NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
No. 129,069
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
JOHN THOMAS,
Appellant,
v.
CITY OF WAMEGO and
KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellees.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from Pottawatomie District Court; JEFFREY R. ELDER, judge. Oral argument heard on April 14, 2026. Opinion filed September 4, 2026. Affirmed.
Jeffrey A. Wilson, of DeVaughn James Injury Lawyers, of Wichita, for appellant.
David R. Cooper and Katherine E. Sittenauer, of Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, LLP, of Topeka, for appellee City of Wamego.
Sherri L. Price, Kansas Department of Transportation, for appellee Kansas Department of Transportation.
Before WARNER, C.J., ARNOLD-BURGER, J., and LAURA JOHNSON-MCNISH, District Judge, assigned.
PER CURIAM: This appeal arises from a crash between a motorcycle and a pickup truck in Wamego while both vehicles were traveling south on a section of road that was widening from one lane to two lanes of traffic. Over the years, the dotted white stripes
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that alerted drivers where the road became two lanes had faded. The motorcycle attempted to pass the pickup on the right side of the widening road—just before the section that had been previously striped as a two-lane road. At the same time, the truck was turning right into a parking lot and the motorcycle collided with the truck's side panel. The motorcycle driver was seriously injured in the crash.
The motorcycle driver sued the City of Wamego (City) and the Kansas Department of Transportation (KDOT). He argues that one or both government entities had a responsibility to maintain the striping between the lanes and had failed to do so, and the lack of striping caused the accident. The district court granted summary judgment to both entities. The court found that KDOT had no duty to maintain striping on the section of the street at issue here. Although the road in question was also part of a Kansas state highway, the Kansas Legislature has directed that the City (and not KDOT) has the legal duty to maintain roadways within city limits. The court also found that even though the City had the duty to maintain the striping and had allowed the paint to fade on the road, its conduct did not cause the crash, as the vehicles collided in a widening section of the road before the section designated for two lanes of traffic.
The motorcycle driver now appeals, challenging both decisions. But after carefully reviewing the record and the parties' arguments, we conclude the district court's summary-judgment decisions were sound as to both of its conclusions. We affirm the district court's judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The section of road at issue here is a southbound portion of Lincoln Avenue in Wamego, just south of the intersection with U.S. Highway 24 (U.S. 24). The road known as Lincoln Avenue inside the Wamego city limits is part of Kansas Highway 99 (K-99). The intersection between Lincoln Avenue and U.S. 24 is like intersections found
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throughout the state: While Lincoln Avenue is designated elsewhere as a four-lane road (with two lanes travelling in each direction, divided by dotted white stripes), that pattern changes near the intersection. To make way for a left turn lane for northbound traffic approaching U.S. 24, southbound Lincoln Avenue is reduced to one lane of traffic. The road then widens into a two-lane road when the northbound left-turn lane is no longer present.
The location where the dotted white striping on the roadway begins, after southbound Lincoln Avenue widens, has changed over the years. In 1995, the striping began a little earlier (about in line with the beginning of the driveway the pickup truck was turning into when the motorcycle hit its side panel). But in 2005, the City adopted plans that designated that the striping would begin after that driveway. It is undisputed that the City then carried out those plans, resurfaced the roads, and painted white stripes that began after the driveway. A zoomed-in diagram from the 2005 plans, which was included as an exhibit, illustrates this layout:
The City has not repainted the dotted white stripes on Lincoln Avenue since 2005, and those lines have faded significantly.
In April 2022, Jacob Blenn was driving his pickup truck on southbound Lincoln Avenue and turned right into the parking lot of a bank using the bank's driveway just past
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the U.S. 24 intersection. When he discovered that the bank's lobby was closed, he drove back onto southbound Lincoln Avenue, planning to take a right turn into the bank's drivethrough entrance, which was slightly further south. Before turning right, Blenn's truck was generally centered between the curb on the right and the double yellow line on the left.
At the same time, John Thomas was travelling south on Lincoln Avenue on his motorcycle. Thomas attempted to pass Blenn's truck on the right, anticipating the truck would be moving into the left lane when the road widened. Instead, Blenn turned right into the driveway, and Thomas' motorcycle collided with the truck's front right fender. Thomas was thrown over the hood of the truck and suffered serious injuries, including the amputation of one leg.
