Thomas Hill, Sr. v. Warden Greene

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedOctober 14, 2025
Docket3:25-cv-01297
StatusUnknown

This text of Thomas Hill, Sr. v. Warden Greene (Thomas Hill, Sr. v. Warden Greene) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thomas Hill, Sr. v. Warden Greene, (M.D. Pa. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

THOMAS HILL, SR., :

Petitioner : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-1297

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

WARDEN GREENE, :

Respondent :

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the court is a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241 to challenge a disciplinary sanction imposed by the United States Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) that resulted in petitioner losing good conduct time. The petition will be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner, Thomas Hill, Sr., is serving a federal prison sentence in Allenwood Low Security Correctional Institution (“LSCI-Allenwood”). He filed the instant petition on July 16, 2025, to challenge a disciplinary sanction imposed by the BOP. (Doc. 1). The relevant disciplinary sanction arises from an incident on July 13, 2024, when Hill was housed in Lewisburg United States Penitentiary (“USP- Lewisburg. (See Doc. 8-9 at 4). On that date, a correctional officer came to Hill’s cell and instructed him to submit to handcuffs so that he could be transported to the prison’s special housing unit. (Id.) Hill refused and

purportedly stated, “I will fight you if you try to take me to SHU.” (Id.) After Hill refused a second request to submit to handcuffs, officers attempted to place them on him, and Hill physically resisted. (Id.) During the incident, Hill

grabbed an officer’s wrist and attempted to pull him towards him. (Id.) The officers used force to get Hill to the floor and then handcuffed him. (Id.) Hill was charged with misconduct for threatening bodily harm, assault, and refusing to obey an order. (Id.) A disciplinary hearing officer conducted

a hearing on the charges on July 22, 2024, during which Hill testified that the charges had been brought in retaliation for a legal case he had filed against the prison’s warden. (Id. at 5). Hill testified that the incident never happened

and that he never physically resisted the officers. (Id.) Hill testified that during the incident, he refused to be placed in handcuffs because the officers would not tell him why he was being placed in handcuffs or being transported to the SHU. (Id.) The disciplinary hearing officer found Hill guilty of the misconduct

charges and sanctioned him with a loss of 27 days of good conduct time and various other penalties. (Id. at 7). On November 25, 2024, Hill filed a regional appeal challenging the

DHO’s decision and the resulting disciplinary sanction. (Doc. 8-4 at 4). The BOP’s administrative remedy coordinator rejected the appeal as improperly filed on December 5, 2024, noting that it improperly appealed multiple

incidents at once. (Id.) Hill attempted to appeal the sanction again on December 2, 2024, but his appeal was rejected for the same reason on December 11, 2024. (Doc. 1-11 at 2; Doc. 8-4 at 4).

Hill next attempted to appeal the decision and sanction on January 10, 2025. (Doc. 1-11 at 3; Doc. 8-4 at 5). That appeal was rejected on January 13, 2025, because Hill was attempting to appeal more than one incident in a single appeal and because the appeal was untimely. (Id.) Hill was given ten

days to properly refile the appeal. (Id.) On January 31, 2025, Hill again attempted to appeal. (Doc. 1-11 at 4); Doc. 8-4 at 6). The appeal was rejected as untimely and because it contained

too many pages. (Doc. 1-11 at 4). Hill was advised that he needed to submit a staff memo explaining why the appeal was late and that a similar staff memo was still required to explain the lateness of his original appeal. (Id.) The rejection noted that the original appeal was due on August 22, 2024,

approximately three months before he filed the appeal. (Id.) Hill was again given ten days to correct the deficiencies in his filing. (Id.) Hill filed another attempted appeal on February 19, 2025. (Doc. 1-11

at 5; Doc. 8-4 at 8). This appeal was again rejected as untimely. (Id.) The rejection noted that Hill had submitted a staff memo with the appeal, but that it had not explained why the original appeal was untimely. (Id.) Hill filed

another attempted appeal on March 17, 2025, which was rejected as untimely on March 24, 2025. (Doc. 1-11 at 6; Doc. 8-4 at 8). Finally, Hill attempted to appeal on April 14, 2025, but his attempt was rejected as

untimely on April 24, 2025, with the rejection again noting that Hill had not submitted a staff memo explaining the untimeliness of his original appeal. (Doc. 1-11 at 7; Doc. 8-4 at 9). Hill did not file any more appeals at the regional level, and instead filed an appeal to the BOP’s central office on May

20, 2025. (Doc. 1-11 at 8). The central office upheld the rejection of his appeals on June 5, 2025. (Id.) Respondent argues that based on this administrative remedy history,

the court should dismiss Hill’s petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Doc. 8 at 11-15). Respondent argues in the alternative that the petition should be denied on its merits. (Id. at 15-23). Hill filed a reply brief on September 5, 2025, making the petition ripe for review. (Doc. 9).

II. DISCUSSION Although there is no explicit statutory exhaustion requirement for Section 2241 habeas petitions, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit has consistently held that exhaustion applies to such claims. Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 1986)); Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of

Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996). Exhaustion allows the agency to develop a factual record and apply its expertise, conserves judicial resources, and provides agencies the opportunity to “correct their own

errors” thereby fostering “administrative autonomy.” Id. at 761-62. The BOP has a specific internal system through which federal prisoners can request review of nearly any aspect of their imprisonment. See 28 C.F.R. §§542.10- .19. That process begins with an informal request to staff and progresses to

formal review by the warden, appeal with the regional director, and— ultimately—final appeal to the general counsel. Id. §§542.13-.15. No administrative remedy is considered fully exhausted until reviewed by the

general counsel. Id. §542.15(a). When an inmate wishes to appeal a disciplinary hearing officer’s appeal, his initial appeal goes directly to the regional director. Id. §542.14(d)(2). Exhaustion is the rule in most cases, and failure to exhaust will

generally preclude habeas review. Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761. Only in rare circumstances is exhaustion of administrative remedies not required. For example, exhaustion is unnecessary if the issue presented is one that

consists purely of statutory construction. Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433-34 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981)). Exhaustion is likewise not required when it would be futile. Rose

v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 516 n.7 (1982).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Rose v. Lundy
455 U.S. 509 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Bradshaw v. Carlson
682 F.2d 1050 (Third Circuit, 1981)
George Vasquez v. Strada
684 F.3d 431 (Third Circuit, 2012)
Paul Shifflett v. Mr. Korszniak
934 F.3d 356 (Third Circuit, 2019)
Quintez Talley v. Major Clark
111 F.4th 255 (Third Circuit, 2024)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Thomas Hill, Sr. v. Warden Greene, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-hill-sr-v-warden-greene-pamd-2025.