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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-6867
THEODORE JERRY BOLICK,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JOEL ANDERSON, in his official capacity; BRYAN P. STIRLING; TERRIE WALLACE; LIEUTENANT SUMTER; LIEUTENANT WRIGHT; LIEUTENANT ROBB; GREGORY FURNESS; KIRKLAND MEDICAL STAFF; OLUWAKEMI BABATUNDE; CATHY GRIMES; JOYALYN ESKEW,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina at Orangeburg. Robert Bryan Harwell, Senior District Judge. (5:21-cv-03800-RBH)
Argued: September 9, 2025 Decided: March 13, 2026
Before KING and BERNER, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Berner wrote the opinion, which Judge King and Judge Floyd joined.
ARGUED: Zoe Terner, DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Brian Craig Mauldin, DAVIDSON & WREN, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Richard B. Katskee, Michael DeLuca, Gabriela Nagle Alverio, DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. William H. Davidson, II, DAVIDSON & WREN, P.A., Columbia, USCA4 Appeal: 23-6867 Doc: 59 Filed: 03/13/2026 Pg: 2 of 20
South Carolina, for Appellees.
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BERNER, Circuit Judge:
Theodore Jerry Bolick was incarcerated at the Kirkland Correctional Institution
Reception and Evaluation Center on two separate occasions, each lasting approximately
five months. During both periods of incarceration, Bolick was not permitted to leave his
cell to engage in physical exercise, despite suffering from serious physical disabilities that
required exercise for rehabilitation. Following his transfer from Kirkland, Bolick filed this
pro se civil rights action against several Kirkland officials as well as the Director of the
South Carolina Department of Corrections. Bolick alleges, among other claims, that the
two extended periods of deprivation of out-of-cell exercise violated his Eighth Amendment
right to humane conditions of confinement. The Eighth Amendment obligates prison
officials to ensure that incarcerated individuals receive the basic necessities of living. These
necessities include not only food and shelter, but also the ability to engage in out-of-cell
exercise unless penological considerations leave prison officials with no alternative.
After the close of discovery, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment
which the district court granted. Upon review of the record evidence, we conclude that
genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on Bolick’s inhumane
conditions of confinement claim against the Kirkland officials. We agree with the district
court, however, that Bolick failed to meet his evidentiary burden to show that the Director
of the South Carolina Department of Corrections could be found liable for this alleged
violation. Accordingly, we affirm in part and vacate in part the district court order and
remand for further proceedings.
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I. Background
Theodore Jerry Bolick was convicted of second-degree burglary in South Carolina
state court and sentenced to twelve years’ incarceration. All men newly incarcerated in the
South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) system are first sent to the Kirkland
Correctional Institution for “reception and evaluation.” The reception and evaluation
process generally lasts between two to three months, during which time the newly-
incarcerated men are assessed to determine their individual safety risk level and their
appropriate permanent place of incarceration. An individual’s safety risk level is based, at
least in part, on the nature of the crime for which the individual was incarcerated and
whether the individual had previously been affiliated with a gang.
SCDC policy requires men incarcerated at Kirkland for reception and evaluation to
remain confined in their cells nearly all the time. They are permitted to leave their cells
only to attend medical appointments, to shower, and to use the telephone. They are never
permitted to leave their cells to engage in physical exercise, purportedly because it would
be unsafe to allow incarcerated individuals to intermingle before they have been
individually evaluated to determine their safety risk and classified accordingly. In lieu of
out-of-cell exercise, men undergoing reception and evaluation at Kirkland are provided a
two-page pamphlet describing the SCDC in-cell exercise policy. The pamphlet includes
instructions for physical exercises—such as sit-ups and knee-bends—that can generally be
performed within the confines of a prison cell.
Bolick was first held at Kirkland for reception and evaluation from September 17,
2020, to February 11, 2021. Pursuant to SCDC policies, Bolick was permitted to leave his
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cell only for medical appointments, to shower, and to make telephone calls. He was not
allowed out of his cell to exercise. Warden Terrie Wallace was responsible for enforcing
SCDC policies at Kirkland. Lieutenants Elaine Sumter, Twonda Wright, and Catherine
Robb directly oversaw Bolick’s dormitory and enforced the policies there.
