Thomas v. Contoocook Valley Sch. D.

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: November 5, 1997
• Docket: CV-96-414-SD
• Status: Published

Opinion

Thomas v. Contoocook Valley Sch. D. CV-96-414-SD 11/05/97 P UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Johanna Thomas

v. Civil No. 96-414-SD

Contoocook Valiev School District; School Administrative Unit No. 1

O R D E R

This claim brought under the Americans with Disabilities

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (ADA), arises from plaintiff

Johanna Thomas's termination from her position as an elementary

school teacher. Before the court is defendant's motion for

summary judgment, to which plaintiff objects.

Background

In 1983 plaintiff Thomas began teaching in the Contoocook

Valley School District in New Hampshire. From the time she began

until approximately 1990, she received good to excellent

performance evaluations of her teaching. In 1990 she had polyps

removed from her voice box, which created significant voice

problems for plaintiff.

Shortly thereafter, plaintiff received reprimands from her

principal concerning her tardiness to work. In addition, her

evaluations began to mention problems with classroom control

and other "non-instructional" issues. In 1993 plaintiff was terminated from her teaching position by Superintendent Larry

Bramblett.

In accordance with state law. New Hampshire Revised Statutes

Annotated (RSA) 189:14-a, which permits a tenured teacher to

request a hearing concerning his or her termination, plaintiff

requested and was granted a hearing before the Contoocook Valley

School Board, which upheld her termination. She then appealed to

the New Hampshire State Board of Education, which affirmed.

Plaintiff once more appealed, this time to the New Hampshire

Supreme Court, which affirmed without opinion.

Plaintiff then filed this action under the ADA claiming

that she was wrongfully terminated by reason of her disability

suffered as a result of her voice box surgery.

Discussion

Defendants seek summary judgment on the ground of collateral

estoppel, a doctrine that prevents relitigation of issues already

resolved in a prior action. During the administrative review of

her termination, the Board found that Superintendent Bramblett

had sufficient reasons of poor performance to terminate Thomas as

a teacher. The Board's finding, if taken to be conclusively

established, undermines her allegation that she was terminated on

account of her voice disability.

The findings of administrative agencies may be accorded

preclusive effect under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. United States v. Utah Constr. and Minina C o . , 384 U.S. 394, 421-

22 (1966) ("When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial

capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it

which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate,

the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce

repose."). Thus courts have extended collateral estoppel to

resolutions by school boards of the reasons a tenured teacher was

terminated. See Graham v. Special School D i s t . No. 1 , 472 N.W.2d

114, 119 (Minn. 1991); see also Umberfield v. School Dist. No.

11, 185 Colo. 165, 522 P.2d 730 (1974).

Accordingly, this court accords collateral estoppel effect

to the School Board's findings of the reasons for Thomas1s

termination. Plaintiff argues that the Board's finding that

Superintendent Bramblett had sufficient reasons of poor

performance to terminate Thomas as a school teacher does not

preclude her ADA claim because it is not inconsistent with a

finding that the superintendent was also motivated by the

impermissible reason of her disability. The First Circuit has

left open the question whether unlawful discrimination may be

established under the ADA based on conduct that was motivated by

a mixture of discriminatory and nondiscriminatory reasons,

commonly referred to as "mixed motive" cases. Leary v. Dalton,

58 F.3d 748, 752 (1st. Cir. 1995) ("The precise relationship

between the ADA's liability standards and the sole causation test

3 is not well settled."). However, upon extensive and persuasive

analysis on the issue, the Eleventh Circuit held that the ADA

does not require disability discrimination to be the "sole"

reason for the adverse action. McNelv v. Ocala Star-Banner

Co r p ., 99 F.3d 1068, 1073-1077 (11th Cir. 1996) (applying a plain

meaning rule of statutory construction to conclude that the ADA's

prohibition against discrimination "because of the disability of

such individual" does not mean solely because of such

disability). This court concurs with the conclusion reached by

the Eleventh Circuit.

Even though discrimination does not have to be the sole

reason for the challenged conduct, in Price Waterhouse v.

Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989), the Court said that "an

employer shall not be liable if it can prove that, even if it had

not taken gender into account, it would have come to the same

decision regarding a particular person." In other words, the

unlawful discriminatory animus must be the "but for" causative

factor of the challenged conduct. The Court reasoned that Title

VII was intended to respect a balance between protecting

employees from discrimination and preserving employers' freedom

of choice over who to enlist as their agents. Even though the

Court was considering Title VII, there is no indication that the

ADA was intended to be more protective of employee rights and

less so of employer prerogative. To preserve employer freedom of

4 choice, this court holds that the Price Waterhouse "but for"

causation test is applicable to the ADA, so that an employer may

escape liability by proving that it would have engaged in the

challenged conduct even if it had not taken disability into

account.

The School Board's findings, which plaintiff is estopped

from denying, establish that the superintendent would have fired

Thomas regardless of whether or not he took her disability into

account. The Board reportedly found "that Mrs. Thomas' classroom

performance suffered from significant problems, including in the

areas of lack of discipline, poor use of time and poor

development of lessons, which issues the board finds to be

inextricably interrelated." Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment, Exhibit 5 ("Addendum to Decision of the Contoocook

Valley School Board," at "Conclusion" [no page numbers on

exhibits]). The Board of Education pointed out that "the local

board did have evidence that M r s . Thomas1s teaching performance

in the three areas of classroom control, lesson planning and use

of time was considered deficient by her teaching principal."

Plaintiff's Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment, Appendix,

Vol. 1, unnumbered Exhibit (Letter to Chairman of State Board of

Education), at 5). Based on these findings, it is clear that

Thomas's poor performance provided sufficient grounds to

terminate her, regardless of her disability.

5 Since plaintiff is estopped from denying these findings,

this court takes it as established that any unlawful

discriminatory animus toward plaintiff's voice disability was not

the "but for" cause of her termination. Accordingly, defendants

are entitled to summary judgment.

Conclusion

For the forgoing reasons, the defendant's motion for summary

judgment must be and herewith is granted.

SO ORDERED.

Shane Devine, Senior Judge United States District Court

November 5, 1997

cc: James F. Allmendinger, Esq. John H. Vetne, Esq.