Thomas v. Bailey

595 P.2d 1, 1979 Alas. LEXIS 503

• Court: Alaska Supreme Court
• Decided: April 10, 1979
• Docket: 4204, 4220
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

Before BOOCHEVER, C. J., RABINOW-ITZ, CONNOR and BURKE, JJ., and DIMOND, Senior Justice.

BOOCHEVER, Chief Justice.

This consolidated appeal concerns the constitutional validity of an initiative which was enacted by the voters as “The Alaska Homestead Act.”¹

In two different court actions, the initiative was attacked as unconstitutional. After the superior court ruled in both cases that the initiative was invalid,² the cases came before us on an expedited basis, before the general election at which the initiative could be considered. After hearing argument, we determined that the difficult constitutional questions presented in these cases could not be decided properly within the short time remaining before the election. We ordered that the initiative should be submitted to the electorate, reserving our determination on the merits for later decision. At the election, the initiative was approved, thus requiring that we decide the constitutional challenges.³

Four main issues have been presented to us:⁴

1. Does the initiative make an appropriation, which is prohibited by the state constitution?

2. Does the initiative amount to special legislation which is prohibited by the Alaska Constitution?

3. Does the initiative amount to a denial of equal protection of the laws under the state and federal constitutions?

4. Was ch. 181, SLA 1978 substantially the same measure as the initiative, thus voiding the initiative?

We have determined that the first issue is dispositive, and thus we do not consider the rest.

According to Alaska’s Constitution, the power of initiative “shall not be used to . make or repeal appropriations.” ⁵ The superior court found that the initiative for an act entitled “The Alaska Homestead Act,” popularly known as the Beirne Initiative,⁶ constituted an appropriation. For reasons that follow, we affirm that decision.

The Beirne Initiative makes available 30 million acres of state land to residents of Alaska.⁷ Under the terms of the proposed statute, certain Alaska residents are eligible to receive specified amounts of land, the exact amount of land being determined by the person’s length of residency: a resident of three years may receive up to 40 acres, a resident of five years up to 80 acres, and a resident of ten years up to 160 acres.⁸ Section 2 of the Initiative contains a part, Eligibility and Application,⁹ which indicates what a person must do to receive a grant:

A person . . . shall receive a homestead grant upon

(1) recording a written application in the form prescribed by AS 34.15.045 in the recording district in which the . land is located; and

(2) filing with the director the following materials:

(A) a copy of the recorded application,

(B) proof of residency,

(C) a $100 filing fee, unless the applicant submits a title search as provided in (b) of this section, in which case the filing fee is $75.

The applicant must also publish notice containing a description of the parcel and stating that application has been made under the Alaska Homestead Act to obtain title to the parcel.¹⁰ Finally, a survey of the land must be provided within five years after the grant is received or it is forfeited.¹¹

The people, when approving Alaska’s Constitution, retained in article XI, section I, power to “propose and enact laws by the initiative, and approve or reject acts of the legislature by the referendum.”¹² The right of initiative and referendum, sometimes referred to as direct legislation, should be liberally construed to permit exercise of that right.¹³ The reason given by the Supreme Court of Arizona for this rule of interpretation applies to Alaska:

It is, of course, a mere platitude to say that the people are the supreme power in our system of government. The history of our constitution and its adoption . shows beyond the possibility of contradiction that the people themselves deliberately and intentionally announced that, by its adoption, they meant to exercise their supreme sovereign power directly to a far greater extent than had been done in the past .

Whitman v. Moore, 59 Ariz. 211, 125 P.2d 445, 450-51 (1942), overruled on other grounds, Renck v. Superior Court, 66 Ariz. 320, 187 P.2d 656, 660-61 (1947).¹⁴

The people did not, however, choose to retain unlimited powers of initiative. Rather, in section 7 of article XI, they declared that certain types of laws could not be enacted by initiative:

Restrictions. The initiative shall not be used to dedicate revenues, make or repeal appropriations, create courts, define the jurisdiction of courts or prescribe their rules, or enact local or special legislation.

The issue before us is whether the law proposed by the Beirne Initiative is, for purposes of section 7 of article XI, a law making an appropriation and, therefore, an illegitimate subject for initiative.

