Thomas M. Bruns v. Courtney C. Bruns

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 28, 2023
• Docket: ED110124
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION FOUR

THOMAS M. BRUNS, ) No. ED110124 ) Appellant, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) St. Louis County vs. ) 15SL-DR00242-01 ) COURTNEY C. BRUNS, ) Honorable Bruce F. Hilton ) Respondent. ) ) Filed: March 28, 2023

Kelly C. Broniec, P.J., Philip M. Hess, J., and James M. Dowd, J.

OPINION

The dissolution decree entered in 2016 in this domestic relations case required Courtney

Bruns (Wife) to remove Thomas Bruns (Husband) from the mortgage obligation on the marital

home within one year of the decree’s entry and required Husband to pay $500 in spousal support

and $363 in child support per month. Neither party complied with its obligation, so in early 2020,

each filed a motion seeking to hold the other in contempt. Following a hearing, the trial court

denied both contempt motions but entered judgment ordering Husband to pay Wife $9,628 in back

child and spousal support. The trial court denied Husband’s motion to vacate the judgment. Husband now appeals

that denial asserting that the trial court erred (1) by ordering Husband to pay Wife arrearages1 after

the court had denied Wife’s motion for contempt, and (2) by basing its award to Wife on exhibits

that were not admitted into evidence. We affirm because Wife’s motion, though titled “motion for

contempt,” also pleaded Husband’s arrearages and prayed the court order him to pay them. As a

result, the trial court had the authority to treat Wife’s motion both as a motion for contempt and as

a motion to enforce child and spousal support. We do not reach Husband’s second point because

he failed to raise it in his motion to vacate.

Background

On January 8, 2020, Husband filed a motion for contempt against Wife for her non-

compliance with the parties’ 2016 dissolution decree that ordered her to refinance the parties’

mortgage to remove Husband’s obligation on that mortgage. On March 3, 2020, Wife filed her

own motion for contempt against Husband for his child and spousal support delinquencies in the

amount of $10,267. On January 4, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on both motions.

In its judgment entered on July 29, 2021, the court found neither party in contempt. As to

Husband’s motion, the court found that Wife’s failure to refinance the marital home was not

willful, wanton, or contumacious. As to Wife’s motion, the court found that Husband was not in

contempt because he had a good faith basis to believe he was current on his support obligations

based upon records from the Missouri Department of Child Services’ website. Nevertheless, the

court ordered Husband to pay $9,628 in back child and spousal support based upon the evidence

adduced at the hearing that showed Husband’s arrearages to be in that amount.

1 Husband refers to the arrearages owed to Wife as “money damages.” We reject the use of that phrase under these circumstances because the money the court ordered Husband to pay Wife is for delinquent child and spousal support. See section 452.335 and section 452.340.

2 In his motion to vacate the judgment filed on September 30, 2021, Husband cited a plethora

of Supreme Court Rules (74.06(b)(3), 74.06(b)(4), and 74.03, 74.80, and 103.09) in support of his

argument that the judgment was improper because it denied Wife’s motion yet still granted her

relief in the form of the award against Husband for his arrearages. On October 5, 2021, the court

denied Husband’s motion to vacate by stamping “Denied” directly on Husband’s motion. On

November 19, 2021, Husband filed his notice of appeal from that order but since the order was not

denominated “judgment” or “decree” as required by Rule 74.01(a), it was not appealable and we

directed Husband to supplement the record with an appealable judgment. He did so and this appeal

follows.

Standard of Review

“The trial court is vested with broad discretion when acting on motions to vacate

judgments.” Anderson v. Central Mo. State Univ., 789 S.W.2d 41, 43 (Mo. App. W.D. 1990).

“When reviewing the denial of a motion to vacate the dismissal of an action, we may only reverse

when a review of the record clearly and convincingly reveals that the trial court has abused its

discretion in denying the requested relief.” Manning v. Fedotin, 64 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Mo. App.

W.D. 2002). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is clearly against the

logic of the circumstances before the court at the time and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that it

shocks one’s sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful consideration.” Beverly v. Hudak, 545

S.W.3d 864, 869 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018).

Discussion

In his first point on appeal, Husband claims that the trial court erred in failing to vacate its

July 29, 2021, award of $9,628 to Wife because when a motion seeking relief is brought before

the court and the motion is denied, the relief sought within that motion must also be denied;

3 therefore, the trial court erred in awarding monetary relief to Wife after it had denied her motion

for contempt in which she had sought that relief.2

Husband relies principally on the general rule that a court lacks authority to enter a

judgment which grants relief beyond that which was requested in the petition. Colbert v. State,

Family Support Div., 264 S.W.3d 699, 701 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008). Colbert quoted the Missouri

Supreme Court’s opinion in Norman v. Wright, 100 S.W.3d 783, 786 (Mo. banc 2003) that “[t]he

relief awarded in a judgment is limited to that sought by the pleadings.” Id.

Although we certainly agree with this general principle, we are not persuaded that it applies

to the circumstances of this case. First, the trial court did not award Wife any relief that was not

“sought by the pleadings.” Id. Wife sought an award for Husband’s arrearages. Her motion

alleged that Husband was in arrears, and, in the prayer, Wife requested that the Court “issue an

Order compelling [Husband] to comply with all terms of the Judgment of this Court, including

total payment of back child support and spousal support plus interest . . . .” In our view, the court

treated Wife’s motion as both a motion for contempt and as a motion to enforce the dissolution

decree. Therefore, its judgment denying Wife’s contempt motion but granting her the relief she

sought in the form of back support payments due under the parties’ divorce decree constituted

entirely consistent holdings. Denying Husband’s motion to vacate was not an abuse of its

discretion.

