THOMAS SPOTTED BEAR v. DARWIN LONG, AOF Administrator; JEAN WHIRLWIND HORSE, Director of Corrections; RONDA BELILE, Sargent of Corrections; and C-O IRINE RONE EAGLE

District Court, D. South Dakota·Decided November 20, 2025·No. 5:25-cv-05054·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA WESTERN DIVISION

THOMAS SPOTTED BEAR, 5:25-CV-05054-RAL Plaintiff, ORDER VACATING PREVIOUS ORDER VS. REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO PAY FILING FEE OR MOVE FOR IN FORMA DARWIN LONG, AOF Administrator; JEAN PAUPERIS AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S WHIRLWIND HORSE, Director of Corrections; | MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN RONDA BELILE, Sargent of Corrections; and FORMA PAUPERIS C-O IRINE RONE EAGLE, Defendants.

Plaintiff Thomas Spotted Bear filed a pro se civil rights lawsuit while he was incarcerated at the Adult Offenders Facility in Pine Ridge, South Dakota. Doc. 1. He filed a motion for leave □

to proceed in forma pauperis and provided a prisoner trust account report. Docs. 6,7. On the same day Spotted Bear filed his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and prisoner trust account report, and before it was possible to review these documents, this Court issued an order requiring Spotted Bear to pay the filing fee or move for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. 9, I. Applicability of PLRA At the time Spotted Bear filed his complaint and motion to proceed in forma pauperis, he was an inmate at the Adult Offenders Facility. Docs. 1, 6. In his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Spotted Bear stated that he expected to be released from custody on October 15,

2025. Doe. 6 at 1. Before the Court ruled on Spotted Bear’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, he was released from custody.! Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a prisoner who “brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis . . . shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). But circuit courts are split on whether the PLRA continues to apply after the prisoner is released during litigation. See Carson v. Tulsa Police Dep’t, 266 F. App’x 763, 766— 67 (10th Cir. 2008) (describing split in authority); see also Domino v. Garland, No. 20-CV-2583, 2021 WL 1221188, at *1 (D. Minn. Apr. 1, 2021). The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have held that, under the PLRA, “a prisoner is obligated to pay assessed fees and costs only while he or she remains incarcerated,” and “[a]fter release, the obligation to pay the remainder of the fees is to be determined solely on the question of whether the released individual qualifies for pauper status.” Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1139 (6th Cir. 1997); see also McGann v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 96 F.3d 28, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1996); DeBlasio v. Gilmore, 315 F.3d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 2003). By contrast, the Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits hold, based on the plain language of § 1915(b)(1), that a complainant must pay the full amount of the filing fee if the complainant was a prisoner when the action was commenced. See Gay v. Tex. Dep’t of Corr. State Jail Div., 117 F.3d 240, 241-42 (Sth Cir. 1997); Robbins v. Switzer, 104 F.3d 895, 897-99 (7th Cir. 1997); In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The Eighth Circuit has not expressly weighed in on this issue but the court’s holding in Tyler is instructive. See In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529-30 (8th Cir. 1997). There, the court denied

' Spotted Bear is not listed as an inmate on the inmate listing portal for the Adult Offenders Facility. See Inmates, Pub. Safety Suite Pro, https://oglala-pd-sd.zuercherportal.com/#/inmates (last visited Nov. 17, 2025).

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the plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and refused to address the merits of the plaintiffs mandamus petition until the requisite financial obligations were met. Id. at 529-30. The court explained that because the plaintiff had previously filed three improper actions, he was no longer eligible for a § 1915(b) installment plan. Id. at 529; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (stating that a prisoner is not eligible for a reduced filing fee or an installment payment plan “if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions . . . brought an action . . . that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim”). As such, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay the filing fee in full, noting that “[e]ven if [plaintiff]’s petition is dismissed, [plaintiff] will still be assessed the full filing fee because the PLRA makes prisoners responsible for their filing fees the moment the prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal.” Tyler, 110 F.3d at 529-30. Based on this language, courts within the Eighth Circuit have held that if a prisoner filed the action while in custody, they remain liable for the filing fee even if they are later released from custody. See Domino, 2021 WL 1221188, at *1 n.3 (stating that the “holding in Tyler that the fee obligation imposed by § 1915(b)(1) is triggered at the time the action is filed . . . is consistent with the conclusion that a complainant who filed an action when he was a prisoner remains liable for the filing fee if he is subsequently released from custody”); Counts v. Missouri, 4:24-CV-01437- MTS, 2025 WL 812276, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 13, 2025) (stating that, in light of the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Tyler, the § 1983 plaintiff was “responsible for the entire [filing] fee because the full fee was assessed against him prior to his release from custody”); McFee v. Minnesota, No. 11-3614, 2012 WL 514708, at *3 nn.5—6 (D. Minn. Jan. 24, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 512611 (D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2012) (recognizing that the plaintiff must pay the filing fee, despite having been released from custody before the court ruled on the motion for IFP); Williams v. Doe #1, No. 4:06CV1344, 2006 WL 3804027, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2006)

(noting “§ 1915(b)(1) continue[d] to apply” despite litigant’s release). But see Clark v. Wood, No. 4:20-CV-1215-JAR, 2021 WL 1873561, at *1 (E.D. Mo. May 10, 2021) (stating that if a plaintiff was released from custody before the court ruled on the IFP motion, the court will consider the motion under the non-prisoner standard in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)). This Court finds that applying the PLRA to Spotted Bear, who filed this action when an inmate though he has been released from custody subsequently, best adheres to the plain language of the PLRA and the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Tyler.? Because Spotted Bear filed this action while he was in custody, he is liable for the full filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). I. Spotted Bear’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Because Spotted Bear filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, this Court vacates its previous order requiring him to pay the filing fee or move for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Doc. 9. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner who “brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis . . . shall be required to pay the full amount ofa filing fee.” 28 U.S.C.

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THOMAS SPOTTED BEAR v. DARWIN LONG, AOF Administrator; JEAN WHIRLWIND HORSE, Director of Corrections; RONDA BELILE, Sargent of Corrections; and C-O IRINE RONE EAGLE, (D.S.D. 2025).

THOMAS SPOTTED BEAR v. DARWIN LONG, AOF Administrator; JEAN WHIRLWIND HORSE, Director of Corrections; RONDA BELILE, Sargent of Corrections; and C-O IRINE RONE EAGLE (THOMAS SPOTTED BEAR v. DARWIN LONG, AOF Administrator; JEAN WHIRLWIND HORSE, Director of Corrections; RONDA BELILE, Sargent of Corrections; and C-O IRINE RONE EAGLE) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Carson v. Tulsa Police Department
266 F. App'x 763 (Tenth Circuit, 2008)
In Re Prison Litigation Reform Act
105 F.3d 1131 (Sixth Circuit, 1997)
In Re Melvin Leroy Tyler
110 F.3d 528 (Eighth Circuit, 1997)
In Re Peter C. Smith
114 F.3d 1247 (D.C. Circuit, 1997)
Deblasio v. Gilmore
315 F.3d 396 (Fourth Circuit, 2003)
Bruce v. Samuels
577 U.S. 82 (Supreme Court, 2016)
Robbins v. Switzer
104 F.3d 895 (Seventh Circuit, 1997)