Thomas E. Johnson v. State of Florida

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedOctober 29, 2025
Docket3D2025-1841
StatusPublished

This text of Thomas E. Johnson v. State of Florida (Thomas E. Johnson v. State of Florida) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thomas E. Johnson v. State of Florida, (Fla. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed October 29, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D25-1841 Lower Tribunal No. F24-9899 ________________

Thomas E. Johnson, Petitioner,

vs.

State of Florida, et al., Respondents.

A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Habeas Corpus.

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender and Amy Weber, Assistant Public Defender, for petitioner.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General and David Llanes, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent State of Florida.

Before FERNANDEZ, GORDO, and BOKOR, JJ.

BOKOR, J. Thomas Johnson, detained in Florida on the authority of a Mississippi

warrant, petitions for habeas corpus relief. He claims that sections 941.15

and 941.17, Florida Statutes, impose a ninety-day maximum on how long a

fugitive can be held awaiting extradition. But Johnson’s argument fails for

two reasons: (1) he waived extradition, agreed to return to Mississippi

voluntarily, and expressly agreed not to seek habeas relief pertaining to any

warrant seeking his return; and (2) he has separate criminal charges pending

in Florida which would preclude application of sections 941.15 and 941.17.

We therefore deny the petition.

I. Background

In 2022, Johnson was arrested in Mississippi and charged with two

felony counts of trafficking in controlled substances. He was released on

bond. On March 20, 2024, the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court in Miami-Dade

County issued a warrant for Johnson’s arrest on felony charges of fraud,

grand theft, and forgery. On April 30, 2024, he was arrested in Mississippi

on the Miami-Dade warrant and sent to Florida to answer the charges. On

May 10, 2024, a bail bondsman notified the Mississippi court of Johnson’s

incarceration here in Florida. The Mississippi court then issued a fugitive

arrest warrant for violation of his Mississippi bond.

2 On May 13, 2024, Johnson signed a waiver of his rights under the

Florida Uniform Criminal Extradition Law, Chapter 941, Florida Statutes,

before a judge of the Miami-Dade Circuit Court. The waiver states:

I, Thomas Johnson, being the person arrested and charged with being a fugitive . . . . have been informed of my rights under the Uniform Extradition Act that I may require issuance of a Warrant of Extradition and of my right to contest such warrant by a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

I hereby waive the rights and privileges I am at liberty to exercise and agree to voluntarily return to the State of Mississippi [and] further understand that I will be held in custody pending arrival of officer(s) from said State . . . .

He later posted bond on the Florida charges but remains detained on the

out-of-state fugitive warrant. Now, having been held for more than ninety

days solely on the fugitive warrant, he argues that sections 941.15 and

941.17 dictate his release.

II. Analysis

Johnson is a fugitive of the State of Mississippi and has agreed to

return there voluntarily. Under section 941.02, Florida Statutes, “it is the duty

of the Governor of this state to have arrested and delivered up to the

executive authority of any other state . . . any person charged in that state

with treason, felony, or other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in

this state.” Our extradition proceedings require the Governor to issue an

arrest warrant in execution of that duty upon formal demand of the state from

3 whose authority the fugitive has fled. §§ 941.03, 941.07, Fla. Stat. But the

fugitive “may waive the issuance and service of the [Governor’s] warrant . . .

and all other procedure incidental to extradition proceedings” by signing

a waiver conforming to certain formalities. § 941.26(1), Fla. Stat. (emphasis

added). Johnson signed such a waiver. He therefore waived all the

procedure incidental to our extradition proceedings, including the habeas

protections codified in the statute, not to mention his express agreement to

“be held in custody pending arrival of officer(s) from” Mississippi, who have

not yet arrived. The waiver alone is sufficient reason to deny this petition.1

But absent the waiver, Johnson still cannot show entitlement to the

statutory protection of sections 941.15 and 941.17. The ninety-day statutory

limit on detention does not run while a fugitive subject to extradition is being

prosecuted locally. Florida’s law is based on the Uniform Criminal Extradition

Act, so courts outside of Florida that have interpreted similar provisions can

guide our construction. Paley v. Bieluch, 785 So. 2d 692, 694 (Fla. 4th DCA

2001). Construing a substantively identical statute, the Court of Appeals of

Wisconsin has held that the thirty- and sixty-day limits run “[o]nce the local

charge is no longer pending.” State ex rel. Miller v. Columbia Cnty. Sheriff,

1 Cf. Vargas v. Junior, 254 So. 3d 1092, 1095 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (applying sections 941.15 and 941.17 where the trial court “vacated Vargas’s waiver of extradition, as Vargas had requested”).

4 383 N.W.2d 499, 501 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1986). This conclusion is in harmony

with the rest of the statute, because even a fugitive who does not waive our

procedure may be held “until he or she has been tried and discharged or

convicted and punished in this state” at the discretion of the Governor. §

941.19, Fla. Stat.; see also Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594, 598

(Fla. 2022) (interpreting a statutory provision in the “broader context of the

statute as a whole” (citation omitted)).

Regardless of whether Johnson waived the procedures incidental to

our extradition process, the Governor has a duty to deliver him to Mississippi,

and the State has a right to prosecute him. The fact that Johnson consented

to all this does nothing to limit “the powers, rights, or duties of the officers of

the demanding state or of this state,” in executing their obligations. §

941.26(2), Fla. Stat.

III. Conclusion

Under the circumstances here, Johnson’s detention beyond ninety

days is lawful. Johnson waived any challenge to his detention incident to the

Mississippi warrant and the statutory limits do not run while Florida pursues

its own charges.

Petition denied.

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Related

Paley v. Bieluch
785 So. 2d 692 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2001)
State Ex Rel. Miller v. Columbia County Sheriff
383 N.W.2d 499 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 1986)
Basulto Vargas v. Junior
254 So. 3d 1092 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2018)

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Thomas E. Johnson v. State of Florida, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-e-johnson-v-state-of-florida-fladistctapp-2025.