entered into evidence at the hearing, makes
clear that employees were required to notify the company before
missing work:
If you are going to be late or absent for any reason, you are required to notify your manager as far in advance as possible. Any employee who fails to give such notification will be charged with an unexcused absence and appropriate discipline will be determined by [Employer].
4 ¶9 The handbook later identifies prohibited conduct, including
“unauthorized absence(s)” and “[f]ailure to call in for an absence.”
It warns employees that violating policies set forth therein “may
result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination of
employment.” Additionally, the last page of the handbook included
Thomas’s signature, acknowledging that he had “received and
carefully read” the handbook. Thomas does not dispute that he
was aware of the policies related to work absences.
¶ 10 Substantial evidence also supports the hearing officer’s finding
that Thomas failed to notify Employer that he would miss work on
January 31, 2024. Indeed, Thomas testified to this at the hearing:
Q: Why were you fired? A: Because I did no-call/no-show to work. Q: And why weren’t you not [sic] at work that day? A: I just didn’t show.
And, as the foregoing demonstrates, Thomas also testified that
Employer fired him for this. Documentary evidence from the
Division’s file further supports this finding. Responding to the
Division’s request for the reason Employer fired Thomas, Employer
wrote, “[Thomas] did not show up to appointments on 01/31 and
didn’t show for company kick off.” Further, Employer stated, “We
5 have not heard from him after several attempts to contact.” When
asked whether Thomas violated company policy, Employer
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
25CA0203 Thomas v ICAO 12-04-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0203 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 31871-2024
Immanuel Thomas,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado,
Respondent.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division A Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN* Román, C.J., and Bernard*, J., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 4, 2025
Immanuel Thomas, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondent
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 Immanuel Thomas appeals the denial of his claim for
unemployment compensation benefits. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Thomas worked as a concrete installer for approximately five
months before Thrasher, Inc. (Employer) terminated his
employment. Shortly thereafter, a deputy for the Division of
Unemployment Insurance (Division) denied Thomas’s claim for
unemployment compensation benefits. Thomas appealed that
decision, and the Division scheduled the matter for an evidentiary
hearing regarding the reasons for Thomas’s job separation.
¶3 Upon reviewing the evidence, the hearing officer found that
Employer terminated Thomas “because he failed to report to work”
and did not notify Employer of his absence. As a result, the hearing
officer found, Thomas “failed to meet the established job standard of
calling out if he was not going to report to work.” Thus, Thomas
was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation
benefits under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX), C.R.S. 2025
(disqualifying claimants terminated for failure to meet “established
job performance or other defined standards”). Finally, the hearing
officer found that Thomas was “responsible” for his termination and
1 was thus not otherwise entitled to benefits. Thomas appealed to
the Panel, which affirmed the hearing officer’s decision.
II. Discussion
¶4 Thomas argues that the Panel erred in affirming the hearing
officer’s decision because (1) insufficient evidence supports the
hearing officer’s factual findings; (2) the hearing officer erred in
determining the cause of Thomas’s job separation; (3) the hearing
officer mischaracterized Thomas’s reason for missing work; and (4)
the hearing officer did not consider circumstances mitigating
Thomas’s unexcused work absence. We consider, and reject, each
of his arguments in turn.
A. Standard of Review and Legal Principles
¶5 Under section 8-74-107, C.R.S. 2025, we may not disturb
factual findings “supported by substantial evidence” and may only
set aside the Panel’s decision if (1) the Panel acted without or in
excess of its powers; (2) the decision was procured by fraud; (3) the
factual findings don’t support its decision; or (4) the decision is
erroneous as a matter of law. Substantial evidence is “probative,
credible, and competent, of a character which would warrant a
reasonable belief in the existence of facts supporting a particular
2 finding.” Rathburn v. Indus. Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App.
1977).
¶6 Section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX) disqualifies a claimant from
receiving benefits if his “failure to meet established job performance
or other defined standards” caused his job separation. To evaluate
cause, the hearing officer considers the totality of the evidence and
determines the motivating factors in the employee’s separation.
Eckart v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 775 P.2d 97, 99 (Colo. App.
1989). “All that is required to establish a disqualification pursuant
to § 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX) is that claimant did not do the job for which
he was hired and which he knew was expected of him.” Pabst v.
Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 833 P.2d 64, 64-65 (Colo. App. 1992).
¶7 The disqualifying provisions of section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX)
“must be read in the light of the express legislative intent . . . to
provide benefits to those who become unemployed through ‘no fault’
of their own.” Cole v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 964 P.2d 617, 618
(Colo. App. 1998) (quoting § 8-73-108(1)(a)). Thus, even if the
hearing officer’s findings may support a disqualification under that
section, a claimant may still be entitled to benefits if the totality of
the circumstances establishes that the job separation occurred
3 through no fault of the claimant. Id. at 618. In this context, “fault”
requires a volitional act or “the exercise of some control or choice by
the claimant in the circumstances resulting in the separation such
that the claimant can be said to be responsible for the separation.”