Thomas sued the City and KDOT, alleging both entities' negligence caused his injuries. Thomas claimed that both entities were responsible for the "design, construction and maintenance of the pavement markings" on Lincoln Avenue. He alleged that the pavement markings were "improperly designed, improperly constructed and improperly maintained" and that the defendants' failure to maintain the road striping "created a dangerous situation where drivers lacked the specific information needed to maintain proper lane placement."
The petition alleged that Blenn did not know Lincoln Avenue widened into two lanes, so he made a right turn from the center of the lane at the same moment that Thomas was approaching on the right. The petition also stated that Thomas was aware that Lincoln Avenue was two lanes and "assumed" that Blenn "was proceeding into the left lane as [he] was about to turn." Thomas claimed that Blenn's failure to drive in the correct lane before making the right turn "was due to the poor and incorrect striping negligently performed and maintained by the defendants" and this failure ultimately caused Thomas' injuries.
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In November 2024, both the City and KDOT moved for summary judgment:
• KDOT argued that it did not owe a duty to Thomas because K.S.A. 68-416a(a)
makes the City responsible for maintaining the roadway. KDOT also argued that there is no evidence of negligent roadway maintenance because the accident occurred in a place where no lane markings were required.
• The City argued that it was not the proximate cause of the collision because the presence or absence of lane markings beyond where the crash occurred did not change the fact that Thomas collided with Blenn at a section that had not been designated for two lanes of traffic. The City also argued that it did not have a duty to warn travelers that the road transitioned from one lane to two because such a warning is not required by the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) and K.S.A. 8-2003.
Thomas opposed both motions. He disputed KDOT's interpretation of K.S.A. 68-
416a, pointing to caselaw describing the state's common-law duty to maintain state highways. Thomas asserted that whether a lane is marked for one or two lanes of traffic is not determinative as to whether it is a one- or two-lane road and asserted that "drivers often switch into a neighboring lane as a lane widens into two." In his response to the City, Thomas argued that factual questions precluded summary judgment because Blenn stated that if the striping on the road had been visible, "he would have stayed in the right hand lane, which would have made the crash as it happened impossible." And the facts supported legal causation because it was reasonably foreseeable that "Blenn reasonably believed there was one lane in this area and that [Thomas] reasonably believed Blenn was moving into the left southbound lane." Thomas also argued that the City's focus on the signage did not absolve the City of its duty to maintain the striping on the roadway.
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The district court held a hearing on the parties' respective arguments and ultimately ruled in favor of the governmental entities. The court found that KDOT did not have a duty to maintain the portions of the state highway that were operated as city roads through interconnection agreements. The court ruled that the City's maintenance of the dotted striping had not caused the accident, as a matter of law, because that striping was not intended to be present on the portion of the road where the accident occurred. In other words, Lincoln Avenue did not widen into a two-lane road until the lane markings existed (as shown on the City's 2005 plans). And the collision occurred in the section of the road that was still one lane. Thomas appealed both summary-judgment decisions.
DISCUSSION
In Kansas, liability for government entities is governed by statute. Under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA), "each governmental entity shall be liable for damages caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any of its employees while acting within the scope of their employment under circumstances where the governmental entity, if a private person, would be liable under the laws of this state." K.S.A. 75- 6103(a). This section is "'properly viewed as an effort to codify the common law doctrine of respondeat superior.'" Rollins v. Kansas Dept. of Transportation, 238 Kan. 453, 457, 711 P.2d 1330 (1985). But the KTCA then limits liability for governmental entities resulting from
"(e) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee, whether or not the discretion is abused and regardless of the level of discretion involved;
.... "(h) the malfunction, destruction or unauthorized removal of any traffic or road sign, signal or warning device unless it is not corrected by the governmental entity
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responsible within a reasonable time after actual or constructive notice of such malfunction, destruction or removal." K.S.A. 75-6104 (Self 2019).
To establish negligence, a plaintiff must show duty, breach, injury, and proximate cause. Montgomery v. Saleh, 311 Kan. 649, 653, 466 P.3d 902 (2020). Because duty is a question of law, courts may resolve it at summary judgment. Elstun v. Spangles, Inc., 289 Kan. 754, 757, 217 P.3d 450 (2009). Although causation is generally a factual question to be decided by a jury, summary judgment is also appropriate when, under the uncontroverted facts, the plaintiff has not shown that the defendant caused the plaintiff's claimed injuries. See Drouhard-Nordhus v. Rosenquist, 301 Kan. 618, 627, 345 P.3d 281 (2015).
