IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2017-CA-01631-COA
THOMAS JARROD SEALE APPELLANT
v.
WILLIAM GRADY THOMPSON JR. APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/25/2017 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. EDWARD C. FENWICK COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: KEMPER COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: KENNETH DUSTIN MARKHAM ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: CARRIE A. JOURDAN NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 06/25/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., GREENLEE AND McCARTY, JJ.
McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. In this custody dispute between the natural father and the maternal grandfather, the
chancery court granted custody to the grandfather, finding that the grandfather overcame the
natural-parent presumption and that the grandfather’s custody served the best interest of the
minor children. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2. Thomas Jarrod Seale (Jarrod) and Haley Thompson Seale had two boys, one born in
2009 and the other in 2010. Jarrod and Haley separated in early 2010, and Haley and the
oldest son moved in with her father, William Grady Thompson (Grady). Haley and Jarrod’s
other son was born later that year. Haley and Jarrod divorced. Because of his ongoing drug addiction Jarrod’s visitation with his sons was limited to supervised visits.
¶3. In June 2013, Haley died in Georgia while undergoing treatment for cancer. At the
time, Haley and the boys were living with her mother, Melanie Lindsey. Melanie had
temporary custody of the boys for several months after Haley’s death. Grady was ultimately
awarded temporary custody, and Jarrod was awarded visitation. Both boys have lived with
Grady for the majority of their lives.
¶4. Jarrod had been previously convicted of felonies—two in 2010 in Arkansas for drug-
related crimes,1 and another in 2012 in Mississippi for obtaining a controlled substance by
fraud. He served five years of probation for the Arkansas convictions and approximately
nine months in jail for the Mississippi conviction.2 Prior to his Mississippi conviction, Jarrod
had voluntarily entered a drug rehabilitation center. He was indicted on the prescription-
fraud charge prior to finishing the required fourteen-month stay at the center, but after
serving his sentence, Jarrod returned to the rehabilitation center to finish the program.
¶5. Because of his drug abuse and incarceration, Jarrod was an absent father for the first
several years of his sons’ lives. He saw them intermittently, and only began paying child
support in August 2014 after being ordered to do so by the chancery court. At that point
Jarrod owed $13,760 in child support, so the chancery court ordered him to pay an additional
$140 per month to cover the back child support.
¶6. There was some confusion during trial about whether Jarrod’s child-support payments
1 Specifically, possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver and use of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. 2 Jarrod had been sentenced to three years.
2 were current. Both Grady and Jarrod stated that he was current in his monthly child-support
payments, but he had not paid off the arrearage. Grady further testified that Jarrod’s child-
support payments had consistently been late. For example, Lisa Seale, Jarrod’s current wife,
made six over-due monthly payments within one month’s time right before trial.
¶7. Grady testified that Jarrod began exercising visitation with the boys after the 2014
order and continued to do so until the hearing.3 Grady stated that the boys loved their father
and looked forward to their visits with him.
¶8. Jarrod testified that he was sober and now self-employed as an electrician. He
admitted that he had been an absent father in the past but had since established a good
relationship with his sons.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9. Our standard of review “in custody matters is quite narrow: the judgment will not be
reversed unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied an
erroneous legal standard.” Davis v. Vaughn, 126 So. 3d 33, 36 (¶9) (Miss. 2013).
DISCUSSION
¶10. On appeal, Jarrod argues that the chancery court’s decision was manifestly wrong
because it failed to consider his changed circumstances since the August 2014 order. Jarrod
contends the chancery court disregarded evidence of his continued sobriety and stable living
environment. He argues that his situation is similar to the natural father’s position in Davis
v. Vaughn.
3 The docket indicates that nothing was filed after the August 2014 order until late September 2016 when Jarrod filed a motion for a status conference.
3 ¶11. In a child-custody determination between a natural parent and a third party the law
presumes that it is in the best interest of the child for the natural parent to have custody.
Smith v. Smith, 97 So. 3d 43, 46 (¶8) (Miss. 2012). “To be awarded custody, therefore, the
third party must first clearly rebut the natural-parent presumption or preference; if it is
successfully rebutted, the chancellor must then examine the Albright4 factors and determine
that third-party custody serves the best interest of the child.” Id.
¶12. “[G]randparents who stand in loco parentis have no right to the custody of a
grandchild, as against a natural parent, unless the natural-parent presumption is first
overcome by a showing of abandonment, desertion, detrimental immorality, or unfitness on
the part of the natural parent.” Id. at 47-48 (¶12).
