Thomas v. Cascade Union High School District No. 5

724 P.2d 330, 80 Or. App. 736
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedAugust 20, 1986
DocketFDAB 84-7; CA A35506
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 724 P.2d 330 (Thomas v. Cascade Union High School District No. 5) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thomas v. Cascade Union High School District No. 5, 724 P.2d 330, 80 Or. App. 736 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).

Opinion

*738 BUTTLER, P. J.

Petitioner seeks review of an order of the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board (FDAB). She was a permanent teacher, ORS 342.315(5), and was dismissed by the Board of Cascade Union High School District No. 5 on grounds of inefficiency, neglect of duty, inadequate performance and gross neglect of duty. She appealed to FDAB pursuant to ORS 342.905(1) and, after a hearing, FDAB affirmed the dismissal solely on the ground of neglect of duty. FDAB found that some of the facts found and relied on by the district were unsubstantiated and held that the grounds of inefficiency, inadequate performance and gross neglect of duty were unsupported by the facts found to be true. She seeks judicial review.

Petitioner has been a junior high school physical education teacher for 12 years, seven with respondent. While participating in a dodgeball game with her students, she was hit with a ball thrown from behind. She reacted in anger, admittedly lost her self-control, grabbed the offending student and kicked her twice in the thigh. The kicks left substantial bruises. After the class ended and the students and petitioner had retired to the locker room, there was a verbal exchange, the nature of which is in dispute, between petitioner and the student involved.

Ultimately, the matter was brought before the school board by the student’s parents, as a result of which the board directed the district superintendent to investigate the matter. After investigation, the superintendent recommended dismissal. The district accepted that recommendation on June 28,1984.

FDAB held its hearing in December, 1984. It found that some of the allegations in the superintendent’s recommendation were unsubstantiated. For example, FDAB determined that petitioner did not chase the student across the gym before kicking her or push the student afterwards. It also found that petitioner did not engage in a shouting match with the student in the locker room following the incident. FDAB concluded, in relevant part:

“The panel, accordingly, does not agree that [petitioner’s] conduct in the locker room constituted ‘verbal harassment’ or that the kicking incident was ‘aggravated’ by the locker room conduct of [petitioner].
*739 “In short, fault of [petitioner] was not proven under the locker room charges and cause for dismissal must rest on the kicking incident alone.”

FDAB went on to hold that the kicking incident did not support the statutory grounds for dismissal charged against petitioner, other than neglect of duty. It stated:

“It is the conclusion of the panel that the kicking incident in and of itself shows sufficient neglect of [petitioner’s] duty to constitute cause for dismissal for ‘neglect of duty’ as that term is used in subsection (1)(d) of ORS 342.865.”

Petitioner assigns three errors on appeal: (1) FDAB’s interpretation of the statutory term “neglect of duty” is erroneous as a matter of law; (2) FDAB’s conclusion that petitioner’s dismissal was not arbitrary, unreasonable or excessive (pursuant to ORS 342.905(5)) was incorrect; and (3) FDAB erred in not remanding the case to the district for reconsideration of the sanction in the light of FDAB’s conclusion that some of the facts on which the district relied were unsubstantiated.

ORS 342.865 lists nine statutory grounds, including neglect of duty, for which a permanent teacher may be dismissed. FDAB has the primary interpretive responsibility for those grounds for dismissal. Ross v. Springfield School Dist. No. 19 (Ross I), 294 Or 357, 657 P2d 188 (1982). It may carry out its responsibility either through interpretive rulemaking or through reasoned interpretations expressed in contested case orders. Ross v. Springfield School Dist. No. 19 (Ross II), 300 Or 507, 518, 716 P2d 724 (1986). If FDAB chooses to interpret the statutory grounds for dismissal through contested case orders,

“it needs to find a way to assure that different panels follow the criteria so developed or give adequate reasons for departing from an earlier interpretation.” Ross II, 300 Or at 518.

While requiring FDAB to “find a way” to assure consistent interpretations by its ad hoc panels, Ross II offers little guidance other than to suggest that for difficult cases the entire 20-member panel sit in banc. Petitioner argues that the three-member panel that heard her case improperly diverged from an earlier panel’s definition of “neglect of duty.”

In Bethel School Dist. No. 52 v. Skeen, 63 Or App 165, *740 663 P2d 781, rev den 295 Or 617 (1983), we reviewed FDAB’s reversal of a dismissal for inefficiency, inadequate performance and neglect of duty. In that case, FDAB concluded that

“the three minor incidents with students * * * do not establish a pattern of misconduct, but rather were unrelated random incidents, and therefore do not furnish a reasonable basis for dismissal.”

Petitioner argues that, because the misconduct in Skeen, which involved some minor physical abuse of a student, was not considered neglect of duty, neither can her allegedly similar acts. However, the cases are factually distinguishable. Further, under Ross II, simply comparing facts between cases is not development of criteria which can be consistently followed. Skeen does not offer a useful definition of neglect of duty. In that case, FDAB only concluded that the facts found as true did not support the several grounds for dismissal charged. In the case at bar and, in accord with Ross II, FDAB has attempted to define neglect of duty in its order, as follows:

“The term ‘neglect,’ as we read the statute, refers to a failure on the part of the teacher to engage in conduct designed to result in proper performance of duty. Neglect of duty, as used in the statute, could occur through repeated failures to perform duties of relatively minor importance, on the one hand, or could occur through a single instance of failure to perform a critical duty, on the other hand.”

As we understand Ross II, that definition is now the applicable one for determining neglect of duty that all FDAB panels are to apply, unless “adequate reasons” for departing from it are given. Ross II, 300 Or at 519.

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Related

Bergerson v. Salem-Keizer School District
60 P.3d 1126 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2003)
Thomas v. Cascade Union High School District No. 5
780 P.2d 780 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1989)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
724 P.2d 330, 80 Or. App. 736, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-v-cascade-union-high-school-district-no-5-orctapp-1986.