Prior to his incarceration, Bolick suffered a number of serious physical injuries,
including broken bones in his legs and feet. Surgeries aimed at repairing these injuries left
Bolick with metal rods in his right femur and fibula, and pins and plates in both feet. The
injuries also severely limited Bolick’s ability to engage in physical activity. He could
neither run nor walk unassisted, though he was able to walk with the assistance of a walker
or a cane. These physical limitations prevented Bolick from being able to perform the
exercises described in the in-cell exercise pamphlet. His cell was not large enough to allow
him to move about freely. The cell had less than 25 square feet of unencumbered space and
held two men and three steel beds.
Without the ability to exercise for an extended period of time, Bolick’s preexisting
ailments worsened and his physical and mental health deteriorated. His muscles atrophied.
He suffered from bedsores, skin rashes, lethargy, fatigue, decreased stamina, shortness of
breath, chest pains, stiff joints, and severe pain. He experienced increased anxiety,
depression, and suicidal ideation. Four months into his first period of incarceration at
Kirkland, two prison doctors diagnosed Bolick with arthritis, major depressive disorder,
and an unspecified personality disorder. A prison doctor also directed prison officials to
assign Bolick to a bottom bunk due to his ailments.
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Bolick did not suffer in silence, however. Taking advantage of Kirkland’s policy for
prisoner requests and grievances, Bolick asked—at least eight times—to be permitted to
leave his cell so he could exercise. Bolick explained that he was unable to exercise inside
his cell. He complained that his cell was too small and crowded to allow him to move
about, and that the inability to engage in physical exercise was causing him significant
physical and emotional harm. Bolick’s repeated requests went unheeded. Instead of
permitting him to leave his cell to exercise, officials over and over directed him to the in-
cell exercise pamphlet. After nearly five months, Bolick was finally classified and
transferred from Kirkland to his permanent place of incarceration
Approximately two months after he was transferred, a South Carolina state trial
court vacated Bolick’s sentence based on a mistrial. The South Carolina state trial court
ordered Bolick released from SCDC custody and he was transferred temporarily to a
pretrial detention center while the state trial court considered the State’s motion for
reconsideration. The State’s motion for reconsideration was granted and Bolick’s
convictions were reinstated. He was once again sent to Kirkland for reception and
evaluation.
Bolick’s second period of reception and evaluation at Kirkland lasted even longer
than the first. This time, he spent over five months—between June 15 and December 9,
2021—confined to his cell nearly all the time. Lieutenant Wright oversaw Bolick’s
dormitory and was responsible for enforcing SCDC policies. Although this cell had only
two beds, three men shared the cell. Because Bolick was the last to arrive, he was forced
to sleep on a mat on the floor. Less than eighteen inches separated the mat from the cell
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toilet. Both of Bolick’s cellmates attested that the cell was so small they were unable to
move around freely and in-cell exercise was impossible.
As before, Bolick filed requests—this time, at least twenty-two—seeking
permission to leave his cell to exercise. In these requests, Bolick described the harm he
suffered as a result of being unable to exercise for an extended period of time. Bolick’s
requests were not granted. Instead, the prison officials once again directed Bolick to do the
exercises contained in the in-cell exercise pamphlet or merely forwarded the request to
other officials within the prison system.
All told, over two periods of incarceration, Bolick spent 324 days, over ten months,
at Kirkland. He was not permitted to leave his cell to engage in physical exercise during
this entire time.
II. Procedural History
Proceeding pro se, Bolick filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against, among others,
SCDC Director Bryan Stirling (Director Stirling), Kirkland Warden Terrie Wallace
(Warden Wallace), and Lieutenants Elaine Sumter, Twonda Wright, and Catherine Robb
(we will refer to Warden Wallace and the Lieutenants collectively as “the Officials”).
Section 1983 enables suit against state or local government officials, and others acting
under color of state law, for constitutional violations. Bolick alleges that the Officials
violated his Eighth Amendment right to humane conditions of confinement by:
1) depriving him of the ability to engage in out-of-cell exercise; 2) denying him adequate
medical care; and 3) confining him to overcrowded cells. Bolick separately alleges that
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Director Stirling should be held liable in his individual capacity for the Officials’ Eighth
Amendment violations under a theory of supervisory liability.1 After discovery, the
defendants moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and
dismissed all of Bolick’s claims. The district court first concluded that Bolick failed to
establish genuine disputes of material fact under any theory of inhumane conditions of
confinement. On the basis of that conclusion, the district court found the Officials entitled
to qualified immunity. The district court also concluded that Bolick failed to submit
evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find Director Stirling liable under a theory of
supervisor liability. Bolick appeals only from the district court’s rulings on his claims
concerning deprivation of out-of-cell exercise. Thus, we do not consider his other claims.
