Thomas Joseph Goddard v. Slickdeals, LLC, and Apple, Inc.

Opinion

1 2 3 6 7 THOMAS JOSEPH GODDARD, Case No. 25-cv-06187-JSC

8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE: APPLE'S MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND 10 SLICKDEALS, LLC, and APPLE, INC., AMENDED COMPLAINT 11 Defendants. Re: Dkt. Nos. 15, 18

12 13 Plaintiff Thomas Joseph Goddard, proceeding in forma pauperis without attorney 14 representation, sues Slickdeals, LLC (“Slickdeals”) and Apple Inc. (“Apple”) for discrimination. 15 (Dkt. No. 1.)1 Pending before the Court are Apple’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against it 16 and Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 15, 18.) After 17 carefully considering the arguments and briefing submitted, the Court concludes oral argument is 18 unnecessary, see N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), GRANTS Apple’s motion to dismiss, and DENIES 19 Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. 20 In sum, as a private complainant, Plaintiff cannot bring a 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 claim. As to 21 his other Title VII claim, Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies, or plausibly 22 alleged discrimination was a motivating factor for Apple’s recission. Plaintiff similarly has not 23 plausibly alleged Apple rescinded his job offer because of his race, as required for a 42 U.S.C. § 24 1981 claim. Plaintiff’s Fair Credit Reporting Act claim fails without allegations Apple’s decision 25 was based on a “consumer report.” In addition, Plaintiff does not allege facts plausibly supporting 26 an unlawful, fraudulent, or unfair practice to state an Unfair Competition Law claim, or plead his 27 1 fraud claim with the specificity required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Finally, as to 2 Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, he does not allege facts to infer 3 Apple’s conduct was outrageous. 5 I. COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS2 6 Plaintiff, who is Jewish and white, and has multiple documented disabilities, lives in 7 Walnut Creek, California. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 34.) Plaintiff alleges in September 2023, Apple extended 8 him “a formal offer of employment as Senior Software Engineer for their Apple Vision Pro team 9 following an extraordinarily rigorous selection process” with a “comprehensive compensation 10 package totaling $1,050,000 in first-three-year compensation.” (Id. ¶ 57.) However, on October 11 24, 2023, “Apple rescinded Plaintiff’s accepted employment offer through a phone conversation 12 with Senior Technical Recruiter John Moultrie.” (Id. ¶ 71.) Mr. Moultrie “revealed that the entire 13 Apple Vision Pro team was ‘extremely frustrated’ by the decision and specifically identified Mike 14 Rockwell as the sole individual driving the recission decision.” (Id.) Mike Rockwell was the 15 Vice President of Apple’s Vision Products Group and had “authority over hiring decisions for the 16 Apple Vision Pro team.” (Id. ¶ 42.) Plaintiff’s “professional interactions with Mike Rockwell 17 date back to 2005-2009 IRC (Internet Relay Chat) channels, where concerning statements were 18 made,” including “claim[ing] Nazi family connections and self-identif[ying] as an ‘armchair- 19 Nazi.’” (Id. ¶¶ 59, 68.) In addition, Apple’s “recission occurred during the documented peak 20 period of post-October 7 antisemitic workplace discrimination against Jewish professionals.” (Id. 21 ¶ 71.) So, Apple’s “stated reason for recission—concerns about ‘short tenure at previous 22 companies’—was clearly pretextual given that Apple’s entire interview team had already 23 extensively reviewed Plaintiff’s employment history during separate full-day interviews.” (Id.) 24 Instead, Apple’s recission “was motivated by discriminatory animus.” (Id. ¶ 72.) 25 Plaintiff also alleges Slickdeals discriminated against him. First, “[f]ollowing Plaintiff’s 26

27 2 Because Plaintiff never served Apple with his amended complaint, (Dkt. No. 7), Apple moves to 1 purchase of Israeli support stickers on Amazon in October 2023, he experienced systematic 2 shipping delays and service discrimination.” (Id. ¶ 52.) Slickdeals is “one of Amazon’s top 3 affiliate marketing partners,” and shares “comprehensive infrastructure for implementing 4 sophisticated discrimination through data sharing capabilities enabled by executive relationships 5 between Slickdeals and Amazon.” (Id. ¶¶ 37, 55.) Second, Plaintiff was hired as a Lead Staff 6 Mobile Engineer at Slickdeals in October 2023. (Id. ¶ 78.) In early 2024, Plaintiff discovered 7 Slickdeals was “circumventing iOS privacy manifests and Apple’s App Tracking Transparency 8 (ATT) requirements.” (Id. ¶ 79). After Plaintiff filed a whistleblower complaint with Apple, he 9 experienced “a systematic pattern of stonewalling,” “racial discrimination by Slickdeals’ 10 management and supervisors,” antisemitism, religious discrimination, retaliation, and denial of 11 ADA accommodations. (Id. ¶¶ 84, 85, 90, 96, 100, 107.) Slickdeals terminated his employment 12 on July 15, 2024. (Id. ¶ 102.) 