Thierry Munganga v. Iowa Workforce Development, Reach for Your Potential and Centro, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: December 3, 2025
• Docket: 25-0122
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-0122 Filed December 3, 2025

THIERRY MUNGANGA, Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.

IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, REACH FOR YOUR POTENTIAL, and CENTRO, INC., Respondents-Appellees. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Mark D. Fisher,

Judge.

An unemployment-benefits claimant appeals the district court’s order

denying his petition for judicial review of an agency decision requiring the claimant

to repay overpaid benefits. AFFIRMED.

Dan Feltes (argued) of Iowa Legal Aid, Iowa City, and Lorraine Gaynor,

Iowa City, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, Eric Wessan, Solicitor General, Halle Kissell

(argued) and William C. Admussen, Assistant Solicitors General, and Andrew

Greenberg, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Heard at oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ. 2

AHLERS, Judge.

It is undisputed that Thierry Munganga was overpaid $5143 in

unemployment benefits for which he did not qualify. When an audit revealed the

overpayment, Iowa Workforce Development (IWD) notified Munganga that he

would need to repay those monies to IWD. Munganga sought administrative

review, and an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that IWD had presented

sufficient evidence of the amount of overpayment and concluded that Munganga

must repay the overpayment. Munganga then sought judicial review in the district

court under Iowa Code chapter 17A (2024). The district court agreed with the ALJ

that Munganga is required to repay the overpayment. Munganga now appeals to

this court.

At the heart of Munganga’s appeal is his claim that his filing errors, which

gave rise to the overpayment, stem from a language barrier. Munganga is a native

French speaker. Yet IWD did not provide filing information or weekly online

processing forms in French. So Munganga filed his weekly claims in English, a

language in which he claims he is not fluent. Munganga contends IWD’s failure to

provide filing information in French amounts to a violation of his due process rights

and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

We start by addressing whether Munganga’s arguments relating to Title VI

are properly before this court because IWD contests error preservation. “In

reviewing agency action, the district court and the appellate court may only review

issues considered and decided by the agency.” Klein v. Iowa Pub. Info. Bd., 968

N.W.2d 220, 235 (Iowa 2021) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Here,

Munganga argued to the ALJ that IWD violated Title VI. But the ALJ never 3

addressed that argument in its ruling, and Munganga did not file a motion for

rehearing requesting the ALJ to do so. And “[w]hen an agency fails to address an

issue in its ruling and a party fails to point out the issue in a motion for rehearing,

we find that error on these issues has not been preserved” for our review. KFC

Corp. v. Iowa Dep’t of Rev., 792 N.W.2d 308, 329 (Iowa 2010).

Munganga responds to IWD’s error-preservation challenge by citing cases

that state that a party is not required to file a motion for rehearing before seeking

judicial review under chapter 17A. See Ellis v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 285 N.W.2d

153, 155–56 (Iowa 1979); Kehde v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 318 N.W.2d 202, 205

(Iowa 1982); Cerro Gordo Cnty. Care Facility v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 374

N.W.2d 673, 675 (Iowa 1985). But none of these cases are on point, as they

address whether a motion for rehearing is necessary to exhaust administrative

remedies before seeking judicial review, not whether a motion for rehearing is

needed to preserve error. No one disputes that Munganga exhausted

administrative remedies. But because the ALJ never addressed Munganga’s

Title VI argument and Munganga did not file a motion for rehearing asking the ALJ

to do so, his Title VI claim is not preserved for our consideration.

Munganga also argues that Iowa Code section 96.3(7), as applied to him,

violates due process. We review his claim de novo. Endress v. Iowa Dep’t of

Human Servs., 994 N.W.2d 71, 76 (Iowa 2020). Section 96.3(7) provides in

relevant part, “If an individual receives benefits for which the individual is

subsequently determined to be ineligible, even though the individual acts in good

faith and is not otherwise at fault, the benefits shall be recovered.” But the

substance of Munganga’s argument is not focused on section 96.3(7) or its 4

requirement that an overpayment be paid back. Instead, he focuses on the

underlying events that gave rise to the overpayment, namely the purported

deficiencies in the filing materials and weekly wage reporting process that were

not available to Munganga in French. He argues that IWD should have reasonably

known he is a French speaker and provided information to him in French to

comport with his due process rights. He concludes his argument by urging “[a]s a

consequence of IWD’s failure to comply with these vital [due process]

requirements, IWD should be prohibited from now collecting on Mr. Munganga’s

overpayment from mistakes in the weekly claims processing as legal relief.”

Munganga’s argument fails to explain how section 96.3(7) itself violates his

right to due process as applied to him. An individual is entitled to procedural due

process when “a state action threatens to deprive [the individual] of a protected

interest in life, liberty, or property.” Id. at 77. But Munganga received both notice

of IWD’s audit of his benefits and the ensuing hearing wherein the overpayment

was established. And Munganga participated in that hearing. So as to the

determination of the overpayment and section 96.3(7)’s requirement that he pay it

back, we find no procedural due process violation.

Additionally, even if we did find a violation of Munganga’s due process rights

when he filed for benefits each week without the benefit of French instructions, he

provides no authority supporting his requested remedy of being excused from

repaying the overpayment. And we can think of none. This is an instance where

Munganga received more benefits than he was entitled to receive, not less. There

is no basis for Munganga to receive the windfall of having his repayment obligation

excused. 5

On a related note, relief from agency action on judicial review can only be

granted when “substantial rights of the person seeking judicial relief have been

prejudiced.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10). There is no dispute that Munganga

received all benefits to which he was entitled. Even if he had been provided the

instructions and filing materials in French, he would not have been entitled to any

additional benefits. So Munganga has not shown that he was prejudiced by the

agency action.1

Finally, Munganga argues that we are able to grant equitable relief under

section 17A.19(10)(b), (c) for agency actions that violate any provision of law or an

erroneous interpretation of the law not clearly vested in the discretion of the

agency. So, he contends, we are able to exercise our authority to grant equitable

relief to allow him to keep the overpayment. But our authority to grant equitable

relief is not so expansive as to permit us to ignore a statutory mandate.

Section 96.3(7) clearly requires the overpayment of unemployment benefits be

repaid. We understand that repaying the overpayment may be a hardship for

Munganga because he in good faith believed he was entitled to receive the

benefits and may have spent them, but section 96.3(7) clearly applies to individuals

1 We are not persuaded by Munganga’s claim that he has been prejudiced because, if he doesn’t repay what he owes, he will not be able to seek unemployment benefits should he become unemployed again, see Iowa Code § 96.3(7)(a) (providing that the IWD may withhold future unemployment benefits until the overpayment is recovered), and his future state income tax refunds will be subject to garnishment until the overpayment is repaid, see id. § 96.11(16). It is speculation to assume that Munganga will not repay the overpaid benefits, will have future unemployment for which he would otherwise be eligible for benefits, and will have future state income tax refunds that will be subject to garnishment. We decline to find prejudice to Munganga based on multiple instances of speculation. 6

even when they act in good faith and are “not otherwise at fault.” We decline to

grant Munganga relief from the statutorily mandated obligation to repay the

overpayment.

As the district court correctly denied Munganga’s petition for judicial review,

we affirm.

AFFIRMED.