Thomas Rollins v. DSCYF TPR

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

THOMAS ROLLINS1, § § No. 280, 2025 Respondent Below, Appellant, § § Court Below–the Family Court v. § of the State of Delaware §

DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES § File Nos. 24-04-01TN FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND § CN12-03528 THEIR FAMILIES, § § Petition Nos. 24-07645 Petitioner Below, Appellee. § 23-04196 §

Submitted: January 28, 2026 Decided: February 27, 2026

Before VALIHURA, LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it

appears to the Court that:

(1) Thomas Rollins (“Father”) appeals from a Family Court order denying

his motion for visitation with his two minor children (the “Visitation Order”), and a

later order terminating his parental rights (the “TPR Order”). For the reasons that

follow, we affirm the Family Court’s judgment.

1 The Court previously assigned a pseudonym to Appellant under Supreme Court Rule 7(d).

(2) On March 2, 2023, the Department of Services for Children, Youth, and

Their Families (“DSCYF”) received a report that Father was physically abusing his

two children – J.L. and J.R.2 Four days later, the Family Court granted an ex parte

emergency order to remove the children from Father’s custody.3

(3) On May 31, 2023, the Family Court held a dispositional hearing. After

the hearing, the court issued an order establishing a case plan for Father to complete

to regain custody of the children.4 The case plan consisted of six elements: (1)

Mental & Behavioral Health; (2) Financial & Resource Management; (3)

Relationship & Community Support; (4) Behavioral Issues; (5) Physical Health of

Children; and (6) Family Functioning.5

(4) The first, third, and fourth elements are relevant to this appeal. The first

element – Mental & Behavioral Health – required that Father complete a “mental

health assessment” and that he “comply with any mental health recommendations[.]”

The third element – Relationship & Community Support – required that Father

“demonstrate acts of protection for his children by ensuring that their safety and

well-being are not at risk when they are cared for by others.” And the fourth element

2 A19 (After Hours DFS Emergency Request for Custody).

3 A21–23 (Ex Parte Custody Order on Division of Family Services Filings dated Mar. 6, 2023).

4 A33–39 (Dispositional Hr’g Order dated May 31, 2023).

5 A36–37 (Dispositional Hr’g Order at 4–5).

3

– Behavioral Issues – required that Father complete a domestic violence perpetrator

course, an anger-management assessment, and “follow [all] recommendations.”6

(5) Shortly after Father began working on his case plan, he was charged

with criminal offenses related to child abuse.7 As a result, a no-contact order was

entered against Father, prohibiting him from visitation with the children.8 Father’s

criminal trial took place on September 10, 2024. His eldest child – J.L. – testified

for the State.9 A jury found Father not guilty, and the no-contact order was lifted.10

(6) Following his acquittal, Father filed a motion for visitation with the

Family Court.11 The court conducted a two-day hearing and determined that

visitation with Father was against the children’s best interests and denied the

motion.12

(7) DSCYF filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights in the

children on the ground of “failure to plan.”13 The court held a two-day hearing. The

6 Id.; A597 (Feb. TPR Tr. 53:1–6).

7 Order at 10.

8 A745–46 (Feb. TPR Tr. 201:20–202:4).

9 A1065 (TPR Hr’g Tr. dated May 2, 2025, at 190:9–19 [hereinafter “May TPR Tr.”]).

10 Order at 10.

11 Opening Br., Ex. 1 at 1 (Visitation Order dated Feb. 24, 2025).

12 Id. at 21–22.

13 The record is unclear regarding the date the TPR petition was filed. The TPR Order suggests that a petition was filed by DSCYF on April 3, 2024 (Order at 7); but the filing is not reflected on the Family Court Docket (see generally A6 (Fam. Ct. Dkt. listing filings from Feb. 20, 2024 to

4

first hearing on February 27, 2025, and the final hearing on May 2, 2025 (the “TPR

hearing”).14 During the TPR hearing, the Family Court heard testimony about

Father’s compliance with his case plan.

(8) Regarding the first case plan element (Mental & Behavioral Health),

DSCYF workers testified that they had not received any records from Father’s

therapist to prove that he had completed an assessment or followed the

recommendations in his case plan.15 Father contended that he had complied with the

requirements and consented to the release of his records, but DSCYF had failed to

obtain his file from the therapist.16 In the end, no documentation regarding this

element was entered into evidence, but the court did not find negatively against

Father on this first element.17

(9) Regarding the third case plan element (Relationship & Community

Support), DSCYF workers testified that Father rarely initiated contact with his

children’s caregivers to inquire about their general needs.18 On one occasion, Father

May 31, 2024)). Nevertheless, as neither Father nor DSCYF objects to the date of filing (see Opening Br. 1; DSCYF’s Answering Br. 3), we will assume that the date is accurate. 14 Order at 2.