We appointed counsel and asked the parties to submit formal briefing.2
1 Bolick also brought a claim for wrongful incarceration. The district court summarily dismissed this claim without prejudice and later denied a motion for reconsideration of the summary dismissal. Bolick appeals the denial of reconsideration. Having reviewed the record and relevant briefing, we affirm the district court’s denial. Bolick’s criminal conviction and sentence have not been invalidated, as required to establish a claim of wrongful incarceration. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484–87 (1994). 2 The Appellate Litigation Clinic at the Duke University School of Law represented Bolick as pro bono counsel. Duke Law student Zoe Terner ably argued on behalf of Bolick as an eligible law student pursuant to Local Appellate Rule 46(a). The panel commends Ms. Terner for her excellent oral advocacy. The district court may also wish to consider appointing pro bono counsel to represent Bolick on remand.
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III. Analysis
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Alexander v.
Connor, 105 F.4th 174, 177–78 (4th Cir. 2024). In doing so, we view the facts in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party—here, Bolick—and draw all reasonable
inferences in his favor. Id. at 179. Summary judgment is appropriate only when “there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Bolick urges us to conclude that there are sufficient material facts in dispute such
that his claims that the Officials and Director Stirling violated his Eighth Amendment right
to humane conditions of confinement by depriving him of out-of-cell exercise should be
sent to a jury. Because Bolick asserts different theories of liability for each, we first address
his claim against the Officials, we then address the question of whether the Officials are
entitled to qualified immunity on that claim, and we close by considering whether Director
Stirling can be held liable for the Officials’ alleged constitutional violations. We find that
Bolick’s claim against the Officials survives summary judgment but his claim against
Director Stirling does not.
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A. Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments imposes an
affirmative obligation on prison officials to provide incarcerated individuals with “humane
conditions of confinement.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). This obligation,
which applies to state prison officials through the Fourteenth Amendment, Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), includes ensuring that incarcerated individuals receive
“the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities[.]” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). One such long-recognized necessity is the
human need for exercise. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991). Depriving
incarcerated individuals “of all meaningful opportunities to exercise generally violates the
Eighth Amendment prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.” Mitchell v. Rice,
954 F.2d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 905. The opportunity to engage
in in-cell exercise will typically not suffice. See id. at 191. Rather, absent exceptional
circumstances, prison officials must provide incarcerated individuals with “some regular
out-of-cell exercise.” Id.
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim of inhumane conditions of confinement
based on the deprivation of out-of-cell exercise, an incarcerated individual must satisfy two
requirements. First, he must establish that the deprivation was “objectively sufficiently
serious[.]” De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 525 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Second, he must establish that the prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind, at a minimum that the prison official acted with deliberate indifference to a
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substantial risk of serious harm. Id. We address each requirement in turn and conclude that
Bolick produced sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to both.
i. Sufficiently Serious Deprivation
We first consider whether the deprivation Bolick suffered was objectively
sufficiently serious. To withstand summary judgment, Bolick must present evidence on the
basis of which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that he suffered a “serious or
significant physical or emotional” harm or was exposed to a “substantial risk thereof”
resulting from the deprivation of out-of-cell exercise. De’lonta, 708 F.3d at 525 (citation
omitted); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993). Relevant to this inquiry, this
court has considered the totality of the circumstances, including the length of the
deprivation. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 191. Prison officials may invoke exceptional penological
considerations to argue that they had no choice but to restrict access to out-of-cell exercise.
Id. at 192. Neither cost nor inconvenience may justify the deprivation, however. Id.
Exercise restrictions, therefore, must be limited to “‘unusual circumstances,’ or
circumstances where ‘disciplinary needs ma[ke] [out-of-cell exercise] impossible.” Id.
(quoting Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979)).
