Thomas Shea v. Leland Dudek

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 3, 2025
• Docket: 22-16778
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 3 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

THOMAS GREGORY SHEA, No. 22-16778

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:21-cv-00518-CLB

v. MEMORANDUM* LELAND DUDEK, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Carla Baldwin, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 3, 2025**

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, KLEINFELD, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Thomas Gregory Shea appeals pro se the district court’s affirmance of the

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for supplemental

social security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (Act). We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We review de novo,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012), and we affirm.1

Contrary to Shea’s contention, because the record was neither ambiguous

nor inadequate, the ALJ was not required to develop the record further with respect

to Shea’s mental impairments. See Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th

Cir. 2001).

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Shea did not

have an impairment or combination thereof that meets or medically equals a listed

impairment. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 20

C.F.R. § 404.1526); see also Molina, 674 F.3d at 1110. The ALJ reasonably

determined the record evidence as a whole did not support Shea’s symptoms and

allegations, and further, that Shea was mentally capable of performing basic work

activities. See id.; see also Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir.

2005); see also Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th

Cir. 2004) (“When evidence reasonably supports either confirming or reversing the

ALJ’s decision, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ.”).

1 Shea’s “motion to proceed In Forma Pauperis” at Docket Entry (DE) No. 13 is denied as unnecessary because the district court previously granted Shea’s motion and the status was not revoked. Shea’s “motion for extension of time” at DE No. 14 is denied as unnecessary because the opening brief was filed. Shea’s “motion to transmit exhibit” at DE No. 15 is granted. Shea’s “notice of delay” at DE No. 33 and “motion to compel a ruling on the appeal” at DE No. 37 are denied as moot.

2 Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s ruling that the State agency psychological

consultant’s 2012 opinions were not supported by the objective findings, and were

too attenuated to be relevant to the period at issue. Likewise, substantial evidence

supports the ALJ’s decision to give significant weight to the opinions of the State

agency’s medical consultants with respect to Shea’s limitations concerning driving

and other hazards. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1110; see also Bayliss, 427 F.3d at

1214 n.1; see also Batson, 359 F.3d at 1196.

The ALJ properly relied on the vocational expert’s testimony. See Bray v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1223 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2009); see also

Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2001) (An ALJ is free to

accept or reject restrictions in a hypothetical question that are not supported by

substantial evidence.).

Finally, Shea’s allegations do not show that the ALJ’s behavior reflected a

clear inability to render fair judgment, and they are not sufficient to rebut the

presumption of impartiality. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857–58 (9th

Cir. 2001) (In order to rebut the presumption that an ALJ is unbiased, a claimant

must “show that the ALJ’s behavior, in the context of the whole case, was ‘so

extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment.’”).

AFFIRMED.