Thomas Bodnar v. County of Riverside

Ninth Circuit

Thomas Bodnar v. County of Riverside

696 F. App'x 275

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedAugust 17, 2017

Docket17-55277

StatusUnpublished

This text of 696 F. App'x 275 (Thomas Bodnar v. County of Riverside) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Thomas Bodnar v. County of Riverside, 696 F. App'x 275 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Thomas Bod-nar appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 381 (9th Cir. 1998) (dismissal on the basis of res judicata); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Bodnar’s Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims arising from the January 6, 2006 arrest as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because those claims were raised, or could have been raised, in a prior federal action between the same parties, and that action resulted in a final judgment on the merits. See Cabrera, 159 F.3d at 381 (setting forth elements of res judicata and explaining that the doctrine bars subsequent litigation both of claims that were raised and those that could have been raised in the prior action).

The' district court properly dismissed Bodnar’s Eighth Amendment claims arising from medical treatment he received after the January 6, 2006 arrest because Bodnar failed to name the allegedly responsible defendants. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under section 1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation .... ”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bodnar further leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and stating that dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate where amendment would be futile).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Thomas Bod-nar appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 381 (9th Cir. 1998) (dismissal on the basis of res judicata); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Bodnar’s Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims arising from the January 6, 2006 arrest as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because those claims were raised, or could have been raised, in a prior federal action between the same parties, and that action resulted in a final judgment on the merits. See Cabrera, 159 F.3d at 381 (setting forth elements of res judicata and explaining that the doctrine bars subsequent litigation both of claims that were raised and those that could have been raised in the prior action).

The' district court properly dismissed Bodnar’s Eighth Amendment claims arising from medical treatment he received after the January 6, 2006 arrest because Bodnar failed to name the allegedly responsible defendants. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under section 1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation .... ”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bodnar further leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and stating that dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate where amendment would be futile).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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696 F. App'x 275, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thomas-bodnar-v-county-of-riverside-ca9-2017.

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