Thomas Oquist v. Wells Fargo Bank Na

Ninth Circuit

Thomas Oquist v. Wells Fargo Bank Na

700 F. App'x 734

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedNovember 1, 2017

Docket17-35124

StatusUnpublished

This text of 700 F. App'x 734 (Thomas Oquist v. Wells Fargo Bank Na) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Thomas Oquist v. Wells Fargo Bank Na, 700 F. App'x 734 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Thomas D. Oquist and Bettejane Jenkins appeal from the district court’s summary judgment in their Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) action seeking rescission. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hauk v. JP Morgan Chase Bank USA, 552 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether they timely sent defendants a notice of rescission. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a), (f) (a borrower may rescind a loan within three days of a loan transaction, or within three years if the lender fails to make required disclosures to the borrower); see also Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 790, 792, 190 L.Ed.2d 650 (2015) (a borrower may exercise right of rescission by notifying the lender of borrower’s intent to rescind within three years after the transaction is consummated); Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[Section] 1635(f) is a statute of repose, depriving the courts of subject matter jurisdiction when a § 1635 claim is brought outside the three-year limitation period.”)

We reject as without merit plaintiffs’ contention that the subject loan transaction was not consummated.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Thomas D. Oquist and Bettejane Jenkins appeal from the district court’s summary judgment in their Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) action seeking rescission. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hauk v. JP Morgan Chase Bank USA, 552 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether they timely sent defendants a notice of rescission. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a), (f) (a borrower may rescind a loan within three days of a loan transaction, or within three years if the lender fails to make required disclosures to the borrower); see also Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 790, 792, 190 L.Ed.2d 650 (2015) (a borrower may exercise right of rescission by notifying the lender of borrower’s intent to rescind within three years after the transaction is consummated); Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[Section] 1635(f) is a statute of repose, depriving the courts of subject matter jurisdiction when a § 1635 claim is brought outside the three-year limitation period.”)

We reject as without merit plaintiffs’ contention that the subject loan transaction was not consummated.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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700 F. App'x 734, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-oquist-v-wells-fargo-bank-na-ca9-2017.

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