The district court found that neither entity involved in this case was liable, as a matter of law, for Thomas' injuries—concluding that KDOT did not have a legal duty to maintain Lincoln Avenue inside the Wamego city limits and the City's failure to re-stripe the road did not cause the accident (that occurred before the section designed for two lanes of southbound traffic). We review the district court's decision de novo, applying the same standards that govern summary judgment generally. GFTLenexa, LLC v. City of Lenexa, 310 Kan. 976, 981-82, 453 P.3d 304 (2019). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and evidence show no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In applying this standard, courts view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, but they do not weigh competing evidence or disregard material facts that are not genuinely disputed. 310 Kan. at 982.
1. K.S.A. 68-416a transfers KDOT's common-law duty to maintain safe highways.
Thomas argues that the district court erred when it concluded that K.S.A. 68-416a placed the duty to maintain the relevant section of Lincoln Avenue on the City, not
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KDOT. The district court found that the legislature "can limit or aggregate duties that may exist a[t] common law" and had transferred the State's previous common-law duty to maintain some state highways that traverse cities—such as Lincoln Avenue in Wamego—to the relevant municipality under K.S.A. 68-416a. We agree with the district court's holding.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo.
Nicholson v. Mercer, 319 Kan. 712, 714, 559 P.3d 350 (2024). When interpreting a piece of legislation, our understanding is governed by the intent of the legislature if that intent can be ascertained. John Doe v. M.J., 315 Kan. 310, 320, 508 P.3d 368 (2022). We attempt to ascertain that intent by confining our analysis to the language enacted, giving common words their ordinary meanings. In re Wrongful Conviction of Sims, 318 Kan. 153, 158, 542 P.3d 1 (2024). When the words of the statute have a plain and unambiguous meaning, appellate courts should not speculate about the intent behind that clear language and should refrain from reading provisions into the statute not readily found in its words. Schmidt v. Trademark, Inc., 315 Kan. 196, 200, 506 P.3d 267 (2022).
At common law, Kansas courts routinely recognized that "the responsibility for some duties is so important to the community that an employer may not be permitted to transfer it to another." Trout v. Koss Constr. Co., 240 Kan. 86, 93, 727 P.2d 450 (1986) (citing Railroad Co. v. Madden, 77 Kan. 80, 83, 93 P. 586 [1908]). Courts found that one "nondelegable duty" was the duty of "a governmental entity to maintain its highways in a reasonably safe condition for the traveling public." Trout, 240 Kan. at 93. On this basis, courts have found that the State's decision to hire a contractor to work on a public road "does not relieve the State of responsibility for injuries arising from the negligence of the contractor, where the injury results from the failure of the State to maintain the highway in a reasonably safe condition." 240 Kan. at 93. Courts have similarly found that municipalities "'have a positive legal duty to keep their streets in a condition reasonably
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safe and convenient for the traveling public and they have no right or discretion to evade or avoid that duty.'" Schmeck v. City of Shawnee, 232 Kan. 11, 21, 651 P.2d 585 (1982).
K.S.A. 2025 Supp. 68-416 establishes a "state highway fund" for "cities on the state highway system . . . for the maintenance of streets and highways in cities designated by the secretary as city connecting links." The cities with roadways that are also state highways receive funds "at the rate of $5,000 per year per lane per mile" for the maintenance of the portions of the state highway that are within the city limits. K.S.A. 68-416a(a) then indicates that "[w]here cities receive an amount per lane per mile as provided in K.S.A. 68-416," those cities "shall be responsible for all maintenance of such city connecting links, except route marking signs."
The statute then identifies two exceptions to this general rule. First, if a city enters into an agreement with KDOT for KDOT to maintain those "city connecting links"—or the portion of the state highway within city limits—"responsibility for maintenance shall be as prescribed in the agreement." K.S.A. 68-416a(b). Second, KDOT is "responsible for all maintenance on all fully access controlled city connecting links." K.S.A. 68-416a(c).
KDOT argues that these statutes demonstrate an intent by the legislature to place the legal duty to maintain portions of a state highway within city limits with the City unless one of the recognized exceptions apply. We agree.
