Thomas Spoon & Maria Spoon v. Chester Lee Bolds & Linda Bolds

2023 Ark. App. 244, 665 S.W.3d 280

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
• Decided: April 26, 2023
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 244 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CV-22-277

THOMAS SPOON AND MARIA SPOON APPELLANTS Opinion Delivered April 26, 2023

V. APPEAL FROM THE PULAKSI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, CHESTER LEE BOLDS AND LINDA SEVENTEENTH DIVISION BOLDS [NO. 60CV-21-1614] APPELLEES HONORABLE MACKIE M. PIERCE, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

MIKE MURPHY, Judge

Appellants Thomas Spoon and Maria Spoon appeal from the February 16, 2022

Pulaski County Circuit Court order granting summary judgment in favor of appellees

Chester Lee Bolds and Linda Bolds in the Boldses’ civil suit for damages related to insurance

proceeds. We affirm.

This case concerns the Spoons’ entitlement to insurance proceeds paid on an

insurance claim on a house after the Spoons sold the house to the Boldses. The Boldses

purchased the Spoons’ house by warranty deed on July 2, 2020. In November 2020, the

Boldses filed an insurance claim because they discovered the roof was leaking. The Boldses’

insurance coverage would not pay because there was preexisting damage to the roof. The

Boldses then filed a claim against the Spoons’ homeowner’s insurance. That insurer accepted the claim but paid the money in dispute ($5,219.48) to the Spoons. When the Spoons failed

to turn the money paid on the insurance claim over to the Boldses, the Boldses filed suit,

raising claims of breach of contract, declaratory judgment, and unjust enrichment.

The Boldses then moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Spoons did not

retain any interest in the house after they sold it by warranty deed, including an insurable

interest. In response to the motion, the Spoons argued there is no privity of contract between

the Boldses and the Spoons’ insurance carrier. The Spoons also contend they are entitled to

the money because they were the owners of the property at the time of loss. They claim that

unjust enrichment cannot equitably apply because the Boldses did not pay for the insurance

policy.

In granting summary judgment, the court’s order found that any and all interest the

Spoons may have had in the house was terminated and extinguished upon the sale of the

house to the Boldses, and it ordered the Spoons to reimburse the Boldses for the roof repairs.

Our law is well settled that summary judgment is to be granted by a circuit court only

when there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Lookabaugh v. Hanna Oil & Gas Co., 2014 Ark. App. 445, at 5–

6, 442 S.W.3d 1, 4. Once the moving party has established a prima facie entitlement to

summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate the

existence of a material issue of fact. Id. On appellate review, we determine if summary

judgment was appropriate by deciding whether the evidentiary items presented by the

moving party in support of the motion leave a material fact unanswered. Id. We view the

2 evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was filed, resolving

all doubts and inferences against the moving party. Id. Our review focuses not only on the

pleadings, but also on the affidavits and other documents filed by the parties. Id.

On appeal, the Spoons argue that summary judgment was not proper because the

court did not address the issues of privity of contract, standing, statute of frauds, or timing.

To support their argument, they contend the general rule is that insurance policies are

personal contracts between the insured and the insurer and that the Boldses were not a party

to the original contract or privy to it. Their argument focuses on the theory of contract law

rather than the equitable claim of unjust enrichment. While this argument might be

persuasive in a breach-of-contract analysis, the Spoons argument ignores the alternate theory

of unjust enrichment upon which the lower court could have granted relief.

Our courts have recognized that when a circuit court grants a summary-judgment

motion without expressly stating the basis for its ruling, that ruling encompasses all of the

issues presented to the circuit court by the briefs and arguments of the parties. Windsong

Enters., Inc. v. Red Apple Enters. Ltd. P’ship, 2018 Ark. App. 39, at 5, 542 S.W.3d 177, 180.

Here the issues of breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and declaratory judgment were

briefed to the circuit court. The written order simply provided that the motion should be

granted without stating the theory it was relying on. Therefore, we have no alternative but

to conclude that the circuit court’s grant of the motion for summary judgment constituted

a ruling on all of the issues raised by the parties.

3 To find unjust enrichment, a party must have received something of value to which

he or she is not entitled and which he or she must restore. GM Enters., LLC v. HCH Toyota,

LLC, 2018 Ark. App. 607, at 10, 567 S.W.3d 878, 884. There must also be some operative

act, intent, or situation to make the enrichment unjust and compensable. Id. One who is

free from fault cannot be held to be unjustly enriched merely because he or she has chosen

to exercise a legal or contractual right. Id. Further, if one has money belonging to another,

which, in equity and good conscience, he ought not to retain, it can be recovered although

there is no privity between the parties. Patton v. Brown-Moore Lumber Co., 173 Ark. 128, 292

S.W. 383 (1927).

Here, it is undisputed that the Spoons received the insurance money that was

distributed for repair of the roof of a house they no longer have an interest in. Unjust

enrichment amounted to an alternative, independent basis for the circuit court’s ruling,

which has gone unchallenged by the Spoons. When an appellant fails to challenge a circuit

court’s alternative, independent basis for its ruling, we will affirm. Edward D. Jones & Co.,

LLC v. Lewis, 2020 Ark. App. 327, at 6–7. Accordingly, we affirm, and the Boldses are

entitled to the reimbursement.

Affirmed.

ABRAMSON and GRUBER, JJ., agree.

The Brad Hendricks Law Firm, by: Lloyd W. Kitchens, for appellants.

Bennie O’Neil, for appellees.