The basic principles for interpreting statutes apply to constitutions,¹⁵ and thus, to resolve this question, we shall turn to the language of section 7 construed in light of the purpose gf the provision.¹⁶ We are especially sensitive to the policy concerns embodied in constitutional provisions because a constitution is a document “unchangeable by ordinary means,” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60, 73 (1803), which “must be considered as a living document adaptable to changing conditions and circumstances unanticipated at the time it was written.” Warwick v. State ex rel. Chance, 548 P.2d 384, 391 (Alaska 1976) (footnote omitted).¹⁷

Appellants argue that “appropriations” refers only to statutes setting aside a specific amount of money and designating it for a particular use. Appellees argue that “appropriations” includes statutes that set aside a specific amount of lands and direct it be given away in the manner required by the Beirne Initiative. The statute proposed by the Initiative gives away — to any resident of three or more years who will conduct a survey, file two papers, and pay a nominal filing fee — public assets in the form of state land. The proposed statute imposes no obligations on the applicant after he or she receives the land — the applicant need not homestead the land or live on it at all. The applicant may sell the land after one year and during that one-year period, the applicant incurs no tax liability.

The language of section 7 prohibits initiatives for the purpose of making appropriations. Though most state constitutions with referendum and initiative provisions have some limitation relating to appropriations, Alaska’s appropriation limitation is worded more generally than that of most other states.¹⁸ We found no decisions examining whether the term “appropriations” in the context of limiting the subject of initiatives prevents initiatives from appropriating land, or applies only to money.¹⁹ The term “appropriations” is sometimes used in the context of selecting land and designating its use,²⁰ though appellants are correct that the usual context of appropriations is setting aside an amount of money and designating it for a particular use.²¹

Appellants, by defining appropriations as exclusively referring to money, implicitly agree that if the Beirne Initiative granted each Alaskan resident, depending on the length of residence, a sum of money, it would be an appropriations initiative and hence illegitimate. Does the fact that the proposed statute gives away land, rather than money, permit it to be enacted by initiative?

Appellants emphasis a change that occurred in the writing of the section restricting the subject of the initiative and referendum.²² The version proposed by the Committee on Direct Legislation stated:

Section 5. Neither the initiative nor referendum may be used as a means of making or defeating appropriations of public funds or earmarking of revenues nor for local or special legislation. Emergency acts are not subject to referendum.²³

The Committee on Style and Drafting eliminated the phrase “of public funds” because:

We felt “of public funds” was not necessary because the only appropriations with which the state could deal are public funds anyway . . ,”²⁴

The words “of public funds,” like the word “appropriations,” may convey different meanings. In one sense, funds may refer to money, while, in another sense, it refers to assets generally.²⁵ Even if the initiative provision referred to appropriations “of public funds,” the issue would still be whether public funds refers generically to the state’s assets or only those assets in the form of money.²⁶ We have concluded that by the term “appropriations,” article XI, section 7 prohibits an initiative whose primary object is to require the outflow of state assets in the form of land as well as money.

Victor Fischer writes of the complex of concerns that produced the various limitations on the subject matter of an initiative:

Further restrictions on direct legislation were added after expressions of concern about its potential use affecting fiscal legislation, local laws, the judicial system, and other “critical” areas. The convention reduced from three to two years the time limits during which an initiative could not be repealed by the legislature, and it provided that the initiative could be amended by the legislature at any time. These moves were considered necessary to assure consistency of initiative enactments with other laws of the state and with the general public interest as seen by the state legislature. The limitations upon direct popular legislative authority were a compromise designed to reserve basic authorities to the people while protecting the state against rash, discriminatory, and irresponsible acts.

