UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Thomas and Frances Frangos
v. Case No. 13-cv-472-PB Opinion No. 2015 DNH 208 Bank of America, N.A., et al.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Thomas and Frances Frangos have sued the Bank of America,
the Bank of New York Mellon, and Shellpoint, a mortgage
servicing company. They seek an injunction barring the
defendants from foreclosing on their home in Portsmouth, New
Hampshire and a determination that defendants are liable for
breach of contract. The case is before me on defendants’
motions for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, I
grant defendants’ motions.
I. BACKGROUND
The Frangoses obtained a mortgage on a house in Portsmouth
in 2005. To finance the purchase, they granted a note to Optima
Mortgage Corporation and a mortgage to the Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), as Optima’s nominee. Over
the next ten years, the note and the mortgage traveled different paths through the secondary mortgage market, changing hands
numerous times.1 At the same time, the Frangoses experienced
financial difficulties, filing for bankruptcy and twice
defaulting on the loan, in 2007 and 2009.
In June 2009, amid ongoing attempts to modify the loan, the
Frangoses ceased making payments on the mortgage. Two years
later, in 2011, MERS assigned the mortgage to the Bank of New
York Mellon (“BNYM”), who then attempted to foreclose on the
home. This process moved slowly, however, and in September
2013, the Frangoses obtained a preliminary injunction barring
the bank from proceeding with the foreclosure. Since that time,
the foreclosure process has stopped and the Frangoses have
continued to live in the home.
1 The note, originally made out to Optima, includes an allonge that bears endorsements: to “Countrywide Document Custody Services, A Division of Treasury Bank, NA,” “Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,” and a blank endorsement. See Doc. No. 25-4 at 6. Countrywide subsequently became BAC Home Loans Servicing, which was eventually purchased by Bank of America, a defendant here. Bank of New York Mellon and Shellpoint each claimed in their papers that it possessed the original note. See Doc. No. 25-2 at 2; 26-1 at 3. During the hearing on the motion, however, both defendants agreed that the original note was being held by BNYM’s counsel as an agent for BNYM. Doc. No. 37, at 5.
2 After BNYM and Bank of America removed the case to this
court, I dismissed the Frangoses’ good faith and fair dealing
claim but allowed their remaining claims to stand. The
Frangoses responded with an amended complaint (Doc. No. 15) that
restated their viable claims and added their current loan
servicer, Shellpoint, as a defendant.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court
must consider the evidence submitted in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in its
favor. See Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 94 (1st Cir.
2001).
A party seeking summary judgment must first show that there
is no genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A material fact “is one
‘that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.’” United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop. with Bldgs.,
960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir. 1992) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). If the moving party 3 satisfies this burden, the nonmoving party must then “produce
evidence on which a reasonable finder of fact, under the
appropriate proof burden, could base a verdict for it; if that
party cannot produce such evidence, the motion must be granted.”
Ayala–Gerena v. Bristol Myers–Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 94 (1st
Cir. 1996); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
III. ANALYSIS
The Frangoses assert causes of action for injunctive relief
and breach of contract.2 They claim that the preliminary
injunction they obtained in 2013 should remain in place
permanently to prevent BNYM from again attempting to foreclose
on their home unless it holds the note associated with the
mortgage and provides the Frangoses with the notice of default
and opportunity to cure that they are entitled to under the
mortgage. The Frangoses base their breach of contract claim on
defendants’ prior unsuccessful effort to foreclose.
A. Injunctive Relief Claims
I reject the Frangoses’ claims for injunctive relief
2 For reasons that are not apparent from the face of the complaint, the Frangoses have separated their injunctive relief claims into two separate counts. I treat both claims together because they are analytically indistinct.
4 because they cannot prove that they will suffer irreparable
harm, which is an essential element of their claims for
injunctive relief. See Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New
England, Inc., 706 F.3d 8, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that
“well-established principles of equity” require that a court
conclude that a party has suffered “irreparable injury” before
issuing an injunction). Although the Frangoses fear that BNYM
will attempt to foreclose on their home again without holding
the note associated with the mortgage, this fear is unrealistic
because the undisputed evidence in the record demonstrates that
BNYM currently controls both the note and the mortgage. Doc.
