Therese Ann Ladd v. State
This text of Therese Ann Ladd v. State (Therese Ann Ladd v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Appellant
Appellee
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
Therese Ann Ladd appeals from a judgment revoking her probation and adjudicating her guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by contact. We affirm.
The trial court initially deferred appellant's adjudication of guilt and placed her on community supervision. The State subsequently moved to adjudicate her guilty alleging six violations of her probation. Appellant pled true to five of those alleged violations. The court then granted the motion and adjudicated appellant guilty.
Appellant's counsel has filed a motion to withdraw, after filing a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), representing he has searched the record and found no arguable grounds for reversal. The motion and brief illustrate that counsel notified appellant of her right to file her own brief. So too did we inform appellant that any pro se response or brief she cared to file had to be filed by January 29, 2007. To date, no response or request for extension of time to file a response has been received.
In compliance with the principles enunciated in Anders, appellate counsel discussed two potential areas for appeal. They involve 1) error in revoking appellant's probation, and 2) ineffective assistance of counsel. However, counsel has satisfactorily explained why each argument lacks merit.
We have also conducted our own review of the record to assess the accuracy of appellate counsel's conclusions and to uncover any reversible error pursuant to Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Our own review has failed to reveal such error. (1)
Accordingly, the motion to withdraw is granted, and the judgment is affirmed.
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice
Do not publish.
1. The judgment indicates that the trial court found appellant had committed all six alleged violations
of her probation. However, on the record, the trial court indicated that the allegations of failure to make
various payments were not the basis of its order. Nevertheless, appellant pled true to the allegation she failed
to register as a sex offender and there was sufficient evidence to support the allegation she failed to attend
and successfully complete sex offender treatment.
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NO. 07-10-0413-CR
NO. 07-10-0414-CR
NO. 07-10-0415-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL C
MAY 13, 2011
______________________________
BOBBY JOE LEE, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
_________________________________
FROM THE 432ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY;
NOS. 1181069D, 1181071D, & 1181073D; HONORABLE RUBEN GONZALEZ, JUDGE
_______________________________
Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
ABATEMENT AND REMAND
Following a plea of not guilty, Appellant, Bobby Joe Lee, was convicted by a jury of theft of property valued at $20,000 or more but less than $100,000, enhanced,[1] in cause numbers 1181069D and 118071D, and criminal mischief with a pecuniary loss of $100,000 or more but less than $200,000, enhanced,[2] in cause number 1181073D. The fifty year sentences imposed in each cause were ordered to run concurrently. Appellant's notices of appeal were timely filed on September 2, 2010, and following the filing of the appellate record, his briefs were originally due to be filed on January 26, 2011.
On January 28, 2011, Appellant's appointed counsel, Richard C. Kline, requested a sixty-day extension of time in which to file Appellant's brief citing as grounds his busy schedule.[3] An extension was granted to February 25, 2011, and counsel was advised that subsequent extensions would not be granted absent good cause. On February 28, 2011, counsel filed a second motion for extension of time reasonably explaining that in addition to his busy schedule, he had a legitimate personal reason for the request. A second extension was granted to March 31, 2011. After the new deadline passed, counsel filed a third motion for extension of time based not only on his trial schedule, but also on the fact that he was moving his personal residence. This Court granted yet another extension setting the new deadline at May 5, 2011.
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