Thomas v. Department of Social & Health Services
This text of 793 P.2d 466 (Thomas v. Department of Social & Health Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
— Joseph K. Thomas appeals the Superior Court's affirmance of the Personnel Appeals Board's summary judgment in favor of the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS). Thomas argues that DSHS violated his seniority rights by replacing him, rather than a less senior employee, upon the return of an exempt employee, John Stern, to classified service. We agree and reverse.
We are concerned here with Thomas's civil service rights upon the return of John Stern from an exempt1 position. Thus, we must first examine Stern's position before moving on to determine how Stern's return affected Thomas's rights.
Effective February 12, 1982, the State Personnel Board abolished the classified position of Community Services Supervisor, then held by John Stern, and established the exempt position of Developmental Disabilities Assistant Director, Community Services. Stern was appointed to the latter position. He held that position until 1985 when, by a letter dated January 22, 1985, he was informed that his appointment to the position would end in 30 days.
The civil service rules would have allowed Stern to return to the position he previously held, but that position had been eliminated. Thus, Stern had to fill a position of [429]*429similar nature and salary. See former RCW 41.06.070(27) and WAC 356-06-055(1). After two appeals to the Personnel Appeals Board, Stern accepted the position offered by DSHS, Developmental Disabilities Case Services Assistant Chief. This position was then held by Thomas. The Board ruled that WAC 356-06-055(1)2 applied, rather than WAC [430]*430356-06-055(2).3 At no time did the Board consider that any statute or regulation required application of the reduction-in-force (RIF)4 rules of WAC 356-30-3305 in placing [431]*431Stern and removing Thomas. Thus, the Board considered neither RCW 41.06.0106 nor former RCW 41.06.070(27).7
Thomas appealed his replacement by Stern. He contended that the RIF rules should have been applied in the determination of which position Stern would be allowed to occupy. Thomas contended that if the RIF rules had been applied, Stern would have been required to replace an employee junior to Thomas. The Board entered summary judgment against Thomas, and the Thurston County Superior Court affirmed the decision.
Thomas argues that the RIF rules applied when DSHS determined which position Stern would occupy upon return [432]*432and that Stern should have been offered the position occupied by the least senior employee in the appropriate classification. DSHS responds that Stern's return to classified service was not a RIF, but merely a return from exempt service.
The Board and the Superior Court agreed with DSHS. An agency's interpretation of its own rule is entitled to great weight, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Department of Ecology, 86 Wn.2d 310, 315, 545 P.2d 5 (1976), but that interpretation remains subject to independent appellate review. Terhar v. Department of Licensing, 54 Wn. App. 28, 32, 771 P.2d 770, review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1008 (1989). WAC 356-30-330(1) (b) reads as follows:
When employees have statutory and merit system rule rights to return to the classified service and the total number of employees exceeds the number of positions to be filled in the classification, those employees in excess will have the reduction in force rights prescribed in this section.
The section specifically addresses situations where employees have "rights to return to the classified service". While the rule does not expressly state that the returning employee is included within the "total number of employees . . .," that is a reasonable interpretation. Any other view would open the door to arbitrary actions by agencies otherwise precluded from arbitrary action by the civil service rules.
Stern did not have a right to the position he previously held, because that position no longer existed. He had, however, the right to return to a position of "similar nature and salary." See former RCW 41.06.070(27) and WAC 356-06-055(1). There may have been a number of such positions. To permit an agency to select the position without reference to any guidelines would be to permit it to "bump" the employee of its choice for any reason whatsoever.
Such arbitrary authority is inconsistent with the purposes of the civil service system as expressed in RCW 41.06.010. Exempt positions are excluded from civil service coverage, but the theory is that personnel decisions within [433]*433the system will not be arbitrary, but will be guided by objective rules.
DSHS should have determined which range 64 position was occupied by the least senior employee, as mandated by WAC 356-30-330(2) (e)(iv), and offered Stern that position. The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
In light of our decision, we do not reach Thomas's other arguments.
Alexander, C.J., and Worswick, J., concur.
Reconsideration denied January 8, 1991.
Judge Philip H. Faris is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Court of Appeals, pursuant to CAR 21(c).
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793 P.2d 466, 58 Wash. App. 427, 1990 Wash. App. LEXIS 255, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-v-department-of-social-health-services-washctapp-1990.