Thigpen v. Wall Printing Corporation

145 So. 714
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedFebruary 6, 1933
DocketNo. 4446.
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 145 So. 714 (Thigpen v. Wall Printing Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thigpen v. Wall Printing Corporation, 145 So. 714 (La. Ct. App. 1933).

Opinion

MILLS, J.

In this case plaintiff brings suit against defendant for $1,350, interest and attorney’s fees for rent of certain premises in Alexandria, La., and $29 for plate glass insurance. Pie was granted by the lower court an uncontested judgment against defendant for that amount, with 5 per cent, interest from judicial demand until paid, and 10 per cent, on principal and interest and all costs of suit. His lessor’s lien is recognized and writ of provisional seizure is maintained.

The judgment, however, is rendered without prejudice to the rights and privileges asserted by the Intertype Corporation, inter-vener, the ranking of whose privilege being reserved for adjudication on the trial of the intervention.

The Guaranty Bank & Trust Company intervened, asserting a privilege as holder of chattel mortgage notes, superior to that of both plaintiff and Intertype Corporation. As the record shows that the bank had executed *715 written waivers of its priority over tile liens of the lessor and other intervener, its opposition can he disposed of at once by granting it judgment as prayed for against defendant, Wall Printing Company, but subordinating its privilege on the property in controversy to that of both lessor, J. B. Thigpen, and inter-vener Intertype Corporation, leaving to be disposed of the controversy between plaintiff and Intertype Corporation as to the ranking of their liens.

Among other property provisionally seized was an Intertype machine and accessories. This machine was sold to defendant in 1922, by the Intertype Corporation, for a cash consideration and deferred payments amounting to $4,200, represented by a series of notes secured by chattel mortgage dated and recorded on August 26,1922. The mortgage was passed by private act acknowledged before a notary.

Defendant, having reduced its indebtedness to $2,665.32, on July 10, 1925, executed new notes and chattel mortgage for the amount of this balance. This act was recorded on August 4, 1925, and was likewise an act under private signature acknowledged before a notary public.

Having reduced its indebtedness to $2,045.-47, defendant, on January 5, 1927, executed new notes and chattel mortgage for this balance. The mortgage was recorded on January 28, 1927, and likewise was by private act acknowledged before a notary.

.These three mortgages do not meet the requirements of section 2, Act No. 198 of 1918, known as the “Chattel Mortgage Act,” which reads: “In order to affect third persons without notice, said instrument must be passed by notarial act.”

The authentic act is defined in article 2234, Revised Civil Code, to be “that which has been executed before a notary public or other officer authorized to execute such functions, in presence of two witnesses.” The decisions make no distinction between an authentic act and notarial act.

“The proposition that a notary by a mere certificate can convert an act under private signature into a notarial act is clearly untenable.” Baker v. Baker, 125 La. 969, 52 So. 115, 117; Union Securities Co. v. Neal, 9 La. App. 494, 121 So. 316; Dainello v. McCoy, 15 La. App. 358, 131 So. 608.

“Statute directing performance in particular manner by implication forbids every other manner of performance.” Lieber v. Watt, 19 La. App. 650, 139 So. 778.

“All mortgages are stricti juris.” Revised Civil Code, arts. 3283, 3306; Durel v. Buchanan, 147 La. 804, 86 So. 189, 192.

As there is no proof in the record that Thig-pen, the lessor, had any actual notice of these three chattel mortgages, they cannot affect in any way his lessor’s lien.

Having reduced his indebtedness to $1,689.97, defendant, on March 15, 1928, executed new notes for this balance, secured by a new chattel mortgage recorded on March 27, 1928. This act is in authentic form, but was passed before Lee J. Novo, notary public. The body of the act shows Lee J. Novo to be the authorized agent of the mortgagee in the transaction. The act is signed “Intertype Corporation, by Lee J. Novo, Agent.” Because of this defect, the plaintiff contends that the mortgage is not a notarial act.

The general rule is that, where he has no personal interest, the notary taking an acknowledgment is not disqualified because of the fact that he is agent or attorney for one of the parties. 1 C. J., 807, and cases cited; 1 R. C. L. 271, and eases cited.

An officer or agent of a corporation not shown to be a stockholder or beneficially interested is qualified to take an acknowledgment where the corporation is a party. 1 C. J., 808, and cases cited; Penn v. Garvin, 56 Ark. 511, 20 S. W. 410; Little v. Thomas, 204 Ala. 66, 85 So. 490; Florida Savings Bank & Real Est. Exchange v. Rivers, 36 Fla. 575, 18 So. 850.

His indebtedness being reduced to $1,268.58, defendant, on July 3,1930, executed new notes for that amount securéd by new chattel mortgage, which was recorded July 10,1930, and is in correct form as a notarial act. Of this last amount, $1,093.58 is still unpaid and is demanded by intervener, with 6 per cent, per an-num interest from May 25, 1930, until paid, and 10 per cent, attorney’s fees.

All of the mortgages sufficiently describe the mortgaged property as “one two-letter in-tertype or type-casting machine of the manufacture of the said Intertype Corporation, known as Intertype, serial No. 4716,” and sufficiently loca'te it as at the place of business of mortgagor in Alexandria, La.

Counsel for intervener Intertype Corporation contend that the execution of each new series of notes and chattel mortgages was but a renewal and extension'of the original indebtedness and mortgage, and was not an ex-tinguishment or novation of same. We are not concerned here with the question of the novation of intervener’s account. The only issue in this case is the ranking of its lien and privilege, derived from the execution and recordation of the chattel mortgage. Each chattel mortgage given this intervener by the lessee is a new and distinct mortgage securing the whole of the balance due on the machine, at the time it is given. Each is so termed in the resolution of the board of directors of the Wall Printing Company, Inc., authorizing the execution of the mortgage. Each new mortgage in effect extinguished the old one, as no debt remained to be secured under the old one. In any event, what would it avail inter-vener to place its reliance in the original mortgage when that instrument is not in the form *716 of a notarial act and could not affect the rights of lessor?

The plaintiff, James B. Thigpen, leased to defendant, Wall Printing Company, Inc., certain premises in the city of Alexandria, La. The lease is in writing, dated —■ January, 1928, is for a period of three years, beginning January 1, 1928, and ending December 31, 1930, at a monthly rental of $75. At the expiration of the lease, defendant held over from month to month without agreement until February 28, 1931. On that date a new contract was drawn leasing the premises for another period of three years, beginning January 1, 1931, and ending December 31, 1933, the rental remaining at $75 per month. It will be noted that both of the last two chattel mortgages, the first recorded March 27, 1928, and the latter, July 10, 1930, were executed and recorded after the commencement and before the expiration of the first lease.

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145 So. 714, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thigpen-v-wall-printing-corporation-lactapp-1933.