Thomas G. Wrocklage v. Department of Homeland Security

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedApril 10, 2015
StatusUnpublished

This text of Thomas G. Wrocklage v. Department of Homeland Security (Thomas G. Wrocklage v. Department of Homeland Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thomas G. Wrocklage v. Department of Homeland Security, (Miss. 2015).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

THOMAS G. WROCKLAGE, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, CH-0752-11-0752-M-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND DATE: April 10, 2015 SECURITY, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NO NPRECEDENTIAL 1

Bonnie Brownell, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

Chris Yokus, Detroit, Michigan, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 This case is before the Board on remand from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit). The court vacated our prior decision and instructed us to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed for the sole remaining charge. Wrocklage v. Department of Homeland Security, 769 F.3d

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add sign ificantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

1363, 1365, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see Wrocklage v. Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. CH-0752-11-0752-I-1, Final Order (June 12, 2013) (hereinafter “Final Order”). For the reasons set forth herein, we ORDER the agency to cancel the removal action, substitute a 14-day suspension, and restore the appellant effective July 1, 2011.

BACKGROUND ¶2 The appellant was removed effective July 1, 2011, based on three charges: Improper Possession of TECS 2 Information (one specification), Unauthorized Disclosure of TECS Information (one specification), and Lack of Candor (two specifications). MSPB Docket No. CH-0752-11-0752-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6, Subtabs 4b, 4f. These charges pertained to his allegations that agency personnel had levied an excessive fine against an elderly couple who inadvertently failed to declare certain agricultural products when they re-entered the United States from Canada via the Sault Ste. Marie border crossing. See id., Subtab 4g at 14-15. ¶3 The administrative judge affirmed the removal action. IAF, Tab 26, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 8. The appellant petitioned the Board for review based in large part on an affirmative defense of whistleblowing, and the Board affirmed the initial decision. Final Order at 2, 11. He then appealed to the Federal Circuit. He did not challenge the Board’s finding as to the first charge, Unauthorized Disclosure of TECS Information, but did challenge the findings for the second and third charges. Wrocklage, 769 F.3d at 1366-67, 1370. The court found that the second and third charges were not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 1369-70. The court vacated the penalty of removal and

2 TECS, or the Treasury Enforcement Communication System, is an online database that allows users to access information relevant to the agency’s law enforcement mission from several different databases related to law enforcement, inspection, and intelligence. TECS includes the agency’s information about persons entering the United States from abroad. Initial Appeal File, Tab 6, Subtab 4f at 1, Tab 12 at 1, 3. 3

remanded the case for reconsideration of the penalty. Id. at 1370-71. Because the record is well-developed, we may address the issue without further remand. ¶4 When some but not all charges are sustained in a chapter 75 appeal, the Board will consider carefully whether the sustained charges merited the penalty imposed by the agency. Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 308 (1981). The Board may mitigate the agency’s penalty to the maximum reasonable penalty so long as the agency has not indicated either in its final decision or in proceedings before the Board that it desires for a lesser penalty to be imposed if fewer than all of the charges are sustained. Lachance v. Devall, 178 F.3d 1246, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1999). ¶5 Although it is by no means an exhaustive list, the Board considers the following factors to be relevant in penalty determinations: (1) the nature and seriousness of the offense, and its relation to the employee’s duties, position, and responsibilities, including whether the offense was intentional or technical or inadvertent, or was committed maliciously or for gain, or was frequently repeated; (2) the employee’s job level and type of employment, including supervisory or fiduciary role, contacts with the public, and prominence of the position; (3) the employee’s past disciplinary record; (4) the employee’s past work record, including length of service, performance on the job, ability to get along with fellow workers, and dependability; (5) the effect of the offense upon the employee’s ability to perform at a satisfactory level and its effect upon supervisors’ confidence in the employee’s ability to perform assigned duties; (6) consistency of the penalty with those imposed upon other employees for the same or similar offenses; (7) consistency of the penalty with any applicable agency table of penalties; (8) the notoriety of the offense or its impact upon the reputation of the agency; (9) the clarity with which the employee was on notice of any rules that were violated in committing the offense, or had been warned about the conduct in question; (10) potential for the employee’s rehabilitation; (11) mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense such as unusual job 4

tensions, personality problems, mental impairment, harassment, or bad faith, malice or provocation on the part of others involved in the matter; and (12) the adequacy and effectiveness of alternative sanctions to deter such conduct in the future by the employee or others. Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305-06. ¶6 Although the agency argued in favor of removal, the court precludes consideration of that penalty. See Wrocklage, 679 F.3d at 1371. The court noted that neither the administrative judge nor the Board made any findings regarding a lesser penalty for the first charge alone. 3 Id. The agency has, however, explained that the remaining charge is a serious one. See IAF, Tab 6, Subtab 4b at 2. The appellant received yearly training regarding the security and integrity of the TECS system, which addressed his responsibility to “protect the privacy of those individuals whose information is stored herein.” Id. The printout in question contained identifying information about an individual, including name, social security number, date of birth, and license plate number. Id.; see id., Subtab 4g at 17. The agency additionally considered that the appellant had been previously suspended for 21 days for other misconduct. Id., Subtab 4b at 2; see id., Subtab 4h. ¶7 The court noted, however, that the administrative judge made no findings regarding whether the appellant intentionally took the TECS reports home, which is a proper consideration under the Douglas factors. Wrocklage, 769 F.3d at 1371; see Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305-06. The court also noted that the Board should consider the appellant’s self-reporting of his conduct as a mitigating factor. Wrockage, 769 F.3d at 1371. The appellant’s length of service and successful performance record are also mitigating factors. See IAF, Tab 6, Subtab 4b at 2. ¶8 As the court explained, the agency’s Table of Offenses and Penalties shows a range of penalties from a written reprimand to a 14-day suspension for a first 3 Indeed, the agency argued before the administrative judge that each charge independently supported the penalty of removal.

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Thomas G. Wrocklage v. Department of Homeland Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-g-wrocklage-v-department-of-homeland-security-mspb-2015.