Although Kansas recognizes a common-law duty requiring governmental entities to maintain highways in a reasonably safe condition for the traveling public, the legislature may alter the common law when it uses clear and unambiguous language. See Ed DeWitte Ins. Agency v. Financial Assocs. Midwest, 308 Kan. 1065, 1071, 427 P.3d 25 (2018). K.S.A. 68-416 and 68-416a reflect such an intent. Under K.S.A. 68-416a(a), when a roadway is designated as a city connecting link and the City receives per-lane maintenance payments, "such cities shall be responsible for all maintenance of such city
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connecting links, except route marking signs." The statutory text is straightforward. The legislature imposed the maintenance obligation on the City and did not leave KDOT with overlapping duties for those same roadway segments. The district court correctly applied this statutory command.
Thomas contends that Trout and similar authorities preserve KDOT's duty to maintain roads notwithstanding the city connecting link statutes. But those cases are distinguishable. Trout concerned KDOT's attempt to avoid liability by contracting work to a private company on an ordinary state highway. Here, KDOT is not relying on a private contractor; it is applying a legislative directive that reassigns maintenance responsibility to a municipal government when the conditions of K.S.A. 68-416 and 68-416a are satisfied. The Trout court addressed contractual delegation; the legislature here altered the underlying duty by statute.
Nor are we persuaded by Thomas' reliance on Rollins, 238 Kan. at 457-58. Rollins held that KDOT could not escape tort liability merely by hiring a private contractor; the decision did not examine a statutory framework that explicitly assigns roadway maintenance authority to a municipality. In contrast, K.S.A. 68-416a establishes a public-law division of responsibility between the State and cities. The statutory text identifies when cities assume maintenance obligations and when KDOT retains them. Subsection (b) governs situations in which the Secretary affirmatively agrees to perform city-link maintenance; subsection (c) reserves full KDOT responsibility for fully access-controlled links. These provisions show that the legislature chose a differentiated model in which duties shift depending on roadway designation. The district court correctly concluded that this statutory scheme supersedes any background common-law duty KDOT might otherwise owe.
The parties do not dispute that Lincoln Avenue was designated as a city connecting link and that the City received quarterly lane-mile maintenance payments.
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Under the plain language of K.S.A. 68-416a(a), the City "shall be responsible for all maintenance" of that segment. The legislature's choice to impose responsibility on the City necessarily limits KDOT's duty in this context; we do not read the statutes to impose dual obligations absent an agreement under K.S.A. 68-416a(b). Because the statutory text controls and the City—not KDOT—was responsible for maintaining the roadway, the district court correctly concluded that KDOT did not have a legal duty to maintain the portion of Lincoln Avenue at the collision site. The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of KDOT on Thomas' claims.
2. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment for the City.
Thomas next challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City—a determination based on the court's conclusion that Thomas had not shown that any action by the City caused his collision with Blenn's pickup truck. On appeal, Thomas argues that the district court's decision was a usurpation of the jury's role in resolving questions of fact.
Thomas asserts that the district court erred in several respects. First, he argues the court resolved the parties' dispute over which set of roadway plans—the 1995 plan or the 2005 plan—governed the configuration of Lincoln Avenue. Second, he maintains the court declared several pieces of evidence—including the drivers' perceptions of the roadway—"irrelevant," even though those facts, in his view, bear directly on causation. And third, he claims the court drew inferences in favor of the City despite conflicting testimony in the record.
Cities have a longstanding duty to maintain their streets in a reasonably safe condition for public travel. Schmeck, 232 Kan. at 21. But that duty is shaped by statute and the governing roadway plans. It does not impose a free-floating obligation to create lane markings wherever a road widens to the extent that it could potentially accommodate
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multiple lanes of traffic. Nor does it require a city to treat every unmarked expanse of pavement as a multi-lane roadway.
Here, the district court relied on the pavement-marking plans approved in 2005, which placed the first southbound lane divider south of the south bank driveway. Both sides agree that those plans governed the resurfacing and striping of Lincoln Avenue during the period relevant to this collision. Under those plans, the City had no obligation to install or maintain a lane divider north of the point where the road fully transitioned into two marked lanes. Thus, even assuming a general duty to maintain safe roadways, the City did not have a duty to paint or preserve a lane line at the location where the collision occurred. The absence of a marking in a place where none was required does not, by itself, establish a breach of the City's duty to maintain its roads.
