Thibodeaux v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance

77 So. 2d 137, 1954 La. App. LEXIS 992
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 10, 1954
DocketNo. 3918
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 77 So. 2d 137 (Thibodeaux v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thibodeaux v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance, 77 So. 2d 137, 1954 La. App. LEXIS 992 (La. Ct. App. 1954).

Opinion

ELLIS, Judge.

This is a suit for compensation in which the plaintiff is claiming total and permanent disability and $30 per week for not exceeding 400 weeks for an alleged accident he suffered on May 27, 1953, while employed by the defendant, Lormand. Plaintiff has joined the insurance carrier as party defendant.

Answer was filed by the defendant denying the contentions of the plaintiff by alleging that compensation has been paid for a period of 28 weeks at the rate of $24.05 per week, making a total of $673.40 and also certain medical expenses. While the plaintiff claims $30 per week the defendant alleges that his weekly wages were $37 per week. The answer further sets up as a defense that if the plaintiff had been hurt in the course and scope of his employment, which was denied, then in that event he had entirely recovered from any injury which he received, and that based on the reports of some physicians that had examined him, the compensation had been discontinued.

Shortly prior to the trial the defendant filed motion in which they tequested the appointment of Dr. Louis Meuleman, an orthopedic surgeon of Lafayette, Louisiana, and any other duly qualified orthopedic surgeon'to examine the plaintiff, which request was allegedly based upon the testimony of Dr. Blais Salatich that the condition of the plaintiff had been a progressive and developing one and that an examination of different sets of x-rays taken at different times led him to believe that the present disability to the plaintiff might not have originally been indicated.

After hearing on the motion the District Judge ordered the named doctor and D'r. Gilly to make this examination.

The case was tried, submitted and based upon written reasons, judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant rejecting the plaintiff’s demands, and he has appealed.

As contended by the defendants and admitted by the plaintiff his case presents largely questions of fact and naturally the defendant rests upon the doctrine of “lack of manifest error.”

It is shown that the plaintiff was examined by Dr. Karr, neu'rologist, Dr. Schlesinger, orthopedist, Dr. Meuleman, orthopedist, Dr. Salatich, orthopedist, Dr. Gilly, orthopedist, Dr. Trahan, general practitioner. A.s happens too frequently the medical testimony is greatly in conflict.

The District Judge clearly found that the injuries were established but the medical evidence as to the disabling effect discloses some conflict. He stated that the question to be determined was the extent of the injury, whether temporary or permanent. In this we agree. After discussing the testimony of the various doctors, the District Judge stated:

“Accepting the testimony of Dr. Gilly, wherein he states ‘that if any evidence of disability exists it exists in the field of the neuro-surgeon’, and the complainant having been examined by a neuro-surgeon (Dr. Karr) and the rupture with herniation of the interver-tebral disc having been ruled out by him (Karr), there remains no evidence of total permanent disability except the testimony of Dr. Trahan, a general practitioner, who saw and examined the plaintiff on several occasions and found him to be totally disabled with ruptured disc, and the testimony of Dr. Salatich, orthopedist,'who.stated there was a ruptured disc...
[139]*139“Therefore, the plaintiff has not proved his case by a preponderance of the evidence and his demands will be rejected.”

Dr. Meuleman disagreed with Dr. Gilly’s statement by testifying “that the neurosurgeons feel that the orthopedists should not do this surgery, and by the same token a good many orthopedists feel that disc surgery is primarily an orthopedic problem.” As Dr. Karr was the only neurosurgeon produced as a witness, the effect of the lower court’s decision is to leave the question of plaintiff’s disability entirely up to him.

A somewhat thorough discussion of the lay and medical evidence is necessary to a proper decision of this case.

On May 27, 1953 the plaintiff in the course and scope of his employment was handling a gravel scoop attached to a chain which was fastened to a truck. The gravel scoop was being used to unload gravel from another truck. In doing this the plaintiff was holding the scoop while the truck pulled it through the gravel in order to load it. On the day stated the front of the scoop hung on something in the bottom of the truck which naturally caused the handles to come up and forward and the plaintiff, in attempting to hold the scoop, was jerked and fell on his right .side in somewhat of a twisted position on the gravel in the truck. He at that time told a fellow worker that he had hurt his back but it was not until after he had gone to eat his dinner that the pain became unbearable. He reported to his foreman who loaned him a pick-up truck and he went to see Dr. Trahan.

It would be useless to detail the testimony as to whether plaintiff suffered an accident as there is no doubt that he did. The only question, as stated, is as to disability if any.

In evaluating the testimony in this case it might be well to remember that the doctors who knew the plaintiff best and treated him longest did not consider him as a malingerer in any sense of the word. We are particularly referring to Dr. Trahan, who treated him at the time of his injury and who was still seeing plaintiff at the time of the trial, which was on March 18, 1954, and Dr. Gilly who saw and examined the plaintiff some 12 times. In fact, no doctor testified that plaintiff was a malingerer, but Doctors Karr, Schlesinger and Meuleman thought that plaintiff was exaggerating his symptoms of pain.

Dr. Trahan testified that he was a general practitioner and that on May 27, 1953, the plaintiff came to his office complaining of back pain. An examination at that time revealed a well developed male who was walking with a limp and bent over double and his pertinent findings then were all to the back, where he found extreme tender-' ness along the latisimus dorsal muscles, which he interpreted as spasm of the muscles. At this time Dr. Trahan located the extreme tenderness along lumbar vertebrae one and two and severe spasm of the back muscles on the right side. Dr. Trahan stated that the patient at the time of this first visit “could just about get around the pain was so severe.” There was no doubt in his mind that the man was in trouble, and did have pain. He examined him thereafter thirty or forty times and has treated him regularly since the accident. Dr. Tra-han’s examinations and findings and conclusions are summed up in the following testimony:

“A. Mr. Thibodeaux was seen, he was examined by me, sent home on bed rest, conservative treatment, and his back was strapped as any ordinary back injury would be, and told to return in two or three days to my office to check him. When the man returned there was some improvement so he was told to return again in three or four days, and when he did come back the symptoms got worse. The man was complaining of more pain. However, the objective findings were about the same, still had tenderness in that area. He was then referred here to Lafayette to Drs. Miles and Romagosa for AP and lateral views of his back, sacroiliac region. This was done and the report came back from Drs. Miles and Roma-[140]*140gosa as being negative; no bony pathology found. • However,' the subjective complaints of this patient continued to • increase.

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Bluebook (online)
77 So. 2d 137, 1954 La. App. LEXIS 992, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thibodeaux-v-houston-fire-casualty-insurance-lactapp-1954.