Thomas v. Bear Stearns & Co

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
• Decided: September 15, 1999
• Docket: 98-11242
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-11242

JANE M. THOMAS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

BEAR STEARNS & CO., INC.

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas (3:93-CV-1970-D)

September 14, 1999

Before DUHÉ, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:1

Jane M. Thomas (“Thomas”) worked as a sales assistant at Bear,

Stearns & Co., Inc. (“Bear, Stearns”). Thomas executed a U-4 form

allowing her to sit for the Series 7 examination to gain her

securities license. The U-4 form contained an arbitration clause.

After being fired Thomas sued Bear, Stearns alleging sexual

harassment and discrimination under Title VII and requested a jury

trial. The district court ordered her to arbitrate her claims and

the arbitration panel denied all of Thomas’ claims with prejudice.

She then moved the district court to reopen her case, vacate the

arbitration award, and grant her a jury trial. Thomas contended

1 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. that the enforcement of the arbitration clause in the U-4 form

denied her right to a jury trial under the Civil Rights Act of

1991, and that the NASD arbitration procedure did not adequately

protect her substantive rights under Title VII. The district court

denied Thomas’ motion and confirmed the arbitration award. Thomas

appeals relying on the same arguments she presented to the district

court.

Thomas’ argument rests entirely on her assertion that

enforcing the arbitration clause included in the U-4 form denies

her right to a jury trial for Title VII claims provided by the

Civil Rights Act of 1991. As the district court noted, only the

Ninth Circuit agrees with her.2 Every other circuit to consider

the issue, including this Circuit, has held that the arbitration

clause contained in a U-4 form requiring arbitration of an

employee’s Title VII claims is enforceable.3 Additionally, these

courts relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Gilmer v.

2 See Duffield v. Robertson, Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998). 3 See Mouton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1998); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1999); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 179, 182-82 (3rd Cir. 1998); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 882 (4th Cir. 1996); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 308, 312 (6th Cir. 1991); Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1130 (7th Cir. 1997); Patterson v. Tenet healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1997); Metz v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1994); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs, Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1467-68 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

2 Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) holding that the

Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) required the enforcement of the

mandatory arbitration clause in a U-4 form in the context of an

ADEA claim. We therefore affirm for the reasons given by the

district court.

AFFIRMED.