15 A595 (Feb. TPR Tr. 51:6–21).

16 Id. at 86:9–89:18.

17 Order at 16–17, 22 (noting the lack of documentation but not finding that Father failed this element of the case plan). 18 See e.g., A728 (Feb. TPR Tr. 184:6–24 (witness stating that “neither of [the parents] have ever asked me how [the children] are doing in school.” “[N]either of [the parents] have asked for update[s] on medical appointments.”)).

5

was invited to attend an Individualized Education Program conference for J.R., but

did not show up.19 The Family Court concluded that “[f]or the Relationships &

Community Supports element Father was required to ensure Children’s safety when

cared for by others. The record from the TPR Hearings [was] void as to any progress

made towards this element.”20 The court found that Father failed this element of his

case plan.21

(10) Regarding the fourth case plan element (Behavioral Issues), DSCYF

acknowledged that Father had completed a domestic violence perpetrator course and

entered Father’s certificate of completion into evidence.22 However, even though

Father had completed the course, DSCYF maintained that he had not changed and

continued to deny that he had physically abused the children.23 The instructor of the

course had given Father a low grade on his “attitude towards [his] victim[s].”24

Notably, a DSCYF worker testified that when she attempted to speak with Father

about J.L., Father responded by calling J.L. a “fat [a**].”25 And on another occasion,

Father exclaimed that “it [was] either [his] way or the highway” should J.L. return

19 A728 (Feb. TPR Tr. 184:14–22).

20 Order at 18.

21 Id. at 22.

22 A598–60 (Feb. TPR Tr. 54:16–56:10).

23 A603–04 (Feb. TPR Tr. 59:15–60:21).

24 A685–86 (Feb. TPR Tr. 141:9–142:14).

25 A602–03 (Feb. TPR Tr. 58:24–59:3).

6

home.26 In response, Father testified that he had come to realize that his actions

might have caused his children trauma.27 When asked why he still denied abusing

the children on a questionnaire, Father stated that he had marked it incorrectly.28

The court ultimately found that Father failed to comply with the Behavioral Issues

element, stating:

While Father exhibited some changes in his ability to take accountability when he testified on May 2, 2025, the record reflects Father described the action requiring Children being taken into DSCYF/DFS custody a “misunderstanding with the state” which calls into question whether Father is truly willing to take full accountability[.]

The [c]ourt has consistently held throughout this case that Children’s disclosures have been credible and that the [c]ourt believes Children were physically abused . . . . The [c]ourt now finds that Father cannot have completed this element of his Case Plan without first acknowledging and accepting full responsibility for the domestic violence and physical abuse. Moreover, the [c]ourt finds that Father cannot protect Children from the issues that led to Children being removed from his care if he, after over two (2) years . . . is still unable to take full accountability and acknowledge the physical abuse the Children experienced and witnessed.29

(11) DSCYF employees also testified about their efforts to reunite the

family. Father faulted DSCYF for preventing him from visiting with the children.

He contended that DSCYF hindered, rather than promoted, the goal of

26 A346 (Visitation Hr’g Tr. dated Nov. 20, 2024, at 180:3–9).

27 A917 (May TPR Tr. 42:7–9).

28 A600 (Feb. TPR Tr. 56:4–10).

29 Order at 19.

7

reunification.30 DSCYF explained that the children were extremely hostile towards

Father.31 A DSCYF witness suggested that the family might benefit from

“therapeutical visitations,” but the witness did not indicate that that was mandatory

under Father’s case plan.32

(12) Last, the court heard testimony regarding the children’s current

placement. At the time of the May termination hearing, J.L. was hospitalized at a

psychiatric institution,33 and J.R. was living with a foster family.34

(13) The Family Court terminated Father’s parental rights on June 2, 2025.

Father appealed to this Court. Father challenges the TPR Order on three grounds.

He claims that the Family Court erred in finding that: (1) he failed to comply with

all elements of his case plan; (2) DSCYF made reasonable efforts to reunite the

family; and (3) termination of his parental rights served the best interests of the

children.35 After a careful review of the record, we find that Father’s second and

30 See, e.g., A551–52, 760–62 (Feb. TPR Tr. 7:17–8:20, 216:24–218:10).

31 See, e.g., A760–62 (Feb. TPR Tr. 216:24–218:10) (J.L. held a chair and threatened to throw it at Father); A61–62 (Review Hr’g Order dated July 21, 2023, at 2–3) (J.L. threatened to kill Father by stabbing him in his sleep and J.R. indicated that he wished Father was dead); A724 (Feb. TPR Tr. 180:6–7) (J.R. stated that he hated Father). 32 A669 (Feb. TPR Tr. 125:1–6).

