Thomas Joseph Goddard v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Opinion

THOMAS JOSEPH GODDARD, Case No. 26-cv-01042-PHK

Plaintiff, GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING- IN-PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR v. EXTENSION AND REQUEST FOR ADA ACCOMMODATION Re: Dkts. 14, 16 Defendant.

On February 2, 2026, pro se Plaintiff Thomas Joseph Goddard filed the original Complaint in this action, as well as an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). See Dkts. 1-2. The Court has not yet determined whether Plaintiff is entitled to proceed IFP, nor has the Court screened the Complaint as required pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). On April 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Extension of Time and Request for ADA Accommodation. [Dkt. 14]. On April 7, 2026, Plaintiff refiled the same motion, including his signature which was omitted in the original filing. [Dkt. 16]. District courts “are afforded broad discretion to control and manage their dockets[.]” Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (applying Ninth Circuit law on procedural issues). For the reasons discussed herein, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART Plaintiff’s Motion. First, Plaintiff requests “a 60-day extension of all currently pending deadlines, including but not limited to response deadlines, discovery deadlines, CMC statement deadlines, and all other scheduling order dates.” [Dkt. 16 at 2]. As an initial matter, the Court notes that there are very few pending deadlines in this case, because the Court has not yet screened the Complaint in this matter initial deadlines, [Dkt. 3], this request is GRANTED-IN-PART. In the full exercise of the Court’s discretion to manage this litigation and the docket in this case, the deadlines currently set by the Initial Case Management Scheduling Order [Dkt. 3] are reset as follows: The deadline for Plaintiff to file his ADR Certification is EXTENDED by 60 days to June 15, 2026. The following deadlines set by the Initial Case Management Scheduling Order [Dkt. 3] are hereby VACATED: the deadline for Defendant to file its ADR Certification; the deadline to meet and confer regarding initial disclosures, early settlement, ADR, and the discovery plan; the deadline to serve Initial Disclosures; the deadlines for the Joint Case Management Statement and Initial Case Management Conference. These activities (as well as Defendant’s need to Answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint) only need take place after the Court screens the Complaint pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court will reset these deadlines at the appropriate time as necessary, and only after that screening Order is issued. Because Defendant has already filed a waiver of service [Dkt. 13], if the Court’s issuance of the screening Order is delayed and approaches the current due date for the Defendant to Answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint, the Court ORDERS either that (a) the Parties shall timely file a stipulation and proposed Order extending the Defendant’s time to Answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint or (b) Defendant will timely file a motion seeking extension of time to Answer or respond to the Complaint, if no agreement can be reached. The Plaintiff SHALL file a Status Report on Plaintiff’s regaining access to his ECF/Pacer account by July 31, 2026. Plaintiff’s request for “ADA accommodation” for an Order “directing the Clerk of Court to accept filings from Plaintiff by mail, email or fax from Plaintiff pending restoration of Plaintiff’s PACER/ECR account access” [Dkt. 16 at 2] is DENIED as MOOT. The request is moot because the Clerk’s office already accepts documents for filings which are properly sent and received by mail. Plaintiff is directed to review Chapter 5 of the Pro Se Handbook (“Chapter 5: How Do I File Papers With The Court?”), available on the Court’s website and about which the Court has ] Plaintiffs request for “[a]ppointment of a courtesy copy recipient for all court notices while 2 Plaintiffremains hospitalized” [Dkt. 16 at 2] is DENIED. First, the request is confusing because it 3 is unclear what the role of this “courtesy copy recipient” would be, who they should be, what their 4 qualifications would be, and why there is a need for such appointment. Other than mentioning this 5 request in one sentence, Plaintiff devotes no substantive briefing to the issue and thus, as the moving 6 party, he does not satisfy his burden of persuasion. Second, Plaintiff cites no law authorizing 7 appointment of a “courtesy copy recipient” and there is nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil 8 Procedure which authorizes a Party to request such appointment. The phrase “courtesy copy 9 recipient” does not appear in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules of this Court, or 10 this Court’s Standing Orders. Third, there are many cases in which an incarcerated person is a 11 plaintiff in litigation pending in this Court and the mere fact that a person is incarcerated does not 12 relieve them of their obligation to prosecute their cases and does not deprive them of the ability to 13 prosecute their cases, including finding out ways to get mail forwarded to them. The fact that 14 Plaintiff avers that he is currently incarcerated and hospitalized does not bar Plaintiff from receiving 15 mail. A 16 However, nothing in this Order prohibits the Parties from trying to reach a reasonable 17 agreement on methods of sending and receiving courtesy copies of filings, whether by mail or Zz 18 otherwise, if the Parties can reach such agreement after reasonable discussions. 19 This Order RESOLVES Dkts. 14 and 16. 20 22 Dated: April 9, 2026 23 24 ’ PETER H. KANG | 25 United States Magistrate Judge 26 27 28