13 On March 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment 14 Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and 15 disability, and retaliation, and on May 8, 2025, the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights. 16 (Id. ¶¶ 30, 31.) 18 On July 23, 2025, Plaintiff sued Slickdeals and Apple. (Dkt. No. 1.)3 Plaintiff asserted 19 claims against Slickdeals for (1) retaliation in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); (2) 20 race and religious discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); (3) hostile work 21 environment in violation of Title VII; (4) retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities 22 Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); (5) disability discrimination in violation of the ADA, 42 23 U.S.C. § 12122(a); (6) failure to accommodate in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 24 12112(b)(5)(A); (7) whistleblower retaliation in violation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 806, 18 25 U.S.C. § 1514A; (8) race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (9) conspiracy to violate 26

27 3 Plaintiff has filed additional complaints in this district asserting discrimination claims against 1 civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985; (14) tortious interference with business relations; and 2 (17) defamation. (Id. at 41-56, 59-60, 62-63.) Plaintiff also asserted claims against both 3 Slickdeals and Apple for (10) pattern and practice of discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 4 U.S.C. § 2000e-6; (15) violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 5 § 17200 et seq.; (16) fraud; and (18) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at 56-57, 60- 6 62, 63-64.) In addition, Plaintiff asserted claims against Apple for (11) race and religious 7 discrimination in violation of Title VII; (12) race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; 8 and (13) violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (Id. at 57-59.) 9 The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and ordered service of 10 the complaint on Defendants. (Dkt. No. 6.) Plaintiff then unilaterally filed an amended complaint 11 but did not serve Apple with that complaint. (Dkt. No. 7.) Apple moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s 12 initial complaint. (Dkt. No. 15.) Plaintiff then moved to file a second amended complaint. (Dkt. 13 No. 18.) 16 “Generally, district courts may not consider material outside the pleadings when assessing 17 the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 18 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018). “A court may, however, consider . . . matters of judicial notice— 19 without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” United States v. 20 Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). A court may take judicial notice of facts “not subject 21 to reasonable dispute” because they are “generally known within the court's territorial jurisdiction” 22 or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 23 questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). This includes “undisputed matters of public record, including 24 documents on file in federal and state courts.” Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 25 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). 26 The Court GRANTS Apple’s request for judicial notice of Plaintiff’s state court complaint 27 in Thomas Goddard v. Slickdeals, Inc., Case No. CGC-25-623360, because it is a public record on 1 notice of any disputed facts stated therein, the Court does take judicial notice of the existence of 2 the allegations. See Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999 (“[A] court cannot take judicial notice of disputed 3 facts contained in such public records.”); see also United States v. Pangang Grp. Co., Ltd., 6 F.4th 4 946, 959 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Although we do not take judicial notice of the truth of this earlier- 5 submitted evidence concerning the Government’s theory of PGC’s corporate ownership, we can 6 take judicial notice of the fact that the Government asserted such a theory.”). 7 Because Plaintiff does not object, the Court also GRANTS Apple’s request for judicial 8 notice of the California Civil Rights Department’s letter regarding records of Thomas Goddard 9 and Apple. (Dkt. No. 23 at 4.) See Interstate Nat. Gas Co. v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 209 F.2d 380, 385 10 (9th Cir. 1953) (“We may take judicial notice of records and reports of administrative bodies.”); 11 see also Krzesniak v. Cendant Corp., No. C 05-05156 MEJ, 2007 WL 640594, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 12 Feb. 27, 2007) (taking judicial notice of California agency’s response to public records request). 