Theron M. Christensen v. Iowa District Court For Story County

• Court: Supreme Court of Iowa
• Decided: May 30, 2025
• Docket: 24-0289
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Iowa Supreme Court

No. 24–0289

Submitted January 21, 2025—Filed May 30, 2025

Theron M. Christensen,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Iowa District Court for Story County,

Defendant.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Stephen A. Owen,

judge.

A prosecutor appeals a district court ruling imposing monetary sanctions

for misconduct while prosecuting a criminal case. Writ Sustained.

McDermott, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices

joined.

Ryan P. Tunink (argued) and Jason C. Palmer of Lamson Dugan & Murray

LLP, West Des Moines, for appellants.

Matthew T. Lindholm (argued) of Gourley, Rehkemper & Lindholm PLC,

West Des Moines, for appellee.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General; Eric Wessan, Solicitor General; and

Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney General, for amicus curiae State of Iowa.

Aaron W. Ahrendsen, Carroll, for amicus curiae Iowa County Attorney’s

Association.

William Bushnell, Assistant Public Defender, for amicus curiae State

Public Defender’s Office. 2

McDermott, Justice.

The district court granted a criminal defendant’s motion to impose

monetary sanctions under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413 against an

assistant county attorney for misconduct while prosecuting a criminal charge.

The assistant county attorney filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging the

sanctions. In this case, we review an order that appears to be unprecedented in

Iowa—one imposing monetary sanctions against a prosecutor in a criminal case.

In the underlying criminal case, a criminal defendant was charged with

operating while intoxicated, first offense, after an officer pulled him over for

speeding. The arresting officer used a radar to ascertain the defendant’s speed.

Theron Christensen, an assistant county attorney for Story County, prosecuted

the case. After the defendant’s lawyer deposed the arresting officer and the

State’s expert witness (and, in the process, exposed serious weaknesses in the

State’s case), Christensen filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude several

categories of evidence. The defendant resisted the motion in limine and, on top

of it, moved for sanctions against Christensen under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure

1.413. The defendant argued that Christensen’s motion in limine was frivolous,

lacking in legal and factual bases, and made in a bad faith attempt to undermine

the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense and to a fair trial.

Two weeks later, and two days before the motion in limine hearing,

Christensen filed a withdrawal of the motion in limine. The next day, Christensen

filed a resistance to the defendant’s motion for sanctions, asserting that his

arguments in the motion in limine were made in good faith and were legally and

factually sound. Several hours after filing the resistance, Christensen emailed

the defendant’s attorney, stating, “I’ve decided to let the bear go this time. I’ll be

filing a motion to dismiss shortly.” According to an affidavit from one of the 3

defendant’s lawyers, Christensen privately admitted before the hearing that he

decided to dismiss the case mostly because he didn’t want the arresting officer

to have to testify about his failure to calibrate his radar in this and potentially

other cases.

During the hearing, the district court dismissed the State’s charges and

informed the defendant’s lawyer that if he wished to continue to pursue

sanctions, he needed to file a separate motion. The defendant’s lawyer thereafter

filed an expanded sanctions motion, adding that Christensen filed the dismissal

for the improper purpose of covering up the officer’s failure to calibrate his radar.

Christensen again resisted the motion for sanctions, arguing in part that any

alleged misconduct was harmless since the operating while intoxicated charge

had been dismissed.

The district court ultimately concluded that Christensen had engaged in

sanctionable conduct in violation of Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413 and Iowa

Code § 619.19 (2023) by filing the motion in limine and by dismissing the case

for an improper purpose. The district court ultimately entered a $2,072 monetary

sanction against Christensen. The district court determined that Christensen

failed to carry his burden to show an inability to pay a monetary sanction and

that the amount reflected the need for deterrence based on the unique role of the

prosecutor in our justice system. Christensen thereafter filed a petition for writ

of certiorari, and we granted review of the petition.

