Thomas Sweeney v. RPD Holding Group LLC

Court of Chancery of Delaware·Decided May 27, 2021·No. CA No. 2020-0813-SG·Published

Opinion

COURT OF CHANCERY OF

THE

SAM GLASSCOCK III VICE CHANCELLOR STATE OF DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY COURTHOUSE 34 THE CIRCLE

GEORGETOWN, DELAWARE 19947

Date Submitted: January 8, 2021 Date Decided: May 27, 2021

Geoffrey G. Grivner, Esquire Kevin A. Guerke, Esquire Kody M. Sparks, Esquire Caleb G. Johnson, Esquire Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP 919 North Market Street, Suite 990 1000 North King Street Wilmington, Delaware 19801 Wilmington, Delaware 19801

Re: Thomas Sweeney, et. al., v. RPD Holdings Group, LLC, et. al., Civil Action No. 2020-0813-SG

Dear Counsel:

This matter is before me on the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on grounds of

forum non conveniens. For the reasons that follow, that motion is granted.

Fifteenth century Italian financier Lorenzo de Tonti promoted an investment vehicle that was a mix of joint tenancy, life insurance and the lottery. In the tontine, investors paid a sum into the vehicle that was never to be repaid. Instead, once the vehicle was subscribed, the investor received modest annuity payments. The payments for each unit were fixed. Nonetheless, the investment was attractive to investors of a sporting nature, because as each unit-holder died, his right to receive payments went not to his heirs, but was spread among the surviving unit-holders, so that the last alive received cumulative annuities that were large indeed.

The tontine, in modern times, is found more in fiction than in real life; the moral hazard incumbent in its rather macabre features make it beloved of mystery writers.1 Nonetheless, many ownership schemes contain features of the tontine; the ownership of shares of the entity at issue here, per the complaint, is one such structure. The following facts, except where noted, are taken from the Amended Complaint; in all events the facts recited represent the parties’ allegations only.

The shares in question here represent interests in a family produce company, Dandrea Holdings, Inc. (“the Company”), which operates in the sandy, tomato- friendly environs of Vineland, New Jersey. 2 The Company equity is composed of 75 shares of stock, with each Dandrea brother, Ronald, Steven, and Frank, beneficially owning 25 shares.3 The ownership structure of this three-brother-owned business is byzantine, and not entirely clear from the Complaint and the briefing. I present it here (to the extent I comprehend it) in simplified form, as sufficient to the issues presented.4 The structure is represented graphically in Figure 1. Each brother’s shares were held by a separate Delaware limited liability holding company,

1 See, e.g., Agatha Christie, 4:50 from Paddington (1957); see also The Simpsons: The Curse of the Flying Hellfish (Fox television broadcast Apr. 28, 1996). 2 The family company was originally Dandrea Produce, Inc. Am. Compl. ¶ 2. After a 2015 merger, the assets and operations of that company were divided into two other entities that are both majority-owned by Dandrea Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation. See id. ¶ 21. 3 Id. ¶ 2. 4 And in aid of the understanding and mental well-being of the reader.

which I will refer to here as “Frank’s LLC,”5 “Steven’s LLC,” 6 and “Ronald’s LLC.” 7 Each brother was the sole manager of his respective LLC. 8 Each LLC was in turn “owned” by the Bryn Mawr Trust Co. of Delaware (“Bryn Mawr”), presumably beneficially for each brother.9 In 2007, the brothers entered a trust agreement (the “TA”). 10 Although the Amended Complaint both quotes and attempts to explain the TA, I find its language opaque. The Plaintiffs’ theory is that the TA was entered to form a tontine-like structure for the stock ownership. The trust created by the TA (the “2007 Trust”) was to maintain life insurance policies in the amount of $2 million (slightly less than the agreed upon value of each brother’s shares) on each brother, presumably payable to the 2007 Trust. 11 Upon the death of a brother, his surviving brothers were able to elect to cause the 2007 Trust to use the life insurance proceeds to purchase the shares of the decedent, pro rata. 12 One brother, Ronald,13 has died, and his survivors have given Sandra, his widow and executrix, notice that they are exercising what amounts to a call right under the TA.

5 Plaintiff FSD Holdings Group, LLC. 6 Plaintiff SPD Holdings Group, LLC. 7 Defendant RPD Holdings Group, LLC. 8 See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23(i)–23(iii); Defs.’ Opening Br. 9, Dkt. No. 12. 9 See Figure 1; see also supra notes 3 and 5–7 and accompanying text. 10 See, e.g., Am. Compl., Ex. 2 (the “2007 Trust Agreement”), Dkt. No 10. 11 Per the Plaintiffs, the premium on each life insurance policy was paid by Dandrea Holdings, Inc., not the 2007 Trust. See Am. Compl. ¶ 37. 12 See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25–29. 13 Because of a superabundance of Dandreas in this litigation, I refer to Ronald, his widow, and his siblings by their first names only. No disrespect is intended thereby.

As an added twist, the Plaintiffs allege that Ronald, surreptitiously and in violation of the TA, somehow changed the beneficiary of the policy owned by the 2007 Trust to his estate, which has received the $2 million in benefits. 14 Despite the calls of the remaining brothers, the Defendants, Ronald’s LLC and Sandra, refuse to turn over the shares. This action was brought by plaintiffs Thomas Sweeney, trustee of the 2007 Trust (the “2007 Trustee”), the surviving brothers, and their respective entities, Frank’s and Steven’s LLCs, which purportedly made the calls on the estate. The Plaintiffs seek specific performance of the TA by Ronald’s LLC and by Sandra as Executrix.

It is worth noting for purposes of the Motion here 15 that the Defendants paint a substantially different view of the facts in their briefing on the Motion and via attachments thereto.16 According to the Defendants, Ronald and his brothers had a falling out over the brothers’ perceived misfeasance in the family business, causing Ronald to sue them.17 That litigation was withdrawn in 2017 in return for the brothers’ promise to buy out Ronald for $5 million, a promise that remains unfulfilled.18 The amount was fixed by a then-recent valuation by the three brothers

14 E.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 38, 40. 15 Because the Motion is based on comity grounds, I am not limited in my consideration to the allegations of the complaint. 16 See generally, e.g., Defs.’ Opening Br., Dkt. No. 12. 17 Id. 10–11. 18 Id. 11.

of their collective interests, totaling $15 million. 19 According to Sandra, Ronald never told her about the TA or the existence of the 2007 Trust.20 She was surprised, therefore, to receive the surviving brother’s calls for Ronald’s stock. 21 When she received these calls, she requested the 2007 Trust’s records, but was stonewalled by the trustee. 22 She therefore filed suit on September 21, 2020 in the Chancery Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey against Sweeney, trustee of the 2007 Trust and a plaintiff here, seeking records and an accounting for the trust, in order to be able to defend against the calls. 23 This Delaware action was filed the next day, September 22, 2020, seeking specific performance of the TA based on those same calls.24 After Ronald’s death, Sandra used her authority as executrix and/or successor manager of Ronald’s LLC to remove that entity from the ownership of Bryn Mawr and vest it in the The Dandrea Irrevocable Trust (2020), a New Jersey entity (the “2020 Trust”). 25 After the complaint in this action was amended, adding Ronald’s LLC as a defendant, Sandra caused that entity to be redomiciled as a New Jersey, rather than a Delaware, limited liability company.26 Sandra is also engaged in

19 See id. 2. 20 Id. 11–13. 21 Id. 22 See id. 11–13. 23 Id. 13–14. 24 Id.; see also generally Am. Compl. 25 Defs.’ Opening Br. 11–12. 26 Id.

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