No. 37, at 5. Further, although the Frangoses claim they need
an injunction to prevent BNYM from reinstituting foreclosure
proceedings without first providing them with notice of default
and opportunity to cure, this claim is also inconsistent with
the record because BNYM has agreed that it will not attempt to
foreclose without providing the Frangoses with proper notice and
opportunity to cure. See Doc. No. 37, at 3-4. Accordingly, the
evidence in the record simply does not support the Frangoses’
contention that an injunction is needed to prevent irreparable
harm.3 For these reasons, defendants are entitled to summary
3 The Frangoses include a claim in their complaint for an 5 judgment with respect to the Frangoses’ claims for injunctive
relief.
B. Breach of Contract Claim
The Frangoses also assert a claim for breach of contract.
They allege that the defendants violated paragraph 22 of the
mortgage by failing to provide the required default notice
before accelerating the loan and initiating foreclosure when
they first attempted to foreclose in 2011. As a result, the
Frangoses argue that they suffered “prejudice.” See Doc. No. 29
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Thomas and Frances Frangos
v. Case No. 13-cv-472-PB Opinion No. 2015 DNH 208 Bank of America, N.A., et al.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Thomas and Frances Frangos have sued the Bank of America,
the Bank of New York Mellon, and Shellpoint, a mortgage
servicing company. They seek an injunction barring the
defendants from foreclosing on their home in Portsmouth, New
Hampshire and a determination that defendants are liable for
breach of contract. The case is before me on defendants’
motions for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, I
grant defendants’ motions.
I. BACKGROUND
The Frangoses obtained a mortgage on a house in Portsmouth
in 2005. To finance the purchase, they granted a note to Optima
Mortgage Corporation and a mortgage to the Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), as Optima’s nominee. Over
the next ten years, the note and the mortgage traveled different paths through the secondary mortgage market, changing hands
numerous times.1 At the same time, the Frangoses experienced
financial difficulties, filing for bankruptcy and twice
defaulting on the loan, in 2007 and 2009.
In June 2009, amid ongoing attempts to modify the loan, the
Frangoses ceased making payments on the mortgage. Two years
later, in 2011, MERS assigned the mortgage to the Bank of New
York Mellon (“BNYM”), who then attempted to foreclose on the
home. This process moved slowly, however, and in September
2013, the Frangoses obtained a preliminary injunction barring
the bank from proceeding with the foreclosure. Since that time,
the foreclosure process has stopped and the Frangoses have
continued to live in the home.
1 The note, originally made out to Optima, includes an allonge that bears endorsements: to “Countrywide Document Custody Services, A Division of Treasury Bank, NA,” “Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,” and a blank endorsement. See Doc. No. 25-4 at 6. Countrywide subsequently became BAC Home Loans Servicing, which was eventually purchased by Bank of America, a defendant here. Bank of New York Mellon and Shellpoint each claimed in their papers that it possessed the original note. See Doc. No. 25-2 at 2; 26-1 at 3. During the hearing on the motion, however, both defendants agreed that the original note was being held by BNYM’s counsel as an agent for BNYM. Doc. No. 37, at 5.
2 After BNYM and Bank of America removed the case to this
court, I dismissed the Frangoses’ good faith and fair dealing
claim but allowed their remaining claims to stand. The
Frangoses responded with an amended complaint (Doc. No. 15) that
restated their viable claims and added their current loan
servicer, Shellpoint, as a defendant.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court
must consider the evidence submitted in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in its
favor. See Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 94 (1st Cir.
2001).
A party seeking summary judgment must first show that there
is no genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A material fact “is one
‘that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.’” United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop. with Bldgs.,
960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir. 1992) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). If the moving party 3 satisfies this burden, the nonmoving party must then “produce
evidence on which a reasonable finder of fact, under the
appropriate proof burden, could base a verdict for it; if that
party cannot produce such evidence, the motion must be granted.”
Ayala–Gerena v. Bristol Myers–Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 94 (1st
Cir. 1996); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
III. ANALYSIS
The Frangoses assert causes of action for injunctive relief
and breach of contract.2 They claim that the preliminary
injunction they obtained in 2013 should remain in place
permanently to prevent BNYM from again attempting to foreclose
on their home unless it holds the note associated with the
mortgage and provides the Frangoses with the notice of default
and opportunity to cure that they are entitled to under the
mortgage. The Frangoses base their breach of contract claim on
defendants’ prior unsuccessful effort to foreclose.
A. Injunctive Relief Claims
I reject the Frangoses’ claims for injunctive relief
2 For reasons that are not apparent from the face of the complaint, the Frangoses have separated their injunctive relief claims into two separate counts. I treat both claims together because they are analytically indistinct.
