Thomas Oscar Cady v. Katie Wilson, et al.

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided June 23, 2026·No. 2:26-cv-01576·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA CASE NO. 2:26-CV-1576-BHS-DWC Plaintiff, v. ORDER DECLINING SERVICE KATIE WILSON, et al., Defendants.

Plaintiff Thomas Oscar Cady, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. 4, 5. Having reviewed and screened Plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court declines to direct service and, instead, provides Plaintiff the opportunity to cure the deficiencies identified herein by filing an amended pleading on or before July 23, 2026. I. Background Plaintiff, an inmate currently confined at Washington State Penitentiary, initiated this action concerning conditions of confinement and medical treatment allegedly received while he was a pretrial detainee at King County Jail (“KCJ”). Dkt. 5 at 1, 3. Plaintiff organizes his complaint into three counts. Count I alleges excessive force and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs arising from events that allegedly occurred at KCJ. Id. at 4–7. Count II alleges deliberate indifference to serious medical needs based on medical treatment Plaintiff received at Harborview Medical Center following the events at KCJ.

Id. at 8–9. Finally, in count III, Plaintiff alleges further deliberate indifference to serious medical needs after he returned from Harborview Medical Center to KCJ. Id. at 9–10. The complaint identifies different defendants in different sections of the pleading, including the caption of the complaint, the defendant information section, and the heading of each count for relief. Id. at 1, 3, 4, 8, 9. Further inconsistencies in defendants appear between those identified in these three locations of the complaint and those discussed in the factual narrative for each count. Id. at 1–10. As relief, Plaintiff seeks damages and an order requiring surgery on his back. Id. at 11. II. Screening Standard Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, the Court must screen proposed

complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must “dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint: (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). Dismissal on these grounds constitutes a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Court is required to liberally construe pro se documents. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). However, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). “Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d). Even pro se pleadings must raise the right to relief beyond the speculative level and must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A plaintiff must set forth specific, plausible facts to support their claims. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–83 (2009). III. Discussion Having reviewed the complaint, the Court finds several deficiencies that must be cured before Plaintiff may proceed. In particular, Plaintiff has failed to clearly and consistently identify the defendants he seeks to sue throughout the complaint. In addition, to the extent the Court can discern the defendants Plaintiff intends to sue, Plaintiff appears to have named several defendants that are not proper defendants in this § 1983 action. A. Unclear Defendant Identification

First, Plaintiff has not clearly and consistently identified the defendants he intends to sue in this action. Throughout the complaint, Plaintiff identifies different defendants in different sections of the pleading, making it difficult to determine which claims are asserted against which defendants. For example, in count I, Plaintiff alleges that the City of Seattle is liable for the conduct at issue and expressly states that the claim is brought against the City of Seattle. Dkt. 5 at 4. However, Plaintiff identifies Mayor Katie Wilson, rather than the City of Seattle, in the caption and defendant-information portion of the complaint. Id. at 1, 3. Similarly, Plaintiff identifies Jail Health Services and various nurses in the caption of the complaint and appears to assert claims

against those defendants in count III, but those defendants are not consistently identified elsewhere in the complaint. Id. at 1, 9. Plaintiff likewise identifies three Harborview Medical Center doctors in the caption, defendant-information section, and heading of count II, but the factual allegations supporting that count refer generally to a single doctor and do not distinguish

among the conduct of three separate physicians. Id. at 1, 3, 8–9. Thus, in its current form, the complaint does not clearly identify which defendants Plaintiff intends to sue or which claims are asserted against each defendant. Rule 8 requires a complaint to provide sufficient notice of the claims asserted and the parties against whom those claims are brought. See McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 requires “sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them”). Plaintiff must therefore clearly identify each defendant he seeks to sue and must consistently identify those defendants throughout the amended complaint. B. Improper Defendants Next, to the extent the Court can discern the defendants Plaintiff intends to sue, several of

the identified defendants appear to be improper defendants for a § 1983 action. First, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to sue the health services division operating within KCJ, Plaintiff has not identified a legal entity capable of being sued for his claims involving King County entities. “In a legal action involving a county, the county itself is the only legal entity capable of suing and being sued.” See Nolan v. Snohomish County, 59 Wn. App. 876, 883, 802 P.2d 792 (1990)). As a result, only the primary municipality, county, or local government unit (in this case, King County) may be sued in this § 1983 action and other county entities must be excluded from any amended pleadings.

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Thomas Oscar Cady v. Katie Wilson, et al., (W.D. Wash. 2026).

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