33 A1047 (May TPR Tr. 172:12–18).

34 A1024 (May TPR Tr. 149:17–24).

35 Opening Br. 33–34.

8

third arguments are meritless and affirm on the basis of the Family Court’s opinion

on those two issues.36 We now turn to Father’s first argument.

(14) In reviewing an appeal from the Family Court, “[w]hen the issues on

appeal implicate rulings of law, our review is de novo and this Court will set aside

erroneous interpretations of applicable law.”37 “We review claims of infringement

upon constitutional rights de novo.”38 Whereas, “[i]f the trial judge has correctly

applied the pertinent law, our review is limited to abuse of discretion.”39 We “will

not disturb inferences and deductions that are supported by the record and the

product of an orderly and logical deductive process.”40

(15) Father contends that the court erred in finding that he did not comply

with the third and fourth elements of his case plan – Relationship & Community

Support and Behavior Issues. We discuss each element in turn.

(16) Regarding the Relationship & Community Support element, we find

that the Family Court’s judgment was supported by the record. The case plan

36 We find the Family Court’s analysis regarding DSCYF’s reunification efforts and the Children’s best interests thorough and well-supported by the record. As to reunification efforts, the court stated that DSCYF had offered numerous service referrals to assist Father in completing his case plan. As to the children’s best interests, the court correctly followed the statutory requirements and examined each factor set forth under 13 Del. C. § 722. We decline to disturb the court’s findings on these matters. 37 In re Stevens, 652 A.2d 18, 23 (Del. 1995) (citation omitted).

38 George v. DSCYF, 150 A.3d 768, 2016 WL 6302525, at *2 (Del. Oct. 27, 2016) (TABLE).

39 Powell v. DSCYF, 963 A.2d 724, 731 (Del. 2008).

40 Id.

9

required that Father “demonstrate acts of protection for his children . . . when they

are cared for by others.”41 However, Father rarely inquired about the children’s

medical conditions or academic performance while they were in DSCYF’s care. The

criminal no-contact order cannot excuse Father from his failure because it did not

prevent him from reaching out to DSCYF workers to check on his children. We

hold that the Family Court’s conclusion was supported by the record and was “the

product of an orderly and logical deductive process.”42

(17) Regarding the Behavior Issues element, Father raises a constitutional

argument. He contends that the court violated his Fifth Amendment right by forcing

him to admit to physical violence against the children – subjecting him to criminal

liability – to fulfill an element of his case plan.43 This argument is meritless. We

addressed this issue in Sierra v. DSCYF.44 In Sierra, the Family Court found that a

child had been physically injured, but the parent denied abusing the child. 45 The

court reasoned that, given the parent’s denial of culpability and the unexplained

injuries to the child, the parent’s home was unsafe for the child. The court terminated

the parental rights in the child and the parent appealed, claiming that the court

41 A597 (Feb. TPR Tr. 53:1–6).

42 Powell, 963 A.2d at 731.

43 Opening Br. 21–22.

44 238 A.3d 142 (Del. 2020).

45 Id. at 158–59.

10

violated his constitutional rights.46 This Court rejected the parent’s argument.

Specifically, this Court stated:

[I]t is important to distinguish between an affirmative order requiring admission, which violates the right not to self-incriminate, and an order setting reasonable conditions for returning the child that are not related directly to culpability . . . . If [the concern for the child’s safety] conflicts with the parents’ admission of culpability, the court could reasonably prioritize the safety of the child. The parents had the right not to incriminate themselves, but they did not have the right to avoid the consequences of no explanation for the injuries. Further alleviating the Fifth Amendment concern, the court found the lack of explanation was “not dispositive alone,” and it provided additional reasons for why it concluded that “the conditions resulting in the prior findings likely continue to exist.”47

The situation here is almost identical to Sierra. The Family Court found that

the children had been physically abused but Father denied culpability. He also

referred to J.L. in insulting terms and was adamantly against reassessing his

approach to parenting.48 The court therefore concluded that “the conditions resulting

in the prior findings” were unlikely to change.49 Father’s attitude, combined with

his refusal to acknowledge past physical abuse, supports the Family Court’s

judgment regarding this element under the Sierra standard. We therefore find that

46 See id.

47 Id. at 159.

48 A346 (Visitation Hr’g Tr. dated Nov. 20, 2024, at 180:3–9).

49 Sierra, 238 A.3d at 159; Order at 22–23.

11

the court did not err when it determined that Father failed to meet this element of his

case plan.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family

Court is AFFIRMED.50

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths Justice

50 Because we affirm the Family Court’s judgment as to the TPR Order, we need not reach the Visitation Order to resolve this appeal.