4 because they cannot prove that they will suffer irreparable
harm, which is an essential element of their claims for
injunctive relief. See Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New
England, Inc., 706 F.3d 8, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that
“well-established principles of equity” require that a court
conclude that a party has suffered “irreparable injury” before
issuing an injunction). Although the Frangoses fear that BNYM
will attempt to foreclose on their home again without holding
the note associated with the mortgage, this fear is unrealistic
because the undisputed evidence in the record demonstrates that
BNYM currently controls both the note and the mortgage. Doc.
No. 37, at 5. Further, although the Frangoses claim they need
an injunction to prevent BNYM from reinstituting foreclosure
proceedings without first providing them with notice of default
and opportunity to cure, this claim is also inconsistent with
the record because BNYM has agreed that it will not attempt to
foreclose without providing the Frangoses with proper notice and
opportunity to cure. See Doc. No. 37, at 3-4. Accordingly, the
evidence in the record simply does not support the Frangoses’
contention that an injunction is needed to prevent irreparable
harm.3 For these reasons, defendants are entitled to summary
3 The Frangoses include a claim in their complaint for an 5 judgment with respect to the Frangoses’ claims for injunctive
relief.
B. Breach of Contract Claim
The Frangoses also assert a claim for breach of contract.
They allege that the defendants violated paragraph 22 of the
mortgage by failing to provide the required default notice
before accelerating the loan and initiating foreclosure when
they first attempted to foreclose in 2011. As a result, the
Frangoses argue that they suffered “prejudice.” See Doc. No. 29
at 7, 11. They admit, however, that they sustained no financial
damages, nor do they make any effort to specify how exactly they
were prejudiced. See id. at 10-12. Because it is beyond
dispute that the Frangoses suffered no compensable monetary
damages, I also reject their breach of contract claim.
In New Hampshire, a breach of contract occurs when there is
“a failure without legal excuse to perform any promise which
forms the whole or part of a contract.” Lassonde v. Stanton,
157 N.H. 582, 588 (2008) (internal brackets omitted). If a
breach is proved, the opposing party may recover damages as
injunction requiring BOA to negotiate with them in good faith but any such claim is clearly moot because BOA no longer has any interest in or involvement with the note and mortgage. See Doc. No. 15, at 9. 6 compensation for any loss caused by the breach. In contract
cases, “the purpose of awarding compensatory damages . . . is to
place the plaintiff in the position the plaintiff would have
occupied absent a breach.” Concord Hosp. v. New Hampshire Med.
Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n, 142 N.H. 59, 61 (1997).
The burden of proving “the extent and amount of damages
sustained as a result of the breach” lies solely on the party
seeking damages. Id. Although “[t]he law does not require
absolute certainty for recovery of damages,” Petrie-Clemons v.
Butterfield, 122 N.H. 120, 125 (1982) (internal quotations
omitted), “a claimed element of loss must be computed in some
rational way upon a firm factual base.” Reliance Steel Products
Co. v. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 880 F.2d 575, 578 (1st
Cir. 1989).
The Frangoses have failed to present evidence to support
their claim that they were damaged by the alleged breach of
their contract with the defendants. Given ample opportunity to
explain how exactly they were harmed by the defendants’ actions,
the Frangoses merely state that they were “prejudiced.”4 Because
4 The Frangoses have not sought nominal damages. Therefore, I need not determine whether a breach of contract claim can be maintained when the plaintiff is seeking to recover only nominal damages. Compare Boston Prop. Exch. Transfer Co. v. Iantosca, 7 the Frangoses have failed to present sufficient evidence to
support a claim that they were damaged by defendants’ alleged
breach of contract, I grant the motion for summary judgment with
respect to the breach of contract claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, I grant defendants’
motions for summary judgment (Doc. Nos. 25, 26).
SO ORDERED.
/s/Paul Barbadoro Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge
November 6, 2015
cc: Mary Ellen Manganelli, Esq. John L. McGowan, Esq. David P. Ginzer. Esq. Thomas J. Pappas, Esq. Joseph J. Patry, Esq.
720 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2013) (“ a plaintiff is entitled to at least nominal damages upon proving a breach,” applying Massachusetts law) with New England Surfaces v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 546 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2008)(allowing nominal damages without proof of actual loss only in two types of tort cases, applying Maine law); Riofrio Anda v. Ralston Purina, Co., 959 F.2d 1149, 1153 (1st Cir. 1992) (requiring proof of actual damages under Puerto Rican law). 8