14 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must include a “short and plain 15 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 16 While the Rule 8 pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” “it demands 17 more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 18 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). On a motion to dismiss, the court “must take all of the factual 19 allegations in the complaint as true.” Id. However, this presumption does not apply to 20 “[t]hreadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.” 21 Id. A court also “need not accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to 22 judicial notice, . . . [or] conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in 23 the complaint.” See Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood of Los Angeles, 759 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th 24 Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). Ultimately, to avoid dismissal, a complaint must “contain sufficient 25 factual matter” to “allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 26 the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 27 544, 570 (2007) (explaining a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 1 Court must “construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any 2 doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 3 Apple moves to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims against it. The Court addresses Apple’s 4 arguments as they apply to each of Plaintiff’s causes of action. 5 A. Tenth Cause of Action: Pattern or Practice of Discrimination (Title VII) 6 Title VII’s Section 2000e-6 authorizes the Attorney General or the EEOC to bring a civil 7 action when they “ha[ve] reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is 8 engaged in a pattern or practice” of discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (“[T]he Attorney 9 General may bring a civil action.”); id. § 2000e-6(c) (“[T]he functions of the Attorney General 10 under this section shall be transferred to the Commission.”). Private individuals, however, are not 11 authorized to bring civil actions under Section 2000e-6. See EEOC v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Nw., Inc., 12 599 F.2d 322, 331 (9th Cir. 1979) (explaining Attorney General and EEOC may bring actions 13 under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 and 2000e-6, but individuals can only bring actions under 42 U.S.C. § 14 2000e-5), aff’d sub nom., Gen. Tel. Co. of Nw., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1980). 15 Plaintiff asserts a Section 2000e-6 claim against Apple and alleges its conduct “constitutes 16 a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of rights secured by Title VII, 17 demonstrating that discrimination was the standard operating procedure rather than isolated 18 incidents.” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 206.) However, as a private individual, Plaintiff may not bring a civil 19 action under § 2000e-6 of Title VII. Plaintiff argues “[f]ederal courts routinely allow private 20 plaintiffs to present pattern evidence,” but there is a difference between allowing private plaintiffs 21 to assert a Section 2000e-6 claim and allowing them to present pattern evidence in support of 22 another claim, and the cases Plaintiff cites do not support his argument. (Dkt. No. 26 at 13.) See 23 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977) (“The Plaintiff in a pattern-or- 24 practice action is the Government.”); see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612 25 (1993) (evaluating liability standards for Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967). 26 So, Plaintiff’s Tenth Cause of Action against Apple for violating 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 is 27 dismissed without leave to amend. B. Eleventh Cause of Action: Race and Religious Discrimination (Title VII) 1 1. Exhaustion 2 Before bringing a Title VII claim, a plaintiff “must exhaust available administrative 3 remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC or an equivalent state agency . . . and receiving a right- 4 to-sue letter.” See Scott v. Gina Morena Enters., LLC, 888 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing 5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)). The plaintiff must file the charge with the EEOC within 180 days 6 after the allegedly unlawful employment practice occurred, or, if the charge is initially filed with a 7 state agency, within 300 days after the allegedly unlawful employment practice or 30 days after 8 notice the state agency has terminated its proceedings under state law, whichever is earlier. See id. 9 at 1106 & n.2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)). “[A]fter exhausting administrative remedies, a 10 claimant has 90 days to file a civil action.” Id. at 1106 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). 11 Title VII’s “charge-filing requirement” is not a jurisdictional requirement, but rather an 12 affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove. See Fort Bend Cnty., Texas v. Davis, 587 13 U.S. 541, 550-52 (2019); Kraus v. Presidio Tr. Facs. Div./Residential Mgmt. Branch, 572 F.3d 14 1039, 1046 n.7 (9th Cir. 2009). “[P]laintiffs ordinarily need not ‘plead on the subject of an 15 anticipated affirmative defense.’ When an affirmative defense is obvious on the face of a 16 complaint, however, a defendant can raise that defense in a motion to dismiss.” Rivera v. Peri & 17 Sons Farms, Inc., 735 F.3d 892, 902 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). So, a motion to dismiss 18 based on a failure-to-exhaust defense should only be granted if “the defense is ‘clearly indicated’ 19 and ‘appear[s] on the face of the pleading.’” Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 738 F.3d 1026, 1045 (9th Cir. 20 2013) (citation omitted), vacated on other grounds, 573 U.S. 942 (2014). 21 “Allegations of discrimination not included in the plaintiff's administrative charge 22 may not be considered by a federal court unless the new claims are like or reasonably related to 23 the allegations contained in the EEOC charge.” B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 24 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Fort Bend 25 Cnty, Tex., 587 U.S. 541. To determine whether a claim is exhausted by a charge, courts 26 “consider such factors as the alleged basis of the discrimination, dates of discriminatory acts 27 specified within the charge, perpetrators of discrimination named in the charge, and any locations 1 at which discrimination is alleged to have occurred.” Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 291 2 F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2002). 3 Apple moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII claim because Plaintiff did not timely file a 4 charge with the EEOC and therefore did not exhaust his administrative remedies. Plaintiff alleges 5 Apple unlawfully rescinded his offer of employment on October 24, 2023, and he filed a charge 6 with the EEOC on March 18, 2025. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 71, 30.) Because based on Plaintiff’s own 7 allegations he filed his EEOC charge more than 180 days after Apple’s allegedly unlawful 8 employment action, Plaintiff did not timely exhaust his administrative remedies and cannot state a 9 Title VII claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). 10 Plaintiff’s argument Apple committed a continuing violation because “the discriminatory 11 pattern extended from October 24, 2023 (initial recission) through November 14, 2023 (written 12 confirmation), bringing the entire hostile environment within the 300-day window,” (Dkt. No. 26 13 at 12-13), is unpersuasive. First, Plaintiff’s contention “[t]he November 14, 2023 written 14 confirmation falls within 300 days of the March 18, 2025 EEOC filing” is incorrect. (Dkt. No. 26 15 at 14.) Second, Plaintiff’s reliance on National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 16 (2002) is unavailing because unlike the Morgan plaintiff, who asserted hostile work environment 17 claims which “cannot be said to occur on any particular day,” Plaintiff alleges Apple took discrete 18 discriminatory acts on particular days. Id. at 115. Furthermore, in Morgan, the Supreme Court 19 still held “only incidents that took place within the timely filing period are actionable.” Id. at 114. 20 Plaintiff does not allege any Apple conduct within the timely filing period. Third, Plaintiff seeks 21 to apply the 300-day limit because he filed a charge with the California Civil Rights Department 22 (“CRD”), but his CRD charge only related to his claims against Slickdeals and so did not help 23 exhaust his claims against Apple. (Dkt. No. 23 at 16-18.) See Freeman, 291 F.3d at 636 24 (explaining different “perpetrators of discrimination named in the charge” can help show charge 25 did not exhaust a claim). Apple also presents a letter in which CRD states it has no record of 26 Plaintiff making a charge against Apple. (Dkt. No. 23 at 4.) 27 Plaintiff also contends “Apple’s fraudulent concealment of Mike Rockwell’s antisemitic 1 connections—tolls the limitations period.” (Dkt. No. 26 at 13.) “The doctrine of fraudulent 2 concealment tolls the statute of limitations where a defendant, through deceptive conduct, has 3 caused a claim to grow stale.” See Aryeh v. Canon Bus. Sols., 55 Cal. 4th 1185, 1192 (2013). 4 However, as explained below, in the discussion of Plaintiff’s Sixteenth Cause of Action for fraud, 5 Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged fraudulent concealment, so Plaintiff also has not plausibly 6 alleged he is entitled to equitable tolling on that ground. 7 Plaintiff also asks to apply the delayed discovery rule. However, Lukovsky v. City & Cnty. 8 of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2008), upon which Plaintiff relies, held the delayed 9 discovery exception applies to the moment a plaintiff discovers “the actual injury, i.e., the adverse 10 employment action, and not when the plaintiff suspects a legal wrong,” i.e., the allegedly 11 discriminatory motive. Id. at 1049-51. So, Plaintiff’s argument he “could not have discovered the 12 discriminatory basis until uncovering Rockwell’s IRC communications (2005-2009) and 13 connecting them to the October 7 temporal pattern” is unavailing. (Dkt. No. 26 at 13.) 