We will sustain a writ of certiorari when a lower court “has exceeded its

jurisdiction or otherwise has acted illegally.” State Pub. Def. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 633

N.W.2d 280, 282 (Iowa 2001). A court acts illegally when its factual findings are

not supported by substantial evidence or when it has failed to properly apply the

law. K.C. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 6 N.W.3d 297, 301 (Iowa 2024). 4

Christensen argues that the district court abused its discretion in

concluding that he engaged in sanctionable conduct and in imposing the

monetary sanction. He focuses on the particular findings of sanctionable

conduct in the district court’s ruling and argues, for instance, that the district

court misunderstood the type of evidence relevant to the case, wrongly assumed

the admissibility of the expert’s opinions, and misunderstood arguments

construing various statutory provisions cited in the motion in limine.

Although Christensen argued below that sanctions were unwarranted

under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413, he did not argue below and does not

argue on appeal a foundational issue pertaining to the district court’s power:

that no law or rule grants a district court the authority to impose a monetary

sanction against a prosecutor in a criminal case. This argument was advanced

instead in an amicus brief by the Iowa Attorney General’s office on behalf of the

State of Iowa. The attorney general has a statutory duty to “[s]upervise county

attorneys in all matters pertaining to the duties of their offices.” Iowa Code

§ 13.2(1)(g). The attorney general’s office did not appear in the district court

proceedings as Christensen represented himself.

Under the party presentation rule, we ordinarily are guided by the

arguments presented by the parties in a case and have deemed arguments

waived for a party’s failure to advance them. See, e.g., State v. Struve, 956 N.W.2d

90, 99 n.2 (Iowa 2021) (“[O]ur system ‘is designed around the premise that

[parties represented by competent counsel] know what is best for them, and are

responsible for advancing the facts and argument entitling them to relief.’ ”

(alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371,

375–76 (2020))). As a result, we ordinarily would deem the argument waived and

not address the State’s argument as an amicus. See Iowa Ass’n of Bus. & Indus. 5

v. City of Waterloo, 961 N.W.2d 465, 476 (Iowa 2021) (“Normally, we do not allow

amici curiae to raise new issues.”); Iowa R. App. P. 6.906(5) (authorizing amicus

briefs to “assist the court in resolving the issues preserved for appellate review”).

But this case presents an exceptional situation in which we deem it necessary

to reach the unpreserved argument.

Party concessions do not in all cases dictate a court’s options. State v.

Gale, ___ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 1415879, at *4 (Iowa May 16, 2025)

(reasoning that the parties’ agreement that there was legal error was not

dispositive of the question before the court). “If the parties don’t offer the correct

reading of a particular statute, we are not bound to blindly follow their lead.” Ctr.

for Investigative Reporting v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 14 F.4th 916, 943 (9th Cir. 2021)

(Bumatay, J., dissenting). “[F]or courts to proclaim a governing legal precedent

based on an adverse party’s concession on a point of law creates a significant

risk of establishing a bad law, and all the more so when the concession is inferred

solely based on the adverse party’s failure to argue the point.” Art & Antique

Dealers League of Am., Inc. v. Seggos, 121 F.4th 423, 438 (2d Cir. 2024).

Concerning the district court’s power to impose a monetary sanction, we

have said that “[t]he court’s inherent power alone . . . does not authorize the

court to assess attorney fees as a sanction against a litigant or counsel.” Hearity

v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 440 N.W.2d 860, 863 (Iowa 1989). Monetary sanctions against

a lawyer “must be authorized by rule of this court or by statute.” Id. In this case,

for what appears to be the first time, a district court relied on Iowa Rule of Civil

Procedure 1.413 and Iowa Code § 619.19 to assess monetary sanctions against

a prosecutor in a criminal case. Although this rule and this statute give courts

the power to impose monetary sanctions in civil cases, they confer no such power

in criminal cases. 6

Rule 1.413 provides that when a lawyer signs a pleading, motion, or other

filing, the lawyer certifies that the lawyer has read it and believes, after

reasonable investigation, that it is factually accurate and justified by existing law

or a good-faith argument to change the existing law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.413(1). The

lawyer further certifies that the filing is not being submitted for any improper

reason, such as harassing someone or causing unnecessary delays or costs in

the case. Id. For a violation of the rule, “the court, upon motion or upon its own

initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or

both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the other party

or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing

. . . including a reasonable attorney fee.” Id. (emphasis added).

