Third Avenue Railway Co. v. Godley

227 A.D. 568, 238 N.Y.S. 380, 1930 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12075
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJanuary 10, 1930
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 227 A.D. 568 (Third Avenue Railway Co. v. Godley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Third Avenue Railway Co. v. Godley, 227 A.D. 568, 238 N.Y.S. 380, 1930 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12075 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1930).

Opinion

Martin, J.

The Transit Commission on February 15, 1928, adopted a hearing order upon its own motion directing a hearing to the end that the Commission might determine whether the practices and equipment of street railways with special reference to the operation of one-man cars were safe and adequate and if not, to determine the safe and adequate equipment and service thereafter to be enforced and used. This hearing order was served upon all companies within the jurisdiction of the Commission operating within the city of New York, and the Commission upon the hearings introduced evidence and invited discussion on all phases of operation of one-man cars.

Statistics and data showing the Unes and hours of one-man operation on the several railway systems and a list of the cars used in such operation, together with a description of the safety features with which such cars were equipped were admitted in evidence as Commission’s exhibits.

[570]*570At the conclusion of the hearings an order was entered of which the following are the important paragraphs:

Ordered that all railroad corporations and street railroad corporations and common carriers operating surface cars subject to the jurisdiction of this Commission and every receiver of such corporation shall within thirty (30) days after the receipt of a certified copy of this order file with the Commission sworn statements showing in respect to cars operated by one-man crews: (а) the car numbers of all cars equipped or used for operation by one man; (b) the safety devices with which such cars are equipped; (c) the lines on which one-man car operation is used; (d) the hours of the day on which one-man car operation is used.
“ Further Ordered that before any cars other than those shown on the statements directed by the foregoing paragraph shall be used for operation by one-man crews, they shall submit the information directed by the foregoing paragraph and shall obtain the approval of this Commission to such operation.
“ Further Ordered that before the hours of operation of cars with one-man crews shall be changed, increased or extended on any fine, the said corporations or receivers shall obtain the approval of the Commission therefor.
Further Ordered that the said corporations and receivers shall equip or cause to be equipped the cars now being operated by one-man crews as set forth in the sworn statements required by the first directory paragraph of this order, with all of the following safety devices or appliances:
“ (a) Sliding or folding doors, interlocked with either the controller or airbrake system.
“ (b) The so-called ‘ dead man feature, which requires the weight of the motorman’s hand on the controller handle or holding bis foot on the control valve and when either hand or foot is removed from the operating position, cuts off the power and automatically sets the brakes.
“ (c) In addition to the regular entrance door, an additional exit available in case of emergency.
“ The said corporations or receivers shall equip 25% of all cars now operated by them in one-man operation lacking any or all of the foregoing devices or appliances, within six (6) months from the date of the receipt of a certified copy of this order; an additional 25% within one year, an additional 25% within one year and six (б) months; and the balance within two years.”

The power of the Commission to make this order is questioned by the petitioner. The railroad company says that the issue in this proceeding is whether the Transit Commission may under the [571]*571claim of regulation, before evidence taken or facts ascertained, make an order which relates solely to the management of the petitioner’s railroad, and whether the Transit Commission may, in the first instance and in advance of any particular operation, substitute its judgment for the judgment of the owners of the property in the management of such railroad.

The Transit Commission contends (1) that the right to regulate the running of railway cars is a governmental power vested in the State in its sovereign capacity, (2) that it may be exercised by the State, directly or through a commission appointed by it, or it may delegate such power to municipalities, and (3) that the State, in the exercise of its police power, may forbid entirely the operation of one-man cars. (City of Schenectady v. Schenectady B. Co., 118 Misc. 676.)

In New York city the right to regulate has been delegated to the Transit Commission, and this right includes the power to act in respect to one-man cars.”

In Sullivan v. City of Shreveport (251 U. S. 169) an ordinance requiring that each street car should be operated during designated hours by two persons, a conductor and a motorman, was under consideration. The court held that where such power has been delegated to a municipality, a city ordinance requiring each street car to be operated by a motorman and a conductor, cannot be declared an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of police power in the absence of a clear demonstration that one-man cars would prove as safe and convenient for the public as cars operated by two men.

The United States Supreme Court has also upheld the reasonableness of a statute requiring a definite type of protection to the public even though since its enactment there had been devised safety features claimed to equal or excel the protection sought by the statute. (Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. White, 278 U. S. 456.)

The petitioner in this case argues that the two provisions of the order under review are not regulatory but that they relate to the management of petitioner’s railway. The petitioner fails, however, to distinguish between acts of the State or its agents in the exercise of the police power in the interest of public safety and attempts to concern itself with the financial management and business direction of the railway company.

The contention of the railroad in this proceeding is not only that the Commission arbitrarily and without any valid reason ruled that there could be no more one-man cars on certain lines and that on other lines one-man cars could be operated during certain [572]*572hours only, but that the Commission has no power to act in such a case before actual operation of such cars.

The representatives of the railroad companies also say that they were called before the Transit Commission to answer the demand that one-man cars be equipped with certain devices to add to their safety and that they were ready to meet the suggestion that the cars should be equipped with sliding or folding doors, interlocked with either the controller or airbrake system; to install the so-called “ dead-man feature, which requires the weight of the motorman’s hand on the controller handle or the holding of his foot on the control valve, the removal of which cuts off the power and automatically sets the brakes, and in addition to the regular entrance door, agreed to provide an additional exit available in case of emergency.

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227 A.D. 568, 238 N.Y.S. 380, 1930 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12075, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/third-avenue-railway-co-v-godley-nyappdiv-1930.