Thomas Lovett and Teresa Lovett v. Blake Grant and Thea Grant

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 20, 2006
• Docket: 13-05-00008-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

                             NUMBER 13-05-008-CV

                         COURT OF APPEALS

               THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                  CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

THOMAS LOVETT AND TERESA LOVETT,                   Appellants,

                                           v.

BLAKE GRANT AND THEA GRANT,                             Appellees.

                   On appeal from the 28th District Court

of Nueces County, Texas.

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez, and Castillo

                        Memorandum Opinion by Justice Castillo

A judgment that finally disposes of all remaining parties and claims, based on the record in the case, is final.  Lehmann v. Har‑Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 200 (Tex. 2001).  Such is the case here.  Thus, I respectfully dissent.

All parties appeared for a jury trial setting.  Appellees represented to the trial court that they reached and executed a settlement agreement at the conclusion of court-ordered mediation.   They further represented that appellants were participants in and agreed to the settlement agreement that encompassed all the pending claims.  Appellants countered that they did not settle the case but, rather, agreed only "to explore settlement."  After hearing the arguments of counsel, the trial court requested a copy of the "final mediated settlement agreement" to "see if we can get this case resolved today, either with that, or something else."  The trial court ordered  appellants' counsel to "read that last mediated settlement agreement" and then recessed the hearing to deliberate. 

After the hearing reconvened, appellees made an oral motion that the trial court  enter judgment consistent with the mediated settlement agreement. Appellees defended the settlement agreement, reiterated that the matter was settled through mediation subject to approval of a judgment, and argued that the sole question before the trial court was the unagreed-to judgment.  Appellees agreed that the settlement agreement tendered to the trial court contained the necessary signatures.  The trial court pronounced in open court:

The Court is going to enter this settlement agreement as the judgment of this case.  Understand, [appellants' counsel] you can do what you need to do, but based on the fact that everyone, including your clients have signed this agreement, the Court is going to accept this as the judgment. . . .  Judgment is entered."    

The trial court entered an order and attached and incorporated in that order a copy of the settlement agreement as the trial court's final judgment.  

Regardless of the language, a judgment that disposes of all claims, based on the record in the case, may be deemed final. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 200.  As reflected in the record before us, the trial court unequivocally intended to resolve the disputes before it, pronounced judgment disposing of all the claims before it, and entered an order that reflects the judgment rendered.  Accordingly, I conclude that the requirements for finality inLehmann are met and we have a final and appealable judgment before us.  Id.     

ERRLINDA CASTILLO

Justice

Dissenting Memorandum Opinion delivered

and filed this 20th day of July, 2006.