Applying this test, we conclude that Bolick met his burden. Bolick was deprived of
the ability to exercise for two extended periods of time, each lasting about five months. He
attests that this deprivation caused his muscles to atrophy and led to fatigue, chest pains,
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joint stiffness, and aches in his back, hips, legs, and feet.3 While incarcerated at Kirkland,
Bolick was unable to rehabilitate his preexisting injuries which led to regression of prior
progress in rehabilitative therapy. Bolick produced evidence to support his allegation that
the inability to exercise for extended periods of time caused him increased anxiety,
depression, and suicidal ideation. The Officials point out that a prison doctor who examined
Bolick did not note any significant health problems. Such factual disputes do not suggest
that summary judgment is appropriate. Rather, they support a conclusion that genuine
issues of material fact remain.
The Officials argue that five to six months without out-of-cell exercise is too short
a period to support a claim of inhumane conditions of confinement. We disagree. See, e.g.,
Rivera v. Mathena, 795 F. App’x 169, 175 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (vacating grant of
summary judgment against an incarcerated individual who suffered injuries resulting from
two-month deprivation of out-of-cell exercise); Brown v. Lamanna, 304 F. App’x 206,
208–09 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (vacating grant of summary judgment against an
incarcerated individual with disabilities who was not able to shower or exercise for two
months). Although the length of deprivation is one consideration, time alone is not
dispositive. See Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 191 (describing totality of the circumstances test). A
deprivation of the same length might pose a substantial risk of serious harm to an
incarcerated individual––like Bolick—who is unable to exercise inside his cell due to his
3 Contrary to the Officials’ assertion, Bolick’s declarations describing his physical and mental condition, even if self-serving, may suffice to create genuine disputes of material facts. See Jones v. Solomon, 90 F.4th 198, 206–07 (4th Cir. 2024).
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physical condition and the small size of the cell, but pose no such risk to another individual
who, for example, is able-bodied and resides in a large cell.
The Officials also contend that safety concerns justified precluding all men
undergoing reception and evaluation at Kirkland from leaving their cells to engage in out-
of-cell exercise. They argue that the circumstances at Kirkland are exceptional,
necessitating this blanket policy. Generalized safety concerns cannot, without more, justify
a complete deprivation of out-of-cell exercise that causes serious or significant physical or
emotional harm or a substantial risk thereof. Our caselaw makes clear that penological
justifications must be particularized to the specific incarcerated individual. See Mitchell,
954 F.2d at 192 (describing the incarcerated individual’s “unmanageable, violent nature”
as a penological consideration that potentially justifies the deprivation of out-of-cell
exercise); see also Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 527 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that
depriving an incarcerated individual of out-of-cell exercise violates the Eighth Amendment
unless the incarcerated individual “pose[s] an acute security risk if allowed out of his cell
for even a short time”).
The Officials introduced no evidence to suggest that Bolick posed an individualized
safety risk. Nor can they. Nothing in Bolick’s personal background, his behavior in prison,
or the circumstances of his conviction can be understood to justify not allowing him to
leave his cell to exercise. The Officials similarly provided no explanation for why other,
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less drastic alternatives to total deprivation of out-of-cell exercise would not address their
penological concerns.4
Finally, the Officials argue that the in-cell exercise pamphlet provided Bolick with
meaningful alternatives to out-of-cell exercise. To be sure, in-cell exercise may substitute
for out-of-cell exercise where out-of-cell exercise is not feasible. See Mitchell, 954 F.2d at
192–93. It may do so, however, only when the incarcerated individual is in fact able to
exercise inside of his cell. See id. at 193. Bolick provided evidence that he was unable to
do so, pointing to his physical condition and the size of the prison cells in which he was
housed. Determining the feasibility and adequacy of proposed alternatives to out-of-cell
exercise involves questions of fact susceptible to material disputes that may not be resolved
at summary judgment.
Having considered the totality of the circumstances, we find that Bolick met his
burden to show that genuine disputes of material fact remain as to whether the deprivation
of out-of-cell exercise was sufficiently serious.
ii. Deliberate Indifference
Having concluded that genuine disputes of fact exist on the first requirement, we
now turn to the question of the Officials’ state of mind. To survive summary judgment, an
incarcerated individual must present direct or circumstantial evidence that the prison
4 In granting summary judgment, the district court relied heavily on the Officials’ argument that the exigencies of the COVID-19 pandemic required them to confine men undergoing reception and evaluation at Kirkland to their cells. The Officials abandoned this justification on appeal, however. For good reason. Significantly, the Kirkland policy that prohibits out-of-cell exercise predates the COVID-19 pandemic.
