Theodore Kyriazis v. Beverly Hills Platinum Realty

Ninth Circuit

Theodore Kyriazis v. Beverly Hills Platinum Realty

542 F. App'x 560

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedOctober 10, 2013

Docket11-56203

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 542 F. App'x 560 (Theodore Kyriazis v. Beverly Hills Platinum Realty) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Theodore Kyriazis v. Beverly Hills Platinum Realty, 542 F. App'x 560 (9th Cir. 2013).

Pincite

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Theodore Kyriazis appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his *561 action alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) in connection with bankruptcy proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion both a dismissal for failure to comply with the local rules, Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam), and the denial of leave to amend, Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir.2011). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 965 (9th Cir.2004). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the action because Kyriazis failed to oppose defendants’ motion to dismiss, despite notice that the failure to do so could be deemed consent to the granting of the motion under the local rules. See C.D. Cal. R. 7-9 (requiring the filing of an opposition or statement of non-opposition to a motion to dismiss); C.D. Cal. R. 7-12 (providing that the failure to file any required document may be deemed consent to the granting or denial of the motion); Ghazali, 46 F.3d at 54 (affirming dismissal for failure to file opposition to motion to dismiss and noting that pro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure).

Denial of Kyriazis’s ex parte application for leave to file his second amended complaint was not an abuse of the district court’s discretion because the proposed amendments would have been futile. See Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir .2009).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kyriazis’s motion to reconsider because Kyriazis failed to establish any basis for reconsideration. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir.1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

MEMORANDUM **

Theodore Kyriazis appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his *561 action alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) in connection with bankruptcy proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion both a dismissal for failure to comply with the local rules, Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam), and the denial of leave to amend, Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir.2011). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 965 (9th Cir.2004). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the action because Kyriazis failed to oppose defendants’ motion to dismiss, despite notice that the failure to do so could be deemed consent to the granting of the motion under the local rules. See C.D. Cal. R. 7-9 (requiring the filing of an opposition or statement of non-opposition to a motion to dismiss); C.D. Cal. R. 7-12 (providing that the failure to file any required document may be deemed consent to the granting or denial of the motion); Ghazali, 46 F.3d at 54 (affirming dismissal for failure to file opposition to motion to dismiss and noting that pro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure).

Denial of Kyriazis’s ex parte application for leave to file his second amended complaint was not an abuse of the district court’s discretion because the proposed amendments would have been futile. See Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir .2009).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kyriazis’s motion to reconsider because Kyriazis failed to establish any basis for reconsideration. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir.1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

542 F. App'x 560, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/theodore-kyriazis-v-beverly-hills-platinum-realty-ca9-2013.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack