Theresa Benites v. Kilolo Kijakazi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 23, 2023
• Docket: 22-55807
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 23 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

THERESA A. BENITES, No. 22-55807

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-03429-JGB-ADS v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner MEMORANDUM* of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 18, 2023** San Francisco, California

Before: BEA, CHRISTEN, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Appellant Theresa Benites timely appeals the district court’s judgment, which

affirmed the final decision of the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her application for Supplemental

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district

court’s judgment affirming the Commissioner’s denial of disability benefits to

ensure that the Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and

a correct application of law. Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 182 (9th Cir. 1995).

“‘Substantial evidence’ means ‘more than a mere scintilla,’ but ‘less than a

preponderance.’ It means ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Human

Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). We affirm.

1. Substantial evidence supports the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) use

of Appellant’s numerical grade level to determine that she “has at least a high school

education.” It is undisputed that Appellant attained a high school diploma, and

Appellant proffered “no other evidence to contradict it[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 416.964(b).

Hence, the ALJ did not commit legal error in failing to reduce Appellant’s education

level based on the remoteness and disuse of her formal education. See SSR 20-01p,

85 Fed. Reg. 13692, 13693 (Mar. 9, 2020).

2. Appellant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), limited to simple,

routine tasks, did not convert her “high school education” to a “limited education.”

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.964(b)(3), (4). A claimant’s RFC and the vocational factor of

education are separate, independent factors considered at step five of the sequential

2 disability evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c)(1). Appellant’s reliance

on Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2015), is misplaced. Appellant contends

that Zavalin compels the conclusion that her RFC, limited to simple, routine tasks,

is inconsistent with the regulatory definition of “high school education” in 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.964(b)(4). Zavalin involved an apparent conflict between a claimant’s RFC,

limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, and the Dictionary of Occupational

Titles’ General Education Development scale. 778 F.3d at 843–44. Zavalin has no

bearing on the conclusion Appellant seeks.

AFFIRMED.