V. Fischer, Alaska s Constitutional Convention 80-81 (1975) (emphasis added).

Initiatives for the purpose of requiring appropriations were thought to pose a special danger of “rash, discriminatory, and irresponsible acts.” The delegates were influenced by the experience of other states whose constitutions placed no restrictions on the subject matter of initiatives. They adopted the appropriations restriction to avoid the bad experiences of those states.²⁷

The delegates wanted to prohibit the initiative process from being used to enact give-away programs, which have an inherent popular appeal, that would endanger the state treasury. A rather lengthy statement by Delegate Taylor ²⁸ explains the delegates’ concerns:

Now in practically all the states that have initiative and referendum there are certain limitations put upon the matters that can be acted upon by those measures. Now appropriations are not subject to the initiative or the referendum. Some states made a great mistake by not restricting the initiative measures and allowed pressure groups to gather great numbers of signatures to a petition and that petition would require the expenditure of large amounts of money, perhaps a great deal more than the state could possibly afford and sometimes they would also initiate some legislation to raise money, a revenue measure and then directed that the proceeds of that measure would be utilized for a particular purpose. In other words, it took the making of revenue measures and expenditure of the funds away from the legislature and in some instances the governmental functions and governmental institutions suffered a great deal. And it was necessary within as short a time as possible to undo the damage that has been done.

Of course, if the proper safeguards are not put around the type of legislation that can be initiated by the people, as I said before, they can do a lot of harm. There was one in California that within a year they found out it was bankrupting the state, and they had to get out another initiative and do away with the first one. Colorado had the same experience, and the State of Washington, because they were levying taxes under those bills and directing where these taxes were going, and the State of Washington in a period of about eighteen months found themselves with not only losing a 60,000,000 dollar surplus that it had in the treasury but also 120,000,000 dollars in the hole. Colorado was about the same way.²⁹

In Alaska, land is a primary asset of the state treasury. No other state government owns as much land.³⁰ We cannot imagine the delegates’ concern over initiatives which depleted, for example, the Colorado treasury of its prime asset, public monies, coexisting with approval of an initiative which depletes Alaska’s treasury of its prime asset, public land.

The outflow of dollars from the state treasury is significant, not in and of itself, but because it represents an expenditure of the state’s assets. We see no rational set of policy concerns that would prohibit an initiative from giving away $9,000,000,000 but would permit it to give away 30 million acres, valued at that sum.³¹

Appellants attempt to distinguish this grant of land from a grant of money in two ways. First, they argue that private land ownership is a desirable policy goal from which the state will reap benefits, especially in the form of future tax revenues. Second, they argue that the cost of surveying the land may be substantial.

The benefits or lack thereof from a policy of private land ownership misconceives the issue. The question is whether this policy may be implemented through initiative, rather than through legislative action.³² The restrictions on permissible subjects for direct legislation represent “a recognition . that certain particularly sensitive or sophisticated areas of legislation should not be exposed to emotional electoral dialogue and impulsive enactment by the general public.” Stewart, The Law of Initiative Referendum in Massachusetts, 12 N.Engd.L.Rev. 455, 461 (1977) (footnote omitted). The danger with direct legislation relating to appropriations is that it “tempt[s] the voter to [prefer] his immediate financial welfare at the expense of vital government activities.” Note, Referendum: The Appropriations Exception in Nebraska, 54 Neb.L.Rev. 393, 394 (1975). Cf. Brown v. Ward, 593 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1979). The lure of an immediate grant of land poses the same temptation as an immediate grant of money. Both decisions are the kind that require the reasoned deliberation characteristic of legislative actions.

The fact that a survey may be costly does not change the essential nature of the Alaska Homestead Act as an appropriations initiative. The applicant pays the surveyor; ³³ no compensation or service is rendered to the state.³⁴ The stated purpose and effect of the Initiative on the state treasury is still an expenditure of state assets in the form of public lands.

Thus, the Alaska Homestead Act would substantially deplete the state government of valuable assets just as surely as an initiative allotting to residents of specified years large sums of money. In the same manner, it constitutes an appropriation and hence may not be enacted by initiative.

AFFIRMED.

MATTHEWS, J., not participating.

1 . In July of 1977, Representative Michael F. Beirne, Senator Jalmar Kerttula and Representative Don Bennett, along with other sponsors, presented to Lowell Thomas, Jr., Lieutenant Governor of Alaska, a copy of an application for an initiative for an Act entitled “The Alaska Homestead Act.” The lieutenant governor certified the application as being in proper form under the requirements of the applicable statutes, AS 15.45.030-15.45.080. Thereafter, initiative petition booklets were prepared for circulation by the sponsors to obtain the necessary signatures to place the initiative on the ballot. In January of 1978, the petition was returned, with a sufficient number of signatures. In February of 1978, the lieutenant governor reviewed the petition and determined that it would be placed upon the ballot.