Thomas argues that the physical width of the roadway created a fact question about whether two separate lanes existed. But Kansas law draws a distinction between roadways that are wide enough to accommodate more than one line of traffic and roadways that are legally designated as "laned." Under K.S.A. 8-1429, a "laned roadway" is one "divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for vehicular traffic." Other provisions—such as K.S.A. 8-1514 or K.S.A. 8-1517—recognize that drivers may sometimes use pavement of sufficient width for certain maneuvers. Those statutes, however, do not convert every sufficiently wide roadway into a marked, multi-lane road for all legal purposes. When read together, the traffic code distinguishes between marked lanes and unmarked width-based roads. Nothing in these statutes obligates a city to stripe a lane divider merely because a widening exists, nor do they impose a duty to maintain lane markings in a location where the governing plans do not call for them. In short, courts give deference to a city's determination as to when a roadway should have multiple lanes of traffic. See K.S.A. 75-6104(e), (h) (Self 2019). To hold otherwise would open the floodgates to present every such decision to a jury to second-guess the City's discretionary calls.
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Thus, as the district court found, the City did not have a duty to change the striping or lane designations from its 2005 plans. The question remains, however, as to whether the City's failure to maintain that striping for the section of road just beyond the driveway where the accident occurred proximately caused the collision between Thomas' motorcycle and Blenn's truck. The district court found that the faded road markings did not cause the accident. Again, we agree with the court's decision.
Proximate cause includes both cause-in-fact and legal causation. Castleberry v.
DeBrot, 308 Kan. 791, 802-03, 424 P.3d 495 (2018). Cause-in-fact requires a showing that the harm would not have occurred but for the defendant's conduct. Legal causation requires harm to be the natural and probable consequence of that conduct. Hale v. Brown, 287 Kan. 320, 322, 197 P.3d 438 (2008). And although negligence actions ordinarily raise factual questions, a court may decide proximate cause as a matter of law when the undisputed facts support only one inference. Cullip v. Domann, 266 Kan. 550, 556, 972 P.2d 776 (1999).
On this record, the collision would have occurred regardless of whether the City had repainted lane markings required by the 2005 plans. Those plans placed the first lane divider south of the south driveway. The undisputed evidence shows that the collision took place north of that point. Even if the City had perfectly maintained every stripe required under the plans, no marking would have appeared at the location where the two vehicles collided. Because the roadway, as legally configured, did not include a lane line at the point of impact, the absence of such a marking could not have been the "but-for" cause of the crash.
Nor does the record support the finding of legal causation. The foreseeability analysis asks whether the defendant's conduct created a general risk of the type of harm that occurred. Burnette v. Eubanks, 308 Kan. 838, 846, 425 P.3d 343 (2018). The City
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could expect drivers to rely on clearly marked lanes to understand when a roadway is divided into two lines of travel. Kansas law uses markings—not width—to define a laned roadway. Given that framework, the City was not required to anticipate that drivers would treat an unmarked transition area as two legal travel lanes, nor that the absence of a marking in that area would lead one vehicle to turn right while another attempted to pass on the far-right edge of the roadway. The statutory scheme makes such reliance on unmarked width unreasonable as a matter of law.
Thomas points to Blenn's statements that if the striping had been present, the truck driver would have driven "in the right lane" before turning into the bank driveway. But this assertion is based on an erroneous legal presumption—that there was a right lane before the designation. We have rejected this claim. But even if Blenn had driven on the right side of the lane rather than in the middle, he would have had no obligation to do so. And more to the point, regardless of whether Blenn was driving on the left side of the lane, the right side of the lane, or its center, there was only one lane of traffic to drive in. It was the inventing decision by Thomas to treat the road as having two lanes of traffic rather than one that led to the collision; as the district court found, if Thomas' motorcycle had remained behind Blenn's truck as was required by this state's traffic laws, this collision would not have occurred.
Because the governing plans did not require a lane marking at the collision site, and because the absence of such marking neither caused nor foreseeably contributed to the crash, the district court correctly concluded that reasonable minds could reach only one inference: The City's conduct was not the proximate cause of the collision. Thus, summary judgment was appropriate.
Affirmed.