Thomas v. Board of Education of the Plum Bayou-Tucker School District No. 1

457 F.2d 1268, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 591, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 10388, 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 7745
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedMarch 30, 1972
DocketNo. 71-1436
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 457 F.2d 1268 (Thomas v. Board of Education of the Plum Bayou-Tucker School District No. 1) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thomas v. Board of Education of the Plum Bayou-Tucker School District No. 1, 457 F.2d 1268, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 591, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 10388, 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 7745 (8th Cir. 1972).

Opinion

STEPHENSON, Circuit Judge.

This action was brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas under 28 U.S.C. § 1342(3) and (4), claiming relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and the rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed by the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution.

Appellants appeal from a judgment of Judge Oren Harris dismissing their claims for mandatory injunctive relief against the appellees seeking reinstatement of certain of the appellants as teachers. Further relief was sought for alleged discriminatory action by the ap-pellees in teacher evaluation, salary schedules and hiring policies. The trial court held that the appellants’ allegations as to the evaluation process, salary schedule, hiring policy and other discrimination were all without merit. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The problems in this ease are primarily factual. For that reason, the historical background of the school district and its operation will clarify the issues to be resolved. Plum Bayou-Tucker School District No. 1 is a small rural school district in Arkansas. Prior to the school year 1965-66 the system was completely segregated, students and faculty. Plum Bayou School in Wright, Arkansas, was operated for white students in grades 1 through 12. Tucker-Rosenwald School, located eight miles away at Tucker, Arkansas, was operated for black students in grades 1 through 12. During the school year 1965-66, the high schools in the district were operated on a freedom of choice basis. Beginning in school year 1966-67, the district voluntarily unitized its high schools. Tucker-Rosen-wald school was closed and the Plum Bayou school became the integrated high school for the system. Elementary schools in the district continued to operate on a segregated basis until the 1969-70 school year when the Tucker-Rosenwald elementary school was closed and the Plum Bayou school became the integrated site. Presently, the entire system is completely integrated as to students and faculty. From the record it appears that there are no major problems stemming from the 1966-67 integration of the district’s high schools. However, when the elementary schools were voluntarily unitized in 1969-70, it became necessary to reduce the number of elementary teachers from 15 to 10. This reduction in teacher personnel generated the principal issues now before us.

THE LAW

As earlier stated, the factual pattern is of primary importance in this case. Both appellants and appellees rely on Moore v. Board of Education of the Chidester School District #59, 448 F.2d 709 (C.A.8, 1971). Appellees contend that Chidester would require the teachers to prove discrimination. On the other hand, appellants urge that the criteria set out in Chidester would require the burden of proof to shift, and that the board, under the facts in this case, must show that they have not discriminated. We agree with appellants. However, there is no indication in the record of the trial that the burden of proof was improperly allocated. In any event, we are satisfied that the school board has shown by clear and convincing evidence [1270]*1270that their policies and procedures were not disciminatory.1

This case is quite similar to Chides-ter. In Chidester this Court was concerned with the problem of a reduction of faculty in a school system as a result of unification of its schools pursuant to Brown I. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). Chidester delineates the standards which a school board must meet in its teacher evaluation plan. We said at 448 F.2d 713:

. .we now make clear that a board of education is obligated to use objective nondiscriminatory standards in the employment, assignment, and dismissal of teachers. A board may also consider established and previously announced non-discriminatory subjective factors in making such decisions.”

In addition, we cited with approval Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 419 F.2d 1211, 1218 (C. A.5, 1970) for the proposition that a teacher possessing the requisite minimum qualifications is entitled to the first available job without comparison with new applicants. Further, we reiterated our position in Walton v. Nashville, Arkansas Special School Dist. No. 1, 401 F.2d 137 (C.A.8, 1968) and Brooks v. School District of City of Moberly, Missouri, 267 F.2d 733 (C.A.8, 1959), that full and fair evaluation using definite non-discriminatory standards is essential before dismissals can occur.

This Court has held that a differential in salaries based solely on race or color is prohibited under the 14th amendment. Morris v. Williams, 149 F.2d 703 (C.A.8, 1945) at 708. The Court in Morris v. Williams stated:

“The crucial question in this case is whether the evidence demonstrates that there existed in Little Rock before the trial and continuing at the time of the trial a policy or custom of paying negro teachers less for comparable service than was paid to white teachers solely on the basis of race or color.” id. 149 F.2d at 708.

We reaffirmed this position most recently in Arkansas Education Association v. Board of Education, Portland Arkansas School District, 446 F.2d 763 (C.A.8, 1971).

In addition, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. Proc. 52(a) we give great weight to the findings of the trial court. The scope of appellate review is limited to determining whether the findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous. Rosenburg v. United States, 422 F.2d 341, 342 (C.A.8, 1970). Each case of this type must be decided upon the basis of its own peculiar facts. Brooks v. School District of City of Moberly, 267 F.2d 733, 740 (C.A.8, 1959).

THE CLAIMS

Lois Thomas. Mrs. Thomas is a black, certified teacher who began her teaching in the all black Tucker-Rosenwald elementary school. Her contract was terminated at the end of the 1968-69 school year. Mrs. Thomas alleges discrimination in the evaluation process used by the school system in reducing its staff after unification. She seeks reinstatement as a teacher and monetary damages for the period in which her employment was terminated.

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457 F.2d 1268, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 591, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 10388, 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 7745, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-v-board-of-education-of-the-plum-bayou-tucker-school-district-no-1-ca8-1972.