Thomas Andrew Clakley v. Linda Fay Richardson
This text of Thomas Andrew Clakley v. Linda Fay Richardson (Thomas Andrew Clakley v. Linda Fay Richardson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
On September 16, 2003, the trial court signed an agreed Final Decree of Divorce between Thomas Andrew Clakley and Linda Fay Richardson which provided for the division of community property of the parties, and awarded Richardson the following:
- Any and all sums of cash in the possession of or subject to the control of [Richardson]; including money on account in any financial institution standing in [Richardson's] name or from which [Richardson] has the right to withdraw funds, subject to the provisions of the following subparagraph; and,
- Gross funds totaling $55,000.00 to be withdrawn from the following accounts in the order listed below, and [Clakley] is hereby ORDERED to transfer and/or release such funds to [Richardson] within fifteen (15) days from the date of signing of this Decree, with any remaining funds from said accounts after payment of said $55,000.00 to [Richardson] being hereby awarded to [Clakley] as his sole and separate property as hereinabove provided:
a) Vanguard Growth Index Fund Account #9921279209 standing in the names of [Clakley] and [Richardson];
- Westvaco Savings & Investment Plan for Hourly Employees Account standing in [Clakley's] name;
- First Bank and Trust Savings Account #220000365 standing in [Clakley's] name;
- Savings account #5040 at Eastex Employees Federal Credit Union standing in [Clakley's] name; and,
- Rollover out of the Vanguard Prime Money Market Fund Account #09940254917 standing in [Clakley's] name.
Neither party perfected an appeal from the divorce decree, and the judgment became final. Clakley delivered $3,000 in cash to Richardson, and executed documents allowing Richardson to withdraw $9,150.62 from the Vanguard Growth Index Fund, which stood in the name of both parties. On February 25, 2004, Richardson filed a Motion for Enforcement of Judgment. On March 4, 2004, Clakley filed a Motion to Enter Qualified Domestic Relations order requesting the trial court enter a qualified domestic relations order in the form required by the plan administrator to enforce the division of community property set forth in the Final Decree of Divorce. The trial court signed the qualified domestic relations order submitted by Clakley's attorney. Neither party filed a motion for clarification of the Final Decree of Divorce. On April 26, 2004, the trial court signed an Order on Motion for Clarification of Final Decree of Divorce. The order found that Clakley owed $47,424.69 on the $55,000 awarded to Richardson in the divorce decree. Clakley appeals the order. In his first issue, Clakley says the court erred because the order did not give Clakley credit for the total sum paid to Richardson from the Vanguard Growth Index Fund, and erroneously awarded Richardson net funds after taxes rather than gross funds. In his second issue, Clakley argues the trial court erred in modifying the division of property after its plenary jurisdiction expired. We will address issues one and two together.
We review the trial court's order for an abuse of discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner, without reference to any guiding rules and principles. See Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985).
A marital property agreement which is incorporated into a divorce decree is construed under the law of contracts. See Allen v. Allen, 717 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tex. 1986).
An unambiguous contract must be enforced as written, examining the entire document and giving terms their plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning unless the instrument shows that the parties used them in a technical or different sense.
Rampart Capital Corp. v. Egmont Corp., 18 S.W.3d 318, 322 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 2000, no pet.) (citing Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996)). If there is no ambiguity, the court must give literal effect to the decree as written. Baxter v. Ruddle, 794 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Tex. 1990). In addition, when a divorce decree is unambiguous, the trial court lacks authority to enter an order altering or modifying the original disposition of property. See Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444, 449 (Tex. 2003). Whether an ambiguity exists is a question of law for the court. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995); see also Hurley v. Hurley, 960 S.W.2d 287, 288 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.). A contract is ambiguous if its meaning is uncertain or it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning. See Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983). A court may not alter a judgment after the expiration of its plenary power, and an order attempting to do so is void. See Lundy v. Lundy, 973 S.W.2d 687, 688 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1998, pet. denied); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.007(b) (Vernon 1998).
Subparagraph 6 on page 11 of the Final Decree of Divorce states Richardson is to receive money on account in any financial institution standing in Richardson's name or from which Richardson has the right to withdraw funds, subject to the provisions of the following subparagraph. Subparagraph 7 of the decree lists the Vanguard Growth Index Fund as the first account from which withdrawals are to be made. This provision of the decree is not ambiguous.
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