Thomas v. Fischer

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedAugust 26, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-01056
StatusUnknown

This text of Thomas v. Fischer (Thomas v. Fischer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thomas v. Fischer, (W.D. Wash. 2024).

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 DAMION THOMAS, CASE NO. 2:24-cv-01056-JCC-DWC 11 Plaintiff, v. ORDER DECLINING TO SERVICE 12 COMPLAINT HENRI FISCHER, 13 Defendant. 14

15 Plaintiff Damion Thomas, proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 16 § 1983. Having reviewed and screened Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court 17 declines to serve the complaint but provides Plaintiff leave to file an amended pleading by 18 September 25, 2024, to cure the deficiencies identified herein. 19 I. Background 20 Plaintiff is an inmate currently confined at Coyote Ridge Corrections Center. Dkt. 3 at 2. 21 It appears Plaintiff has filed this action for events occurring at Monroe Correctional Complex as 22 the sole defendant named in this action is Henri Fisher, who Plaintiff says is the Chaplain at that 23 facility. Id. at 3. 24 1 After obtaining a permit to order religious beads, Petitioner alleges he ordered beads from 2 an authorized dealer. Id. at 4. On or around February 19, 2021, Defendant Fischer informed 3 Plaintiff that his bead package exceeded the allowable weight. Id. at 4–5. Plaintiff maintains that 4 the beads minus the packaging were within the three-pound weight limit. Id. Despite this,

5 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Fischer gave Plaintiff “two options not authorized by the 6 Department” for resolving the issue with the overweight package. Id. at 5. One of these options 7 was to accept delivery of the bead package and incur a restriction on ordering beads. Id. at 13. 8 Plaintiff states he “made disagreements” with the options presented and, after this, the Defendant 9 sent Plaintiff his bead package. Id. at 5. 10 Plaintiff states that he attempted to order new beads in May 2021, but the order was 11 delayed by the Defendant (presumably as a result of a bead-ordering restriction). Id. at 14. 12 Plaintiff notes that an “investigation by the Department” found Defendant Fischer retaliated 13 against him for filing a grievance. Id.at 5. However, Plaintiff does not explain when that 14 grievance was filed, what it entailed, and what specific act was reviewed in the investigation.

15 As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Id. at 9. 16 II. Screening 17 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Court is required to screen 18 complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or 19 employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must “dismiss the 20 complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint: (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 21 state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant 22 who is immune from such relief.” Id. at (b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Barren v. Harrington, 23 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998).

24 1 The Court is required to liberally construe pro se documents. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 2 97, 106 (1976). However, even pro se pleadings must raise the right to relief beyond the 3 speculative level and must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation 4 of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

5 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). 6 III. Discussion 7 In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges a single claim of First Amendment retaliation against 8 Defendant Fischer in his individual capacity. See Dkt. 3 at 4–5. Plaintiff’s claim is deficient and 9 must be cured before he may proceed in this action. The Court will address the pleading 10 deficiencies below. 11 To plead a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) he suffered a 12 violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and (2) the 13 violation was proximately caused by a “person” acting under color of state law. See Crumpton v. 14 Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). Thus, the first step in pleading an individual

15 capacity § 1983 claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright 16 v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). On step two, a plaintiff must allege facts showing how the 17 individual defendants caused, or personally participated in causing, the harm alleged in the 18 complaint. See Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). 19 “It is well-established that, among the rights they retain, prisoners have a First 20 Amendment right to file prison grievances. Retaliation against prisoners for their exercise of this 21 right is itself a constitutional violation, and prohibited as a matter of clearly established law.” 22 Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). A “viable 23 claim of First Amendment retaliation” in the prison context must include: (1) An assertion that a

24 1 state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that inmate’s protected 2 conduct, and that such action (4) was capable of chilling the expression of a person of ordinary 3 firmness, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Id. at 4 1269–71 (citing Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005)).

5 Here, Plaintiff’s allegations touch on each of the necessary elements for a retaliation 6 claim, but they are cursory and lack sufficient factual detail to state a viable claim. Plaintiff 7 alleges he “made disagreements” with options provided to him by the Defendant. Dkt. 3 at 5. 8 Assuming Plaintiff is referencing the submission of a formal or informal grievance, this 9 allegation may relate to the protected conduct element of his claim. Plaintiff next alleges the 10 Defendant restricted him from ordering beads for a six-month period and possibly delayed a bead 11 order made during that period. Dkt. 3 at 5, 14–15. These allegations may relate to the adverse 12 action element of his claim. But, to state a claim for retaliation, an adverse action must be taken 13 “because of” an inmate’s protected conduct. Rhodes, at 567. 14 As it stands, the Complaint does not contain sufficient facts showing how Plaintiff’s

15 disagreements motivated the Defendant to take any adverse action against him. Plaintiff also 16 does not specify whether it was the bead restriction, or something else, that he considers to be an 17 adverse action motivated by this potentially protected conduct.

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Related

Rizzo v. Goode
423 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court, 1976)
United States v. Morrison
429 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Papasan v. Allain
478 U.S. 265 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Albright v. Oliver
510 U.S. 266 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Rex Milton Rose v. Joseph C. Rinaldi
654 F.2d 546 (Ninth Circuit, 1981)
Rhodes v. Robinson
408 F.3d 559 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)
Brodheim v. Cry
584 F.3d 1262 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)

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Thomas v. Fischer, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-v-fischer-wawd-2024.