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official both knew of and consciously disregarded the substantial risk of serious harm from
the deprivation of out-of-cell exercise. Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir.
2015). Circumstantial evidence can establish actual knowledge if, for example, the risk
“was obvious,” or the prison official “expressly noted” or “had been exposed to
information” about the risk. Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). If the prison official’s
response “was so patently inadequate,” then a jury may reasonably infer that the official
knew that her response was not appropriate. Cox v. Quinn, 828 F.3d 227, 236 (4th Cir.
2016) (citation omitted).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Bolick, we conclude that
genuine issues of material fact remain concerning whether the Officials knew that Bolick’s
physical ailments in combination with the crowded conditions would make it impossible
for him to exercise inside of his cell. See Makdessi, 789 F.3d at 133–34. The Officials knew
that Bolick was not permitted to leave his cell to exercise. Lieutenants Sumter, Wright, and
Robb oversaw the Kirkland dormitories where Bolick was housed and enforced the SCDC
policies. Bolick filed numerous requests and grievances complaining that the inability to
engage in exercise was causing his physical and mental health to deteriorate. In response,
the Officials simply directed Bolick to the in-cell exercise pamphlet despite his assertions
that he was unable to perform the exercises contained therein. A reasonable jury could
conclude that, in so doing, the Officials consciously disregarded a significant risk of serious
harm to Bolick.
The Officials concede that they were aware of Bolick’s condition and his complaints
but maintain that they were simply carrying out the official SCDC policy that precludes
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out-of-cell exercise for all individuals undergoing reception and evaluation. To the
contrary, an Eighth Amendment violation may lie even where a prison official acts
pursuant to official policy. See, e.g., Gordon v. Schilling, 937 F.3d 348, 358–59 (4th Cir.
2019).
Thus, Bolick met his burden to show that genuine disputes of material fact remain
as to whether the Officials acted with deliberate indifference by depriving him of the
opportunity to engage in out-of-cell exercise.
B. Qualified Immunity
The Officials contend that, even if a reasonable jury could find they violated
Bolick’s Eighth Amendment right to humane conditions of confinement, they are entitled
to qualified immunity. We disagree.
We apply a two-step inquiry to determine whether summary judgment on the basis
of qualified immunity is warranted. Nazario v. Gutierrez, 103 F.4th 213, 230 (4th Cir.
2024). First, we consider whether, in the light most favorable to the injured party, the
government official’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Id. We then ask whether the
right at issue in the first step was clearly established at the time of the contested action. Id.
The official invoking qualified immunity bears the burden to show that the right was not
clearly established. Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 378 & n.4 (4th Cir. 2007). Answering
either question in the negative warrants granting qualified immunity. Nazario, 103 F.4th at
230.
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We have already determined that factual disputes preclude summary judgment on
Bolick’s claim of inhumane conditions of confinement. These disputes necessarily also
preclude summary judgment on the first step of the qualified immunity inquiry. See
Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 193 (explaining that a factual review of the feasibility of alternatives
to out-of-cell exercise must precede a grant of qualified immunity). Accordingly, we
proceed to the second step: whether the right was clearly established.
A constitutional right is clearly established when its contours are sufficiently clear
for a reasonable official to understand that her conduct violates that right. Nazario, 103
F.4th at 230. The official must have “fair warning, with sufficient specificity” that her
conduct is constitutionally suspect. Quinn v. Zerkle, 111 F.4th 281, 294 (4th Cir. 2024)
(quoting Aleman v. City of Charlotte, 80 F.4th 264, 295 (4th Cir. 2023)). A right that is
“manifestly included within more general applications of the core constitutional principle
invoked” is also clearly established. Nazario, 103 F.4th at 231 (quoting Pritchett v. Alford,
973 F.2d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 1992)). We look to the precedent of the United States Supreme
Court and our own court in conducting this inquiry. Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d
533, 538 (4th Cir. 2017).