2 . In the action filed by appellee Warren, Judge Carlson held that the initiative was displaced by an act of the legislature, ch. 181, SLA 1978, and thus voided the initiative under article XI, section 4 of the Alaska Constitution. See Warren v. Boucher, 543 P.2d 731 (Alaska 1975). In the action filed by Bailey, et at, and Trustees for Alaska, Judge Rowland held that the initiative amounted to special legislation, which is exempted from the initiative process by article XI, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution, and that it effected an appropriation, which, according to article XI, section 7, cannot be enacted by initiative.

3 . The case was reassigned to the author of this opinion on March 9, 1979.

4 . Other issues were raised but were inadequately briefed. In view of our decision, we have not specified those additional challenges to the initiative.

5 . Alaska Const., art. XI, § 7.

6 . The Beirne Initiative is divided into two sections. The first section makes certain findings of fact and declarations with respect to land ownership in Alaska. The second section amends Title 38, Chapter 5 of the Alaska Statutes by adding new provisions designed to implement transfer of state lands to private ownership. We shall cite particular provisions of the Initiative by reference to the section number designated for Alaska Statutes.

7 . AS 38.05.410(a).

8 . AS 38.05.420(c).

9 . AS 38.05.420.

10 .AS 38.05.420(f).

11 . AS 38.05.440.

12 .Alaska’s Constitutional Convention witnessed a far-ranging and spirited debate over the wisdom of initiative and referendum provisions. 2 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention 928-73 (1955) (hereinafter PACC). Victor Fischer, a participant in the Convention, writes of the opposing views:

Those supporting inclusion of direct legislative authority cited: (1) successful use of the initiative in other states to enact laws upon which the legislature refused to act, (2) the value of additional checks and balances, and (3) the importance of the legislature’s awareness that such power exists with the people. They argued that the initiative and referendum represent progressive government, that the ultimate trust should be with the people, not the legislature; and that the provision constituted a means of proving to Alaskans that their rights would be enhanced under statehood.

Opponents of direct legislation provisions argued that the two systems are cumbersome, costly, and totally unnecessary when the legislature is truly representative of the people as under the Alaska constitution, and that the powers of initiative and referendum are outmoded systems instituted fifty years before when legislatures functioned differently . . Some also viewed these measures more as tools of organized special interests than as a democratic device of the people.

After three hours of debate on the concepts underlying the initiative and referendum, delegates voted forty-three [sic: thirty-four] to sixteen to include the initiative in the constitution. The decision to retain the referendum won by a tally of forty to eight.

V. Fischer, Alaska’s Constitut&nal Convention 79-80 (1975) (footnotes omitted). The Convention Proceedings indicate the initiative provision passed thirty-four to sixteen. 2 PACC 972 (1955).

In light of the political climate in Alaska, it is not surprising that the constitutional provisions retaining direct popular control won approval:

One of the basic arguments for statehood was [the] lack of self determination and self governance under the federal administration [of Alaska], Statehood proponents saw the constitution as a means to define the powers that would be accrued to the people under statehood as well as the limits that would be placed on the powers of government. In this context, convention delegates were conscious of public interest in constitutional provisions dealing with basic rights and controls, including suffrage, direct legislation, and constitutional revision.

V. Fischer, Alaska’s Constitutional Convention 69 (1975).

13 . Municipality of Anchorage v. Frohne, 568 P.2d 3, 8 (Alaska 1977); Boucher v. Engstrom, 528 P.2d 456, 462 (Alaska 1974); Epperson v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d 61, 82 P.2d 445, 448 (1938) (per curiam); Laam v. McLaren, 28 Cal.App. 632, 153 P. 985, 987-88 (1915); Brownlow v. Wunsch, 103 Colo. 120, 83 P.2d 775, 777 (1938) (en banc); State ex rel. McPherson v. Snell, 168 Or. 153, 121 P.2d 930, 934 (1942); Othus v. Kozer, 119 Or. 101, 248 P. 146, 149 (1926) (en banc); Sudduth v. Chapman, 88 Wash.2d 247, 558 P.2d 806, 808-09 (1977) (en banc).