The statute that the district court relied on, Iowa Code § 619.19, lays out

similar requirements. It likewise authorizes “an appropriate sanction, which may

include an order to pay the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable

expenses incurred because of the filing of the motion, pleading, or other paper,

including a reasonable attorney fee.” Id. § 619.19(4).

Neither rule 1.413 nor § 619.19 allows a district court to impose monetary

sanctions on a prosecutor in a criminal case. As an initial matter, the placements

of rule 1.413 and § 619.19 make clear that they apply only in civil, and not

criminal, cases. Section 619.19 is in subtitle three of the Iowa Code, titled “Civil

Procedure.” Similarly, Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413 is, as its name

suggests, in the rules of civil procedure. “We read statutes as a whole, meaning

we look beyond the isolated words and phrases to obtain a construction that is

in harmony with surrounding provisions.” State v. Boone, 989 N.W.2d 645, 649–

50 (Iowa 2023). Both rule 1.413 and § 619.19 are found within sections bearing

the title “civil procedure.” They both thus logically apply in civil cases only. 7

The rules governing civil procedure were never intended or designed to

apply in criminal cases. We made this point clear in State v. Addison, 95 N.W.2d

744 (Iowa 1959). In Addison, a criminal defendant filed a petition for a new trial

under rules 252 (now rule 1.1012) and 253 (now rule 1.1013) of the Iowa Rules

of Civil Procedure. Id. at 745. The defendant argued that rule 1(a) (now rule

1.101), which stated that “[t]hese rules shall govern the practice and procedure

in all courts of the state,” indicated that the rules of civil procedure should be

applied broadly to criminal proceedings as well. Id. at 747. We disagreed,

explaining:

It is true rule 1(a) says, ‘These rules shall govern the practice and procedure in all courts of the state, except where * * * statutes not affected hereby provide different procedure in particular * * * cases.’ This provision does not specifically limit operation of the rules to civil cases. Doubtless it was not thought necessary to do so. The title given the rules as well as their content indicates they are civil in nature.

Id. (omissions in original).

In Addison, we declared that the Iowa “Rules of Civil Procedure have no

application to criminal cases unless a statute makes them applicable.” Id. We

have not abandoned that view in the intervening half-century. See, e.g., State v.

Sallis, 981 N.W.2d 336, 349 (Iowa 2022) (“The civil rules, however, do not apply

to criminal proceedings.”); State v. Russell, 897 N.W.2d 717, 725 (Iowa 2017)

(“[O]ur rules of civil procedure do not apply to criminal matters . . . .”); see also

State v. Wise, 697 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (“The Rules of Civil

Procedure have no applicability in criminal cases, unless made applicable by

statute.”).

What’s more, Iowa Code § 602.4202 requires the supreme court to submit

its proposed procedural rules, including the rules of civil and criminal procedure,

to the legislative council and to legislative leadership. See id. § 602.4202(1)–(2). 8

Unless the legislative council acts to delay the implementation of a set of rules,

the rules go into effect. Id. § 602.4202(2). The supreme court has never, to our

knowledge, presented a civil or criminal rule that would provide the legislature

with any inkling that a court could impose monetary sanctions against

prosecutors in criminal cases.

When statutes and rules of civil procedure are intended to apply in

criminal proceedings, they say so explicitly. See, e.g., Iowa Rs. Crim. P. 2.13(1)

(“By defendant. A defendant in a criminal case may depose all witnesses listed

by the State in the minutes of testimony in the same manner, with the same

effect, and with the same limitations, as in civil actions except as otherwise

provided by statute and these rules.”), 2.15(4)(e) (“Service upon a minor witness

shall be as provided for personal service of an original notice in a civil case

pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.305(2).”), 2.19(3) (“Reporting of the

trial shall be governed by Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.903.”), 2.26(1)(c)(1)

(“Upon a judgment for a fine, an execution may be issued as upon a judgment

in a civil case, and return thereof shall be made in like manner.”). The same is

true with statutes. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 617.1 (“Any defendant in any criminal

action pending or to be brought in any court in the state of Iowa may be served

with process, either civil or criminal, in any other action pending or to be brought

against the defendant in the courts of this state while the defendant is present

in this state . . . .”); id. § 622.8 (“In all civil and criminal cases the husband and

wife may be witnesses for each other.”). No rule of criminal procedure

incorporates rule 1.413(1), and nothing in § 619.19 provides that the statute

applies in criminal proceedings. And indeed, we have never applied either one in

a criminal context. Applying the rule we enunciated long ago in Addison, rule

1.413(1) and § 619.19 apply in civil proceedings only. 9

Limiting our civil sanctions rule to civil cases aligns with the federal courts’

approach as well. Federal precedent shows that the federal rule authorizing

sanctions against attorneys, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, does not apply

in criminal cases. “[B]ecause rule 1.413 is based on Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 11, we look to federal decisions applying [R]ule 11 for guidance.” First

Am. Bank v. Fobian Farms, Inc., 906 N.W.2d 736, 745 (Iowa 2018) (alterations in

original) (quoting Barnhill v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 765 N.W.2d 267, 273 (Iowa 2009)).

Federal courts uniformly hold that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do

not apply in criminal proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Arrington, 763 F.3d

17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . do not apply

to criminal cases.”); Gray v. United States, 385 F. App’x 160, 162 (3d Cir. 2010)

(per curiam) (“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not applicable to

criminal cases.”); United States v. McCalister, 601 F.3d 1086, 1087–88 (10th Cir.

2010) (explaining that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply solely to civil

actions while the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure apply solely to criminal

actions); see also Yuri R. Linetsky, A Rule 11 For Prosecutors, 87 Tenn. L. Rev. 1,

57 (2019) (stating that “among the sixty-one rules in the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure, there is no corollary rule” to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

11).

“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply

that of an advocate.” Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:3.8 cmt. [1]. As then-Attorney

General Robert Jackson said, “The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty,

and reputation than any other person in America,” thus “[w]hile the prosecutor

at his best is one of the most beneficent forces in our society, when he acts from

malice or other base motives, he is one of the worst.” Robert H. Jackson, Att’y

Gen. of the U.S., The Federal Prosecutor 1 (Apr. 1, 1940). But courts (and the 10

voting public) are not without other tools to hold prosecutors accountable,

including “vigorous judicial oversight in the district court, appellate review,

postconviction-relief proceedings, attorney disciplinary proceedings, human

resource management, and elections.” Venckus v. City of Iowa City, 930 N.W.2d

792, 803 (Iowa 2019). What’s more, our rules of professional conduct for lawyers

subjects prosecutors to ethical responsibilities beyond those imposed on other

lawyers. See Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:3.8 (providing eight “special

responsibilities of a prosecutor” in addition to the disciplinary rules governing

all attorneys). Violations of these responsibilities can result in discipline ranging

from a public reprimand to suspension or revocation of the prosecutor’s law

license. See, e.g., Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Borth, 728 N.W.2d 205,

207–08 (Iowa 2007) (public reprimand); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.

Zenor, 707 N.W.2d 176, 177–78 (Iowa 2005) (suspension of law license).

Neither rule 1.413 nor § 619.19 applies to Christensen’s conduct as a

prosecutor in this case. As a result, we hold that the district court erred by

relying on this rule and statute to impose a monetary sanction against

Christensen for his conduct. We thus reverse the sanctions order and the

monetary sanction it imposed.

Writ Sustained.