We find ample support for our holding in Missouri law. First, that the motion was titled

“motion for contempt” and did not include in its title anything concerning Wife’s request for an

2 Although it is difficult for us to discern, Husband seems to be asserting based on his mention of Rule 74.06(b) that the judgment was irregular. A judgment is irregular when it is "‘achieved in a manner materially contrary to the law’s established procedures for the orderly administration of justice.” Interest of B.K.B., 655 S.W.3d 16, (Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (quoting Lambert v. Holbert, 172 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Mo. App. S.D. 2005). Therefore, giving Husband the benefit of the doubt, we will treat his motion as a motion to vacate under Rule 74.06(b).

4 award of the arrearages is not determinative. “[A] legal document ‘is not judged by its title but by

its substance and content.’” Wilson v. Wilson, 640 S.W.3d 136, 139 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022)

(quoting State ex rel. Ashby Rd. Partners, LLC v. State Tax Comm’n, 297 S.W.3d 80, 84 (Mo. banc

2009)). In Wilson, the court decided that the trial court appropriately treated Wife’s motion,

labeled as one for contempt, as a motion to enforce the terms of the parties’ dissolution judgment.

Id. In support of its holding on this issue, the court noted that “[i]t appears the amount awarded to

Wife was intended to make her whole under the dissolution judgment . . . rather than to alter

Husband’s conduct[,]” which is the purpose of contempt. Id. at 139-40.

In contrast, in Colbert, 264 S.W.3d at 700, father filed a motion for contempt against the

Family Support Division alleging that the Division violated the terms of a court order by

intercepting his income tax refunds and using that money to pay his child support arrearages. The

trial court denied Colbert’s motion for contempt and declared Colbert’s arrearages satisfied. The

court of appeals held that the trial court lacked the authority to deny the motion for contempt and

that Colbert no longer owed arrearages because there was no pleading before the court that raised

that issue and because the parties did not try the issue by express or implied consent. Id. at 700-

01.

Similarly, in MacDonald v. Minton, 142 S.W.3d 247, 251 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004), mother

asserted the trial court erred in making any findings with regard to father’s child support arrearage

since the matter was neither pleaded nor tried and neither party requested the court determine the

amount of any arrearage. Mother conceded that while evidence was offered regarding arrearages,

it was only offered to prove the necessity of increasing child support, not for an arrearage

determination or award. Id. at 252. The court of appeals agreed, holding that the issue was not

tried by implied consent because the implied consent rule does not apply when the evidence is

5 relevant to an issue already present in the case. Id.; City of Kansas City v. New York-Kansas Bldg.

Associates, L.P., 96 S.W.3d 846, 854 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002).

This case differs from Colbert and MacDonald and more closely aligns with Wilson

because here, Wife pleaded in her motion that Husband was in arrears since he did not begin paying

child support until October 2017 and spousal support until March 2018. She also pleaded that

“[Husband’s] disregard for the judgment of this Court is so egregious that he should be held in

contempt of court and be forced to pay child support and spousal support that is in arrears,

$10,267, in compliance with such Order . . . .” (Emphasis added). Moreover, Wife asked the court

to “enter its Order finding that the [Husband is] in contempt of court and to issue an order

compelling [Husband] to comply with all terms of the Judgment of this Court, including payment

of child and spousal support.” Therefore, like Wilson, we find that the trial court’s award was

intended to make Wife whole pursuant to the dissolution judgment, rather than to alter Husband’s

conduct. Wilson, 640 S.W.3d at 139-40.

Finally, we confirm the trial court’s authority to enforce the parties’ original divorce decree

in the manner it did. While a court cannot modify a final judgment, “‘a court generally has the

inherent power to make such proper orders as are necessary to effectuate its decrees.’” State ex

rel. Cullen v. Harrell, 567 S.W.3d 633, 639 (Mo. banc 2019) (quoting Benton v. Alcazar Hotel

Co., 194 S.W.2d 20, 24-25 (Mo. 1946)). This includes dissolution judgments. Id. In Cullen, our

Supreme Court found that the trial court’s judgment did not modify or grant Wife any additional

relief from the dissolution judgment. Id. Rather, the court’s order was merely enforcing the

judgment. Id. “Circuit courts ‘have [the] inherent power to enforce their own judgments and

should see to it that such judgments are enforced when they are called upon to do so.’” Id. (quoting

McLean v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 277 S.W.3d 872, 876-77 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009)).

6 Similarly, here, the trial court did not modify the dissolution judgment or grant relief pursuant to

the judgment; the trial court only enforced the judgment.

Therefore, based on the foregoing principles, the trial court’s decision was correct and was

not an abuse of discretion. Point I is denied.

In his second and final point on appeal, Husband argues that the trial court’s award of back

support improperly relied on exhibits that were not admitted into evidence. Husband did not raise

this argument in his motion to vacate and therefore the issue is not preserved for appellate review.

“Our Court will not consider an argument that was not presented to the trial court and made for

the first time on appeal.” Solomon v. St. Louis Cir. Att’y, 640 S.W.3d 462, 463 (Mo. App. E.D.

2022). “Simply put, a party cannot rely on one theory to set aside a judgment before the trial court

then, when unsuccessful, rely upon a different theory on appeal.” McGee ex rel. McGee v. City of

Pine Lawn, 405 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) (internal citations omitted). Moreover,

Husband’s claim is without merit because the exhibits were, in fact, admitted into evidence by the

trial court. Point II is denied.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Husband’s motion to

vacate the judgment which ordered Husband to pay to Wife $9,628 in child and spousal support

arrearages.

______________________________ James M. Dowd, Judge

Kelly C. Broniec, P.J., and Philip M. Hess, J. concur.