14 . In note 12, supra, we describe the background of the initiative and referendum provisions in Alaska’s Constitution.

15 . Hammond v. McDonald, 49 Cal.App.2d 671, 122 P.2d 332, 338 (1942); Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195 P.2d 662, 670 (1948); Higer v. Hansen, 67 Idaho 45, 170 P.2d 411, 414-15 (1946); In re McCabe, 168 Mont. 334, 544 P.2d 825, 828 (1975); Postal Fin. Co. v. Sisneros, 84 N.M. 724, 507 P.2d 785, 786 (1973). In construing a constitutional provision which has been ratified by the voters, the court also can look to evidence on the meaning the voters probably placed on the provision, State v. Lewis, 559 P.2d 630, 637-38 (Alaska), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 901, 97 S.Ct. 2943, 53 L.Ed.2d 1073-74 (1977).

16 . Hotel Employees Local 879 v. Thomas, 551 P.2d 942, 944 (Alaska 1976); Warren v. Boucher, 543 P.2d 731, 735 (Alaska 1975); State v. City of Anchorage, 513 P.2d 1104, 1110 (Alaska 1973); State v. American Can Co., 362 P.2d 291, 296 (Alaska 1961). We also look to provisions from other jurisdictions that are similar to the Alaska statutory or constitutional provision at issue. Hewing v. Alaska Workmen’s Comp. Bd., 512 P.2d 896, 899 (Alaska 1973); 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction §§ 52.01-52.05 (4th ed. 1973).

17 . Accord, Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326-27, 4 L.Ed. 97, 103 (1816); People v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 42 Cal.2d 621, 268 P.2d 723, 731, appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 859, 75 S.Ct. 87, 99 L.Ed. 677 (1954); State ex rel. Linn v. Superior Court, 20 Wash.2d 138, 146 P.2d 543, 547 (1944) (en banc).

18 .Cal.Const. art. II, § 9(a) (exempts from referendum “statutes providing for tax levies or appropriations for usual current expenses of the State”); Md.Const. art. XVI, § 2 (exempts from referendum any “law making any appropriation for maintaining the State Government, or for maintaining or aiding any public institution, not exceeding the next previous appropriation for the same purpose”); Mass.Const. art. XLVIII, Init., pt. II, § 2 (exempts from initiative any measure “that makes a specific appropriation of money from the treasury of the commonwealth”) and art. XLVIII, Ref., pt. III, § 2 (exempts from referendum any law “that appropriates money for the current or ordinary expenses of the commonwealth or for any of its departments, boards, commissions or institutions”); Mich.Const. art. 2, § 9 (exempts from referendum “acts making appropriations for state institutions or to meet deficiencies in state funds"); Mo.Const. art. III, § 51 (exempts from initiative laws “for the appropriation of money other than of new revenues created and provided for thereby”) and art. III, § 52(a) (exempts from referendum “laws making appropriations for the maintenance of state institutions and for the support of public schools”); Mont.Const. art. III, § 4 (exempts from initiative “appropriations of money”) and art. III, § 5 (exempts from referendum laws making “an appropriation of money”); Neb.Const. art. III, § 3 (exempts from referendum acts “making appropriations for the expense of the state government or a state institution existing at the time of the passage of such act”); N.M.Const. art. IV, § 1 (exempts from referendum “general appropriation laws; laws providing for the payment of the public debt or interest thereon, or the creation or funding of the same .; for the maintenance of the public schools or state institutions”); Wash.Const. art. II, § 1(b) enacted by amend. 7 (1912) (exempts from referendum “such laws as may be necessary for the . . . support of the state government and its existing institutions”).

19 .Most decisions dealing with the appropriation restriction involve a factual pattern in which one group wants a referendum on a statute increasing or enacting a tax, and another group claims it is an appropriation for current state expenses or for state institutions and, therefore, immune from referendum. See Michigan Good Roads Fed’n v. Alger, 333 Mich. 352, 53 N.W.2d 481, 486-87 (1952) (statutes which required an increase in gas tax to be credited to the motor vehicle highway fund not subject to referendum under constitutional provision exempting from referendum “acts making appropriation for state institutions”); Heinkel v. Toberman, 360 Mo. 58, 226 S.W.2d 1012, 1016 (1950) (en banc) (statute levying gas tax for construction and maintenance of highways is not an appropriation law and, therefore, is subject to referendum); State ex rel. Hoppe v. Meyers, 58 Wash.2d 320, 363 P.2d 121, 125-26 (1961) (en banc) (statute increasing fuel tax and requiring proceeds to go to toll bridge authority not subject to referendum under constitutional provision exempting from referendum laws for the “ ‘support of the state government and its existing institutions’ ”); cf. Dorsey v. Petrott, 178 Md. 230, 13 A.2d 630, 639 (1940) (statute abolishing Conservation Commission and creating a new Commission of Fisheries with expanded duties is not an “appropriation for maintaining the State Government” and is therefore subject to referendum); Murray v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 345 Mass. 23, 184 N.E.2d 336, 339 (1962) (statute increasing salaries of members of state supreme court and legislature is not an appropriation and hence is subject to referendum); State ex rel. Bonner v. Dixon, 59 Mont. 58, 195 P. 841, 845-46 (1921) (initiative authorizing issuance and sale of bonds for schools is not an appropriation and hence is a proper initiative), as modified by Board of Regents v. Judge, 168 Mont. 433, 543 P.2d 1323, 1330-31 (1975). See also State ex rel. Linn v. Romero, 53 N.M. 402, 209 P.2d 179, 185 (1949) (statute increasing gas tax to meet highway department’s bond obligation is a law providing “for the payment of the public debt” and therefore not subject to referendum). Other cases dealing with similar, but distinguishable, constitutional language are helpful to an understanding of the complex issues involved in this area. See Geiger v. Board of Supervisors, 48 Cal.2d 832, 313 P.2d 545, 546—49 (1957) (tax on sales and use of property adopted by county board of supervisors pursuant to state legislation authorizing such a tax is not subject to referendum under constitutional provision exempting “tax levies” from referendum); Greenberg v. Lee, 196 Or. 157, 248 P.2d 324, 336 (1952) (en banc) (city ordinance prohibiting “punchboards” was an “emergency ordinance” within meaning of city charter provision exempting such ordinances from power of referendum).

20 . Black’s Law Dictionary 131 (4th ed. 1951) defines “appropriation of land” as “the act of selecting, devoting, or setting apart land for a particular use or purpose.” In fact, the Beirne Initiative itself refers to “vacant, unappropriated and unreserved” land as the pool of land from which an applicant may choose. AS 38.-05.410(a); 38.05.530(6). For other references to appropriations in the context of lands, see ch. 213, § 1, SLA 1970 (formerly codified at AS 07.10.150, repealed by ch. 118, SLA 1972); Alaska Statehood Act, Pub.L. 85-508, § 6(a) and (b), 72 Stat. 339 (1958) (codified at 48 U.S.C.A. Prec. § 21, § 6(a) and (b) (Supp.1978)); 1964 Op.Att’y Gen. No. 7 at 2 (Alaska, Sept. 14, 1964).

. In Municipality of Anchorage v. Frohne, 568 P.2d 3, 5-6 (Alaska 1977), we considered whether the Municipality of Anchorage had to make appropriations by ordinance or whether it could proceed by City Council memorandum. We concluded that either method was permissible and noted in the Anchorage Municipal Charter a definition of appropriations as “ ‘a unit of funding provided for by the Assembly in the municipal budget.’ ” Id. at 5, quoting Anchorage Municipal Charter art. XVII, § 17.-13(a). In Thomas v. Rosen, 569 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1977), we found that the governor possessed no power to item-veto a bond authorization that the legislature had submitted to the voters. Since the governor could strike or reduce items on appropriations bills, Alaska Const, art. II, § 15, the question before the court was whether the voter-approved bonding proposition was an appropriation bill within the meaning of the constitutional provision. In concluding that it was not, we adopted the following definition of appropriation:

‘[T]he setting aside from the public revenue of a certain sum of money for a specified object, in such manner that the executive officers of the government are authorized to use that money, and no more, for that object, and no other.’

21 Id. at 796, quoting State ex rel Finnegan v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 143, 264 N.W. 622, 624 (1936). These cases indicate that the term “appropriations” frequently refers to money. In Frohne, however, the case turned on the court’s analysis of the legal change effected by adoption of the Anchorage Municipal Charter, while in Thomas, the court rested its decision on the constitution’s policy on state debt. Thus, Frohne and Thomas defined appropriations according to the terms and purpose of the specific provisions they were interpreting. Neither decision purported to offer a general definition of appropriations.

22 . For an explanation of the process of writing Alaska’s Constitution, including the role of different committees at the Convention, see V. Fischer, Alaska’s Constitutional Convention 45-68 (1975).

23 . 6 PACC app. V at 19-20 (1955). The revised section 5 became art. XI, § 7.

24 . Statement of Delegate Sundborg, 4 PACC 2969 (1956). Delegate Sundborg was the member of the Committee on Style and Drafting who explained the Committee’s change in the provisions relating to direct legislation. See 4 PACC 2947-77 (1956).

We believe the brief Convention discussion referring to the elimination of the phrase “of public funds” basically points to the rather commonsense notion that the subject of an appropriations act could never be something that the state did not own. The term “appropriations” certainly would include acts directing the outflow of money and in that sense, the phrase “appropriations of public funds ” would be unnecessary. But the fact that all acts appropriating money are appropriations of public funds does not imply that only acts appropriating money constitute appropriations of public funds.

25 .We note some of the definitions of “funds” in Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951):

FUND, n. A generic term and all-embracing as compared with term “money,” etc., which is specific.

A sum of money set apart for a specific purpose, or available for the payment of debts or claims.

In the plural, this word has a variety of slightly different meanings, as follows:

Moneys and much more, such as notes, bills, checks, drafts, stocks and bonds, and in broader meaning may include property of every kind.

Money in hand; assets; cash; money available for the payment of a debt, legacy, etc.

The proceeds of sales of real and personal estate, or the proceeds of any other assets converted into money.

Corporate stocks or government securities; in this sense usually spoken of as the “funds.”

Assets, securities, bonds, or revenue of a state or government appropriate for the discharge of its debts.

No funds. This term denotes a lack of assets or money for specific use. It is the return made by a bank to a check drawn upon it by a person who has no deposit to his credit there; also by an executor, trustee, etc., who has no assets for the specific purpose.

Black’s Law Dictionary 802-03 (4th ed. 1951) (citations omitted, emphasis added).

The word “fund” comes originally from the Latin word “fundus,” which meant a piece of land or a farm, see IV The Oxford English Dictionary 603 (1933), or landed property in general, see the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 533 (1970). Black’s defines “fundus” as follows:

FUNDUS. In the civil and old English law, land; land or ground generally; land, without considering its specific use; land, including buildings, generally; a farm.

Black’s Law Dictionary 803 (4th ed. 1951). Black’s defines the phrase “fundi publici” as public lands. Id.

26 . In this case, the superior court found:

“Public funds” are the capital assets of the public body and here of necessity includes the real property capital assets of the State governmental entity.

Memorandum Decision at 12.

27 . The commentary by the Committee on Direct Legislation states:

The restrictions in Section 5 will prevent the abuses and problems that have sometimes arisen in the states permitting initiative and referendum.

6 PACC app. V at 23-24 (1955).

28 . Warren Taylor was the member of the Committee on Direct Legislation who made most of the comments on the Committee’s proposed referendum and initiative provision.

29 . 2 PACC 931-33 (1955).

30 . At statehood, the people of Alaska were given an “unprecedentedly large grant of 104 million acres [of land].” H.R.Rep.No.95-1045, Pt. I, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1978).

31 . This assumes that the average value per acre is $300.

32 . The very same arguments could be made for an initiative that required a grant of money to Alaska residents. Many believe that granting more money to private citizens, thereby increasing the discretionary income available for spending in the private sector, is a policy which is economically and philosophically superior to government expenditures of equivalent sums. Some believe this would increase tax revenues. Although the legislature could appropriate grants of money to citizens, appellants admit that an initiative could not require appropriations for that purpose.

33 . We note that the applicant need not bear the cost of the survey. A survey must be made within five years of receiving the land, AS 38.-05.440, yet the applicant may sell the land after one year.

34 . If state-owned land were surveyed by private individuals, that would be valuable to the state. The value to the state is certainly insignificant, however, when the surveyed lands are in private ownership.