¶13. In Davis, the chancery court found that the natural father had not deserted or
abandoned his daughter, and so the natural-parent presumption was not rebutted by the
maternal grandmother. Davis, 126 So. 3d at 36 (¶8). The chancery court awarded custody
to the natural father. Id. Like this case, there was a lengthy gap between the initial custody
petition and the final custody order. Id. at 35 (¶¶4-5). The Mississippi Supreme Court
affirmed, finding that the question of whether the natural father had deserted his daughter
“was a factual question best left to the [chancery court], and the evidence support[ed] [its]
ruling . . . .” Id. at 39-40 (¶20). The supreme court said, “Because the [chancery court]
applied the correct legal standard and because [the] findings of fact were neither manifestly
wrong nor clearly erroneous, we affirm.” Id. at 40.
4 Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1008 (Miss. 1983).
4 ¶14. Here, the chancery court found that Grady stood in loco parentis after Haley’s death.
Importantly, the grandfather had “provided a roof over the boys’ heads, fed and clothed them,
[and] made sure that they went to the doctor as needed . . . .” He had acted as the boys’
father without any help from Jarrod. The chancery court ruled “[p]erhaps most importantly,
it was Grady who provided the love, guidance, and discipline of a father to the boys.” The
record showed that the grandfather “took an early retirement so that he could devote more
time to the boys.”
¶15. The chancery court also determined that the grandfather had rebutted the natural-
parent presumption:
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2017-CA-01631-COA
THOMAS JARROD SEALE APPELLANT
v.
WILLIAM GRADY THOMPSON JR. APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/25/2017 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. EDWARD C. FENWICK COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: KEMPER COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: KENNETH DUSTIN MARKHAM ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: CARRIE A. JOURDAN NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 06/25/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., GREENLEE AND McCARTY, JJ.
McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. In this custody dispute between the natural father and the maternal grandfather, the
chancery court granted custody to the grandfather, finding that the grandfather overcame the
natural-parent presumption and that the grandfather’s custody served the best interest of the
minor children. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2. Thomas Jarrod Seale (Jarrod) and Haley Thompson Seale had two boys, one born in
2009 and the other in 2010. Jarrod and Haley separated in early 2010, and Haley and the
oldest son moved in with her father, William Grady Thompson (Grady). Haley and Jarrod’s
other son was born later that year. Haley and Jarrod divorced. Because of his ongoing drug addiction Jarrod’s visitation with his sons was limited to supervised visits.
¶3. In June 2013, Haley died in Georgia while undergoing treatment for cancer. At the
time, Haley and the boys were living with her mother, Melanie Lindsey. Melanie had
temporary custody of the boys for several months after Haley’s death. Grady was ultimately
awarded temporary custody, and Jarrod was awarded visitation. Both boys have lived with
Grady for the majority of their lives.
¶4. Jarrod had been previously convicted of felonies—two in 2010 in Arkansas for drug-
related crimes,1 and another in 2012 in Mississippi for obtaining a controlled substance by
fraud. He served five years of probation for the Arkansas convictions and approximately
nine months in jail for the Mississippi conviction.2 Prior to his Mississippi conviction, Jarrod
had voluntarily entered a drug rehabilitation center. He was indicted on the prescription-
fraud charge prior to finishing the required fourteen-month stay at the center, but after
serving his sentence, Jarrod returned to the rehabilitation center to finish the program.
¶5. Because of his drug abuse and incarceration, Jarrod was an absent father for the first
several years of his sons’ lives. He saw them intermittently, and only began paying child
support in August 2014 after being ordered to do so by the chancery court. At that point
Jarrod owed $13,760 in child support, so the chancery court ordered him to pay an additional
$140 per month to cover the back child support.
¶6. There was some confusion during trial about whether Jarrod’s child-support payments
1 Specifically, possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver and use of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. 2 Jarrod had been sentenced to three years.
2 were current. Both Grady and Jarrod stated that he was current in his monthly child-support
payments, but he had not paid off the arrearage. Grady further testified that Jarrod’s child-
support payments had consistently been late. For example, Lisa Seale, Jarrod’s current wife,
made six over-due monthly payments within one month’s time right before trial.
¶7. Grady testified that Jarrod began exercising visitation with the boys after the 2014
order and continued to do so until the hearing.3 Grady stated that the boys loved their father
and looked forward to their visits with him.