14 Because Apple has proven Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies, Plaintiff 15 cannot state a Title VII claim against Apple. 16 2. Failure to State a Claim 17 Even if Plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies, Plaintiff fails to state a Title 18 VII claim. To state a Title VII discrimination claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) he is a member of 19 a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his position; (3) he experienced an adverse employment 20 action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more 21 favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an 22 inference of discrimination.” See Berry v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 656 (9th Cir. 2006) 23 (quotation marks and citation omitted). As to the fourth prong, a plaintiff must allege facts 24 sufficient to demonstrate his protected status was a “motivating factor” for the defendant’s adverse 25 employment action. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003). 26 Plaintiff alleges he is a member of protected classes “based on his race (white) [and] 27 religion (Jewish),” was “qualified for the Apple Vision Pro Senior Software Engineer position,” 1 ¶¶ 213-214.) Plaintiff, however, does not allege any “similarly situated individuals outside his 2 protected class were treated more favorably” or facts which plausibly “give rise to an inference of 3 discrimination.” See Berry, 447 F.3d at 656. Plaintiff alleges Apple informed him it was 4 rescinding his offer based on nondiscriminatory concerns about his “short tenure at previous 5 companies,” which undermines his allegations Apple rescinded the offer because of his race or 6 religion. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 71.) See Colombo v. Palo Alto Unified Sch. Dist., No. 24-CV-00909-NC, 7 2024 WL 6840045, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2024) (dismissing Title VII claim because 8 allegations suggested “race and gender were in fact not motivating factors” for defendant’s 9 actions). Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the “temporal proximity of the rescission to the October 10 7 attacks,” Mr. Rockwell’s “discriminatory statements” between 2005 and 2009, and Mr. Smith’s 11 outreach for recruitment in 2024 are insufficient to create a plausible inference Apple’s stated 12 reason was pretextual and, instead, Plaintiff’s race or religion were motivating factors for Apple’s 13 recission. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 217.) Furthermore, Plaintiff’s statistical evidence regarding other 14 institutions’ discrimination against individuals based on their being Jewish does not create a 15 plausible inference Apple discriminated against Plaintiff because he was Jewish. (Dkt. No. 26 at 16 16-18.) 17 Because Apple has shown Plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies, and Plaintiff 18 fails to state a claim against Apple for race and religious discrimination, Plaintiff’s Eleventh Cause 19 of Action is dismissed. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend his Title VII claim if he can 20 plausibly allege he exhausted his administrative remedies by timely filing a charge with the 22 C. Twelfth Cause of Action: Race Discrimination (42 U.S.C. § 1981) 23 Section 1981 prohibits discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts on 24 account of race. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981. To state a Section 1981 claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) 25 he is a member of a racial group, (2) some contractual right with defendant was impaired, (3) 26 defendant intentionally discriminated against him based on race, and (4) his race was a but-for 27 cause of the contractual impairment.” See Ray v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 1279 1 Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982)). For a Section 1981 2 claim, “a plaintiff bears the burden of showing that race was a but-for cause of its injury.” 3 Comcast Corp., 589 U.S. at 333; see also Williams v. Tobener, No. C 16-02209 SBA, 2016 WL 4 5235039, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2016) (“To plead intentional discrimination, plaintiff cannot 5 merely invoke his race in the course of a claim’s narrative and automatically be entitled to pursue 6 relief. Rather, plaintiff must allege some facts that demonstrate that race was the reason for 7 defendant’s actions.” (cleaned up)). 8 Like his Title VII claim, Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claim does not include facts supporting a 9 plausible inference Apple rescinded his employment offer because of his race. See also Baptiste v. 10 LIDS, 17 F. Supp. 3d 932, 943-44 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“The same legal principles are applied to the 11 analysis of § 1981 employment discrimination claims as to Title VII employment discrimination 12 claims.”). Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claims are “implausible because the complaint identifies 13 independent non-discriminatory reasons for the alleged [contractual] impairment,” specifically, 14 Apple’s concerns about his short-term tenure at other jobs. See Astre v. McQuaid, 804 Fed. App’x 15 665, 667 (9th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). Because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged he would have 16 been hired but-for Apple’s discrimination, he has not stated a Section 1981 claim. 17 So, Plaintiff’s Twelfth Cause of Action for Apple’s violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is 18 dismissed with leave to amend. 19 D. Thirteenth Cause of Action: Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 1681) 20 Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), an employer must provide an employee or 21 a job applicant with notice before and after it takes adverse action against them “based in whole or 22 in part on” a consumer report. See 15 U.S.C § 1681b(b)(3); 15 U.S.C. § 1681m. The FCRA 23 defines a “consumer report” as a “communication of any information by a consumer reporting 24 agency.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1). 25 Plaintiff alleges Apple violated the FCRA because it rescinded his employment offer based 26 on “background check information” without providing FCRA notices. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 227.) 27 Elsewhere in the complaint, Plaintiff alleges Apple rescinded his offer based on his “short tenure 1 Plaintiff never alleges Apple acted based on a “consumer report” or information from a consumer 2 reporting agency. Because the FCRA only requires notice for adverse actions “based in whole or 3 in part” on information contained in a consumer report, Plaintiff does not state an FCRA claim 4 against Apple. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(3); 1681m; see also Marchioli v. Pre-Employ.com, 5 Inc., No. EDCV 16-2305-JGB (DTBx), 2017 WL 2130294, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2017) 6 (dismissing plaintiff’s claim for lacking factual allegations “to infer that the purported adverse 7 employment action was taken ‘based in whole or in part on’ the credit report,” or “that the 8 information on which [] decision was based constitute[d] a ‘consumer report’”). 9 So, Plaintiff’s Thirteenth Cause of Action against Apple for FCRA violations is dismissed 10 with leave to amend. 11 E. Fifteenth Cause of Action: California Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.) 12 To state a claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law, a plaintiff must allege the 13 defendant engaged in an “unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” See Cal. Bus. 14 & Prof. Code § 17200. To allege an unlawful business act or practice, a plaintiff must allege a 15 predicate violation of a separate law. See Ingels v. Westwood One Broad. Servs., Inc., 129 Cal. 16 App. 4th 1050, 1060 (2005) (“A defendant cannot be liable under § 17200 for committing 17 ‘unlawful business practices’ without having violated another law.” (quotation marks and citation 18 omitted)). Plaintiff alleges “Defendants” violated “federal privacy laws through the FTM tracking 19 domain masking scheme; securities laws through false reporting of user engagement metrics; 20 Apple’s App Store policies and developer agreements; federal employment discrimination laws; 21 the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030; and FTC Act Section 5 regarding 22 deceptive practices.” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 241.) Plaintiff does not clarify which of these laws Apple, as 23 opposed to Slickdeals, violated. And although Plaintiff’s opposition brief alleges Apple violated 24 Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the FCRA, and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, as 25 explained above, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Apple for violating any of these laws. 26 (Dkt. No. 26 at 23-24.) Because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged Apple violated any predicate 27 law, Plaintiff cannot state a UCL claim based on Apple’s unlawful business practices. 1 To the extent Plaintiff’s UCL claim is based on Apple’s fraudulent business acts or 2 practices, Plaintiff’s UCL claim fails. As the Court explains in its discussion of Plaintiff’s 3 Sixteenth Cause of Action, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for fraud. See Rosal v. First Fed. Bank 4 of California, 671 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“Although fraud is not an essential 5 element of a claim under § 17200, allegations of fraudulent conduct must nevertheless satisfy the 6 heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).”). 7 Plaintiff also alleges “Defendants’ practices are unfair because they offend established 8 public policy regarding privacy, securities fraud, and other employment discrimination, and the 9 harm caused greatly outweighs any benefits.” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 243.) However, “[a] plaintiff alleging 10 unfair business practices under [the UCL] must state with reasonable particularity the facts 11 supporting the statutory elements of the violation.” Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc., 14 Cal. 12 App. 4th 612, 619 (1993). Plaintiff’s complaint does not state any facts supporting Apple’s unfair 13 practices or explaining the actions Apple took and why those actions were unfair. Furthermore, 14 Plaintiff’s brief argues “[c]oncealing a Nazi-sympathizing executive’s role in employment 15 decisions while publicly representing equal opportunity employment violates fundamental public 16 policy.” (Dkt. No. 26 at 24.) However, Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. 17 Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163 (1999), upon which Plaintiff relies, specifically rejected Plaintiff’s argument 18 violations of “fundamental public policy” are sufficient to state a UCL claim for unfair business 19 practices. See id. at 184-85, 187 (holding “courts may not apply purely subjective notions of 20 fairness” or rely on “[v]ague references to ‘public policy’” and must instead identify “conduct that 21 threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those 22 laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise 23 significantly threatens or harms competition”). 24 So, Plaintiff’s Fifteenth Cause of Action against Apple for UCL violations is dismissed 25 with leave to amend. 26 F. Sixteenth Cause of Action: Fraud 27 To state a fraud claim, a plaintiff must allege “(a) misrepresentation; (b) defendant’s 1 misrepresentation); (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc., 6 2 Cal. 4th 1174, 1184 (1993). In addition, “[t]o comply with [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 9(b), 3 allegations of fraud must be ‘specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular 4 misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend against the 5 charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.’” Bly-Magee v. California, 236 6 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). To meet the Rule 9(b) standard, “a pleading 7 must identify the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged, as well as what is 8 false or misleading about the purportedly fraudulent statement, and why it is false.” Cafasso, U.S. 9 ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). 10 Plaintiff’s only allegation of fraud plausibly related to Apple is: “Defendants made 11 material misrepresentations and omissions regarding . . . their non-discriminatory employment 12 practices.” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 247.) Because Plaintiff does not include facts supporting his conclusory 13 allegations “Defendants knew the representations were false when made” and “intended for 14 Plaintiff . . . to rely on these misrepresentations,” he has not sufficiently pled each element of a 15 fraud claim. (Id. ¶¶ 249-250.) Furthermore, Plaintiff’s fraud claim does not comply with Federal 16 Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) because he does not identify Apple’s allegedly false or misleading 17 statement about “their non-discriminatory employment practices,” or explain why the statement is 18 false. (Id. ¶ 247.) See Cafasso, U.S., 637 F.3d at 1055. Plaintiff’s opposition brief includes 19 additional factual allegations, but such allegations must be in the complaint itself. (Dkt. No. 26 at 20 25.) 21 So, Plaintiff’s Sixteenth Cause of Action against Apple for fraud is dismissed with leave to 22 amend. 23 G. Eighteenth Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 24 To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), plaintiff must 25 allege: (1) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) defendant intended to cause, or 26 recklessly disregarded the probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) plaintiff suffered severe 27 or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by 1 (1993). To be outrageous, conduct “must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually 2 tolerated in a civilized community.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 3 Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations “Defendants’ conduct was extreme and outrageous and 4 exceeded the bounds of conduct usually tolerated in a civilized society” is insufficient to state an 5 IIED claim. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 262.) See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements 6 of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Plaintiff alleges 7 Apple rescinded his employment offer for discriminatory reasons, but he does not state facts to 8 create a plausible inference Apple’s actions were outrageous. Furthermore, “pleading of personnel 9 management activity is insufficient to support” an IIED claim, “even if improper motivation is 10 alleged,” because “[m]anaging personnel is not outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human 11 decency, but rather conduct essential to the welfare and prosperity of society.” Janken v. GM 12 Hughes Elecs., 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 80 (1996); see also Ali v. Intel Corp., No. 18-CV-03981- 13 LHK, 2019 WL 1369926, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2019) (holding plaintiff could not state an 14 IIED claim based on Intel’s decision not to hire him), aff’d, 797 F. App’x 325 (9th Cir. 2020). 15 So, Plaintiff’s Eighteenth Cause of Action against Apple for intentional infliction of 16 emotional distress is dismissed with leave to amend. 18 The Court also dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against Slickdeals without prejudice to 19 Plaintiff’s pursuit of those claims in a separate lawsuit. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20, 20 a plaintiff may join defendants in one action if:

21 (A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, 22 occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and

23 (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. 24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Both prongs must be satisfied. See Visendi v. Bank of Am., N.A., 733 25 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir. 2013). The Court may raise the misjoinder issue sua sponte. See Fed. R. 26 Civ. P. 21 (“On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a 27 party”); see also L.B. v. LinkedIn, No. 5:24-CV-06832-EJD, 2025 WL 2899514, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 1 Oct. 10, 2025) (“District courts have broad discretion in determining whether to order severance 2 under Rule 21.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). Because the complaint’s allegations 3 conclusively establish Plaintiff’s claims against Slickdeals do not “aris[e] out of the same 4 transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” as his claims against Apple, or 5 present “question[s] of law or fact common to” Apple and Slickdeals, the Court dismisses these 6 claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Factually, Plaintiff’s claims against Apple arise from 7 Apple’s October 24, 2023 rescission of a job offer, but his claims against Slickdeals arise from 8 retaliation and discrimination he faced while a Slickdeals employee from October 2023 to July 9 2024. Plaintiff also asserts 11 causes of action against Slickdeals but not Apple, and the four 10 causes of action he asserts against both Apple and Slickdeals do not arise from the same facts. If 11 Plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims against Slickdeals, he must file those claims in a separate 12 complaint. 14 The Court also DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. 15 (Dkt. No. 18.) Because Plaintiff’s proposed second amended complaint repeats several of the 16 flaws identified in this Order, leave to file the complaint would be futile. See Carvalho v. Equifax 17 Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining district court has discretion to 18 deny leave to amend due to “futility of amendment”). And, in any event, the Court has granted 19 plaintiff leave to file a first amended complaint consistent with this Order. 21 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Apple’s motion to dismiss. The 22 dismissal as to Plaintiff’s Tenth Cause of Action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 is without leave to 23 amend. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his Eleventh Cause of Action under Title VII only if he 24 can in good faith allege exhaustion of his administrative remedies consistent with the law as set 25 forth in this Order. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the other claims he alleges against Apple in 26 his complaint, but Plaintiff may not add new defendants or claims not in the original complaint 27 without first seeking additional leave of court. Further, Plaintiff is cautioned that his amended 1 pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim 2 || showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”). 3 Plaintiffs deadline to file an amended complaint against Apple is November 21, 2025. If 4 || Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint by that date, judgment will be entered in Apple’s 5 favor on all claims. Any claims against Slickdeals must be set forth in a separate complaint. 6 Finally, as Plaintiff is proceeding without counsel, the Court directs his attention to the 7 Handbook for Pro Se Litigants, which is available along with further information for the parties on 8 || the Court’s website located at http://cand.uscourts.gov/proselitigants. Plaintiff may also contact 9 the Legal Help Center via telephone: (415)-782-8982, or email: fedpro@sfbar.org for free 10 || assistance regarding his claims. 11 This Order disposes of Docket Nos. 15 and 18. 5 13 Dated: October 21, 2025

15 A. cOVELINE SCOTT CORLEY = 16 United States District Judge

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