Thomas Robert Dilks v. Jason Anderson

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: September 29, 2025
• Docket: 5:24-cv-02686
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 THOMAS ROBERT DILKS, Case No. 5:24-cv-02686-JFW-PD

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING ACTION 13 v. FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE 14 JASON ANDERSON, et al., 15 16 Defendants.

17 18 I. Pertinent Procedural History and Plaintiff’s Claims 19 On December 16, 2024, Thomas Robert Dilks (“Plaintiff”), a pretrial 20 detainee proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 21 §§ 1983 and 1985 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1964, alleging violations of various 22 rights under the United States Constitution, along with federal and state 23 criminal statutes, in connection with his pending criminal charges. Dkt. No. 24 1. The Complaint named 28 Defendants and asserted 11 causes of action, 25 including claims for civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 26 (“RICO”), intentional violation of common law torts, fraud, intentional 27 obstruction of justice, intentional and negligent interference with prospective 28 economic advantage, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional 1 distress. Id. at 24-31. Plaintiff sought monetary damages, along with an 2 investigation by the United States Attorney’s Office and criminal prosecution 3 of Defendants under federal criminal RICO statutes. Id. at 32. 4 On June 12, 2025, the Court issued a screening order dismissing the 5 Complaint under the Younger1 abstention doctrine, absolute judicial 6 immunity, and for failure to state a claim and directed Plaintiff to file a First 7 Amended Complaint curing the defects identified by the Court no later than 8 July 15, 2025. Dkt. No. 12. The Court’s Order was mailed to the address 9 listed on the Complaint, which was the High Desert Detention Center in 10 Adelanto, California. Id. 11 On July 9, 2025, the Court’s order was returned from the High Desert 12 Detention Center with notations “RETURN TO SENDER” and “NIC” (not in 13 custody). Dkt. No. 18. 14 On August 5, 2025, the Court issued an Order requiring Plaintiff to provide his current address and comply with the Court’ s June 12, 2025 15 Order. Dkt. No. 20. The Court ordered Plaintiff to provide a current address 16 and a First Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies outlined in Docket 17 Number 12 to the Court no later than August 25, 2025. Id. Plaintiff was 18 cautioned that if he failed to respond to the Order, the Court would 19 recommend dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. See id. The Order 20 was mailed to the address listed on the Complaint. Id. 21 On August 25, 2025, the Court’s Order was returned from High Desert 22 Detention Center with notations “RETURN TO SENDER” and “NIC.” Dkt. 23 No. 21. 24 To date, Plaintiff has not responded to the Court’s orders, provided an 25 updated address, or otherwise communicated with the Court about his case 26 since April 2025. Accordingly, the case is now subject to dismissal for 27

28 1 Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of 2 Civil Procedure and Local Rule 41-6. 3 II. Discussion 4 Rule 41(b) grants district courts the authority to sua sponte dismiss 5 actions for failure to prosecute. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629- 6 30 (1962). In determining whether dismissal for lack of prosecution is 7 warranted, a court must weigh several factors, including: (1) the public’s 8 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage 9 its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to defendants; (4) the availability of less 10 drastic sanctions; and (5) the public policy favoring the disposition of cases on 11 their merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002); Ferdik 12 v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992). Dismissal is appropriate 13 under the foregoing analysis “where at least four factors support dismissal ... 14 or where at least three factors ‘strongly’ support dismissal.” Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). 15 In this case, the first two factors – public interest in expeditious 16 resolution of litigation and the need to manage the Court’s docket – weigh in 17 favor of dismissal. Plaintiff did not file a First Amended Complaint or provide 18 an updated address. His failure to file an amended complaint or update his 19 address—or show good cause for his delay—prevents the Court from moving 20 this case toward disposition and shows that Plaintiff does not intend to 21 litigate this action diligently. 22 Arguably, the third factor – prejudice to Defendants – does not counsel 23 in favor of dismissal because no viable pleading exists, and thus Defendants 24 are unaware that a case has been filed. However, the Ninth Circuit has held 25 that prejudice may be presumed from unreasonable delay. See In re Eisen, 31 26 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1994); Moore v. Teflon Commc’ns. Corp., 589 F.2d 27 959, 967-68 (9th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff’s inaction in this matter is an 28 1 unreasonable delay, given that the Court has attempted to mail several orders 2 to Plaintiff and has received no communication. In the absence of any 3 explanation, non-frivolous or otherwise, for Plaintiff’s delay, the Court 4 presumes prejudice. See Laurino v. Syringa Gen. Hosp., 279 F.3d 750, 753 5 (9th Cir. 2002) (presumption of prejudice can be rebutted by a non-frivolous 6 explanation); Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642 (citing Yourish v. California 7 Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 991 (9th Cir. 1999)). 8 The fourth factor – the availability of less drastic sanctions – ordinarily 9 counsels against dismissal. However, the Court attempted to avoid outright 10 dismissal by giving Plaintiff ample time to communicate with the Court, 11 update his address, and file an amended complaint. Plaintiff was also 12 expressly warned that failure to comply with the Court’s orders could result in 13 dismissal. See Dkt. Nos. 6, 12, 20. Thus, the Court explored the only 14 meaningful alternatives to dismissal in its arsenal and found that they were not effective. See Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) 15 (“The district court need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before 16 finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful 17 alternatives.”) (citation omitted). 18 The fifth factor – the general policy favoring resolution on the merits – 19 ordinarily weighs against dismissal. Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 643. It is, 20 however, the responsibility of the moving party to move the case toward 21 disposition on the merits at a reasonable pace and to refrain from dilatory and 22 evasive tactics. Morris v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 942 F.2d 648, 652 (9th Cir. 23 1991). Because Plaintiff has failed to participate in his own lawsuit, it does 24 not appear that retention of this case would increase the likelihood of the 25 matter being resolved on its merits. This factor does not weigh in favor of or 26 against dismissal. 27 In sum, four out of the five factors support dismissal. The Court 28 ! || concludes that dismissal for failure to prosecute is warranted.

For the foregoing reasons, this action is dismissed for failure to

4 prosecute. ; IT IS SO ORDERED.

6 || Dated: September 29, 2025 7

9 TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28