¶8. Jarrod testified that he was sober and now self-employed as an electrician. He
admitted that he had been an absent father in the past but had since established a good
relationship with his sons.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9. Our standard of review “in custody matters is quite narrow: the judgment will not be
reversed unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied an
erroneous legal standard.” Davis v. Vaughn, 126 So. 3d 33, 36 (¶9) (Miss. 2013).
DISCUSSION
¶10. On appeal, Jarrod argues that the chancery court’s decision was manifestly wrong
because it failed to consider his changed circumstances since the August 2014 order. Jarrod
contends the chancery court disregarded evidence of his continued sobriety and stable living
environment. He argues that his situation is similar to the natural father’s position in Davis
v. Vaughn.
3 The docket indicates that nothing was filed after the August 2014 order until late September 2016 when Jarrod filed a motion for a status conference.
3 ¶11. In a child-custody determination between a natural parent and a third party the law
presumes that it is in the best interest of the child for the natural parent to have custody.
Smith v. Smith, 97 So. 3d 43, 46 (¶8) (Miss. 2012). “To be awarded custody, therefore, the
third party must first clearly rebut the natural-parent presumption or preference; if it is
successfully rebutted, the chancellor must then examine the Albright4 factors and determine
that third-party custody serves the best interest of the child.” Id.
¶12. “[G]randparents who stand in loco parentis have no right to the custody of a
grandchild, as against a natural parent, unless the natural-parent presumption is first
overcome by a showing of abandonment, desertion, detrimental immorality, or unfitness on
the part of the natural parent.” Id. at 47-48 (¶12).
¶13. In Davis, the chancery court found that the natural father had not deserted or
abandoned his daughter, and so the natural-parent presumption was not rebutted by the
maternal grandmother. Davis, 126 So. 3d at 36 (¶8). The chancery court awarded custody
to the natural father. Id. Like this case, there was a lengthy gap between the initial custody
petition and the final custody order. Id. at 35 (¶¶4-5). The Mississippi Supreme Court
affirmed, finding that the question of whether the natural father had deserted his daughter
“was a factual question best left to the [chancery court], and the evidence support[ed] [its]
ruling . . . .” Id. at 39-40 (¶20). The supreme court said, “Because the [chancery court]
applied the correct legal standard and because [the] findings of fact were neither manifestly
wrong nor clearly erroneous, we affirm.” Id. at 40.
4 Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1008 (Miss. 1983).
4 ¶14. Here, the chancery court found that Grady stood in loco parentis after Haley’s death.
Importantly, the grandfather had “provided a roof over the boys’ heads, fed and clothed them,
[and] made sure that they went to the doctor as needed . . . .” He had acted as the boys’
father without any help from Jarrod. The chancery court ruled “[p]erhaps most importantly,
it was Grady who provided the love, guidance, and discipline of a father to the boys.” The
record showed that the grandfather “took an early retirement so that he could devote more
time to the boys.”
¶15. The chancery court also determined that the grandfather had rebutted the natural-
parent presumption:
The court cannot say that Jarrod has abandoned or deserted his children, at least not in the technical, legal sense. The court does find that Grady has shown by clear and convincing evidence that Jarrod is unfit to have custody of these children. His serious neglect of his children, his drug use and addiction, coupled with his felony drug convictions, all of which resulted in his prolonged absence from any meaningful relationship with the children and to the detriment of the children.
Although Jarrod argues otherwise, the chancery court did acknowledge that Jarrod had
remained sober and that testimony indicated he had changed for the better. Because of this,
the chancery court granted Jarrod liberal visitation.
¶16. After finding the natural parent presumption had been rebutted, the chancery court
conducted an Albright analysis. Jarrod only addresses one of the chancery court’s Albright
findings—moral fitness. He argues that the chancery court disregarded his rehabilitation in
finding that factor favored Grady. The chancery court’s findings on this factor did focus on
Jarrod’s felony convictions and drug abuse. These events, while in the past, are still facts.
5 They played a meaningful role in the lives of the entire family. The chancery court was
correct to include them in the analysis. Furthermore, the chancery court did not dismiss the
father’s efforts to recover from addiction and drug abuse. Indeed, these issues were handled
with respect and sensitivity—as they should be. It does not change the reality that the moral
fitness factor favored the grandfather. Considering that the majority of the factors favored
Grady, there was no abuse of discretion.
¶17. The evidence in this case supports the chancery court’s ruling. Since the chancery
court applied the correct legal standard and its findings were not manifestly wrong or clearly
erroneous, we affirm.
¶18. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, TINDELL, McDONALD, LAWRENCE AND C. WILSON, JJ., CONCUR.