The right Bolick asserts is that of incarcerated individuals to engage in regular
exercise, including some out-of-cell exercise, absent particularized penological
justifications or other exceptional circumstances. A reasonable prison official would have
been on notice that the Officials’ conduct here would have violated this right, which had
been clearly established by the time Bolick was incarcerated at Kirkland. See Aleman, 80
F.4th at 295.
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For over half a century, this court has recognized that depriving an incarcerated
individual of adequate exercise can violate the Eighth Amendment. See Sweet v. S.C. Dep’t
of Corr., 529 F.2d 854, 865 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc); see also Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 191–
92 (holding that absent unusual circumstances, the Eighth Amendment generally requires
prison officials to provide incarcerated individuals with some regular exercise
opportunities, including some regular out-of-cell exercise). The Supreme Court similarly
recognized this right in Wilson v. Seiter. 501 U.S. at 304–05.
The Officials contend that the asserted right is that of incarcerated individuals to
“out-of-cell exercise, while temporarily housed at an in-take institution assessing the
dangerousness, vulnerability, and compatibility of 8000 inmates annually, all the while
being let out for phone calls and showers, receiving proper medical attention, and being
provided with an in-cell exercise program.” Resp. Br. 19. The complexity of this
formulation evinces its excessive granularity. The precise fact pattern at issue need not
have been specifically adjudicated. See Nazario, 103 F.4th at 230–31. If qualified
immunity was applied in every case except where the “very action in question [had]
previously been held unlawful,” Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 236 (4th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)), civil liability for government actions
would rarely lie. This is not what our precedent requires, particularly in the Eighth
Amendment context. See Pfaller v. Amonette, 55 F.4th 436, 445–46, 453 (4th Cir. 2022).
Because genuine issues of material fact remain as to Bolick’s claim that the Officials
violated his Eighth Amendment right to out-of-cell exercise, and because that right was
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clearly established at the time of Bolick’s incarceration, the Officials are not entitled to
summary judgment on the question of qualified immunity.
C. Supervisory Liability
We turn now to the question of whether Director Stirling can be held liable for the
Officials’ alleged violations of his constitutional rights under a theory of supervisory
liability. Although Bolick never personally interacted with Director Stirling, Bolick argues
that Director Stirling should nevertheless be held liable.
A supervisor may be held personally liable under Section 1983 for a constitutional
violation committed by a subordinate state or local government official where the
supervisor’s “indifference or tacit authorization” was “a causative factor” in enabling the
violation. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798–99 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Slakan v. Porter,
737 F.2d 368, 372–73 (4th Cir. 1984)). This is not a theory of vicarious liability for the
deeds or misdeeds of a subordinate. Rather, the supervisor is found “liable for his or her
own misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). To determine whether such
liability may attach, we must consider whether the supervisor’s own “deliberate
indifference permitted the constitutional abuses to continue unchecked.” Slakan, 737 F.2d
at 373. A supervisor who promulgates, directs, or oversees policies and practices that
foreseeably inflict widespread constitutional injury cannot escape liability by hiding behind
subordinates responsible for implementing her commands. Id. at 376.
A claim of supervisory liability requires the plaintiff to prove that 1) the supervisor
had actual or constructive knowledge that her subordinate’s conduct “posed ‘a pervasive
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and unreasonable risk’ of constitutional injury” to persons in the plaintiff’s position; 2) the
supervisor exhibited “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization” of the
constitutionally injurious conduct; and 3) some “affirmative causal link” existed between
the supervisor’s inaction and the plaintiff’s constitutional injury. Wilkins v. Montgomery,
751 F.3d 214, 226 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799). To survive Director
Stirling’s motion for summary judgment, Bolick must provide sufficient evidence to create
a genuine dispute of material fact as to all three elements.
Our analysis begins and ends with the first element. On the record before us, there
is insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Director Stirling
possessed actual or constructive knowledge that the unreasonable risk of constitutional
injury posed by the SCDC policy prohibiting out-of-cell exercise at Kirkland was
widespread. See Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799 (citation omitted). We therefore affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment and dismissal of Bolick’s claims against Director
Stirling.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we vacate the district court’s order granting
summary judgment to the Officials, affirm the grant of summary judgment to Director
Stirling, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
VACATED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART
AND REMANDED