Id. A claimant’s responsibility or “fault” for his job separation is an
ultimate legal conclusion based on the established findings of
evidentiary fact. Id. at 618-19.
B. Application
¶8 The hearing officer found (and the Panel affirmed) that
Employer’s performance standards required that employees notify
Employer before missing a scheduled work shift. Substantial
evidence in the record supports this finding. A copy of Employer’s
Employee Handbook, entered into evidence at the hearing, makes
clear that employees were required to notify the company before
missing work:
If you are going to be late or absent for any reason, you are required to notify your manager as far in advance as possible. Any employee who fails to give such notification will be charged with an unexcused absence and appropriate discipline will be determined by [Employer].
4 ¶9 The handbook later identifies prohibited conduct, including
“unauthorized absence(s)” and “[f]ailure to call in for an absence.”
It warns employees that violating policies set forth therein “may
result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination of
employment.” Additionally, the last page of the handbook included
Thomas’s signature, acknowledging that he had “received and
carefully read” the handbook. Thomas does not dispute that he
was aware of the policies related to work absences.
¶ 10 Substantial evidence also supports the hearing officer’s finding
that Thomas failed to notify Employer that he would miss work on
January 31, 2024. Indeed, Thomas testified to this at the hearing:
Q: Why were you fired? A: Because I did no-call/no-show to work. Q: And why weren’t you not [sic] at work that day? A: I just didn’t show.
And, as the foregoing demonstrates, Thomas also testified that
Employer fired him for this. Documentary evidence from the
Division’s file further supports this finding. Responding to the
Division’s request for the reason Employer fired Thomas, Employer
wrote, “[Thomas] did not show up to appointments on 01/31 and
didn’t show for company kick off.” Further, Employer stated, “We
5 have not heard from him after several attempts to contact.” When
asked whether Thomas violated company policy, Employer
answered, “Yes.”
¶ 11 The foregoing all qualifies as “substantial evidence” as a
matter of law. See Rathburn, 566 P.2d at 373. Thus, we reject
Thomas’s argument that because Employer did not participate in
the hearing, the hearing officer was not presented with sufficient
evidence to support a disqualification finding. We also note that
Thomas provides no legal authority supporting his position, and we
are aware of none.
¶ 12 We are similarly unpersuaded that the hearing officer erred in
attributing Thomas’s job separation solely to his unexcused
absence on January 31. As Thomas points out, he also testified
that he was uncomfortable attending a mandatory impending
company kick-off event out of town. He argues that his
“termination was already imminent,” and his termination therefore
cannot be solely attributed to his unexcused absence on January
31. Even if the hearing officer erred in this respect, Thomas does
not explain how such error, if corrected, would mandate reversal,
and it is not apparent to us that it would. We further note that the
6 hearing officer had no obligation to address “specific evidence . . .
[that] he or she [did] not find persuasive,” and we thus perceive no
error in the hearing officer’s decision to omit any discussion of the
company kick-off event. Tilley v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 924
P.2d 1173, 1177 (Colo. App. 1996). To the extent that Thomas asks
us to reweigh the evidence, we may not do so. Sanchez v. Indus.
Claim Appeals Off., 2017 COA 71, ¶ 57, 411 P.3d 245, 258.
¶ 13 Thomas also argues that the hearing officer mischaracterized
his reason for missing work on January 31. The hearing officer
found that Thomas missed work to take a needed “mental health
day”; Thomas now contends that “declining work conditions”
prompted his absence. He does not, however, dispute that he chose
to miss work and chose not to notify his supervisor. Again, we
perceive no reason why Thomas’s motivation for missing work bears
on the case’s disposition, and Thomas provides no analysis to guide
us. In any event, like the Panel, we note that substantial evidence
supports the hearing officer’s finding. Indeed, in his written
communications with the Division, entered into evidence, Thomas
expressly stated that he substituted work on January 31 for a
“mental health day.” Accordingly, this argument also fails.
7 ¶ 14 Finally, Thomas argues that the hearing officer did not
consider several circumstances “mitigating” his failure to notify
Employer regarding his absence. Those circumstances include
Thomas’s (1) supervisor being out of town and habitually failing to
answer or return calls; (2) belief that calling in his absence would
yield more severe disciplinary consequences than an unexcused
absence; and (3) sense of “reduced job stability.” This argument
fares no better. Thomas provides no authority or analysis
demonstrating that any of these circumstances legally warrants
reversing the Panel’s decision. We therefore reject these
contentions. Vallagio at Inverness Residential Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v.
Metro. Homes, Inc., 2017 CO 69, ¶¶ 39-40, 395 P.3d 788, 795 (we
do not consider conclusory propositions devoid of legal citations or
analysis).
III. Disposition
¶ 15 We affirm the Panel’s order.
CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE BERNARD concur.