1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 THEODORA MEDLEY, No. 2:24-cv-3804 DJC SCR P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND 14 GABRIEL WILLIAMS, et al., FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is incarcerated in state prison and proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a 18 civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has filed a “motion for judicial intervention” 19 that undersigned construes as seeking (1) the appointment of counsel; and (2) leave to file a 20 supplemental complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d). ECF No. 18.1 21 For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff’s request to file 22 a supplemental pleading be denied. However, the appointment of counsel for plaintiff is 23 warranted for the limited purpose of representing her at a settlement conference. Robert L. 24 Chalfant has been selected from the Court’s Pro Bono Attorney Panel to represent plaintiff for 25 this limited purpose and has agreed to be appointed. Accordingly, the undersigned hereby stays 26 the action and sets it for a settlement conference before Magistrate Judge Chi Soo Kim on a date 27 1 Plaintiff filed an identical motion in Medley v. Pfitzer, et al., 2:24-cv-0227 DJC SCR P 28 (“Medley I”) at ECF No. 128. This case was severed from Medley I on May 5, 2025. ECF No. 2. 1 to be scheduled in accordance with this order. The undersigned also recommends that defendant 2 Samiinia be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). 3 MOTION TO FILE A SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADING 4 Plaintiff’s 118-page motion for judicial intervention includes a request to add several 5 defendants to this action: R. Morales, Warden, Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“SATF”); G. 6 Jones, Director of CDCR; J. Macomber, CDCR Secretary; Sgt. Moreno of California Health Care 7 Facility (“CHCF”); P. Garcia; Oscar Hallway, SATF; Dr. I. Galvese; and B. Peters. ECF No. 18 8 at 2. Plaintiff broadly alleges disability and transgender discrimination but pleads no specific 9 facts about any defendant. For support, plaintiff attached grievances and accommodation 10 requests filed throughout 2025. Id. 19-117. She requests injunctive relief, including an ADA 11 tablet, Glucerna 1.5 4x/day, and durable medical equipment (“DME”). Id. at 4. 12 The undersigned liberally construes this request as seeking leave to file a supplemental 13 pleading under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d). See United States v. Jackson, 21 F.4th 14 1205, 1216 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Pro se motions from prisoners are to be liberally construed.”) 15 (citation omitted). Rule 15(d) provides: 16 On motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event 17 that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented. The court may permit supplementation even though the original pleading is defective in stating a 18 claim or defense. The court may order that the opposing party plead to the supplemental pleading within a specified time. 19 20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). “The purpose of Rule 15(d) is to promote as complete an adjudication of 21 the dispute between the parties as possible by allowing the addition of claims which arise after the 22 initial pleadings are filed.” William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 23 Inc., 668 F.2d 1014, 1057 (9th Cir. 1981). Courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to 24 grant or deny leave to supplement under Rule 15(d). Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 25 1988). Leave to serve a supplemental pleading will be denied where the supplemental pleading 26 asserts a “separate, distinct and new cause of action” unrelated to the original complaint that 27 should be the subject of a separate lawsuit. Planned Parenthood of S. Arizona v. Neely, 130 F.3d 28 400, 402 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). 1 Plaintiff’s request to add new defendants also implicates the permissive joinder of parties 2 under Rule 20. A party may be joined as a defendant under Rule 20 if: 1) any right to relief is 3 asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the 4 same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and 2) any question of law 5 or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). The first prong 6 requires “factual similarity in the allegations supporting Plaintiffs’ claims.” Visendi v. Bank of 7 Am., N.A., 733 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir. 2013). The second prong requires more than “merely 8 alleg[ing] that Defendants violated the same laws in comparable ways,” and will not be met 9 where the new claims plaintiff asserts “each require particularized factual analysis.” Id. (citing 10 Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997)). 11 Even if the requirements of Rule 20(a) are met, district courts “must examine whether 12 permissive joinder would ‘comport with the principles of fundamental fairness’ or would result in 13 prejudice to either side.” Johnson v. High Desert State Prison, 127 F.4th 123, 134 (9th Cir. 2025) 14 (quoting Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1296 (9th Cir. 2000)). “This is because 15 Rule 20 . . . is designed to promote judicial economy, and reduce inconvenience, delay, and added 16 expense. It is therefore within the district court’s inherent power to deny joinder if it would 17 undermine the orderly and expeditious disposition of the case.” Id. at 134 (9th Cir. 2025) 18 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 19 Applying Rules 15(d) and 20(a)(2) here, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff’s 20 request to supplement her complaint be denied. The new allegations do loosely share the same 21 subject matter as the original complaint, i.e., access to medical care and disability 22 accommodations, but involve distinct claims that should be brought in a separate suit. For 23 example, the attached grievances involve requests for DME (e.g., ankle braces, inflatable 24 mattress, CPAP machine, etc.) that are not at issue in the original complaint. Further, the new 25 allegations occurred in 2025, primarily at SATF, whereas the complaint’s events happened in 26 2020-2023 at CHCF. See Gonzalez v. Mason, No. C 07-180 SI (PR), 2008 WL 2079195, at *2 27 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2008) (denying leave to file supplement complaint where new allegations 28 occurred at a different prison with different defendants), aff’d, 357 F. App’x 835 (9th Cir. 2009). 1 Moreover, given the new, later-occurring claims’ lack of temporal and geographic nexus 2 to those in the operative complaint, granting plaintiff’s motion would permit her “unfairly to 3 evade the strictures of the Prison Litigation Reform Act[.]” Wilkins v. California Dep’t of Corr. 4 & Rehab., No.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 THEODORA MEDLEY, No. 2:24-cv-3804 DJC SCR P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND 14 GABRIEL WILLIAMS, et al., FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is incarcerated in state prison and proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a 18 civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has filed a “motion for judicial intervention” 19 that undersigned construes as seeking (1) the appointment of counsel; and (2) leave to file a 20 supplemental complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d). ECF No. 18.1 21 For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff’s request to file 22 a supplemental pleading be denied. However, the appointment of counsel for plaintiff is 23 warranted for the limited purpose of representing her at a settlement conference. Robert L. 24 Chalfant has been selected from the Court’s Pro Bono Attorney Panel to represent plaintiff for 25 this limited purpose and has agreed to be appointed. Accordingly, the undersigned hereby stays 26 the action and sets it for a settlement conference before Magistrate Judge Chi Soo Kim on a date 27 1 Plaintiff filed an identical motion in Medley v. Pfitzer, et al., 2:24-cv-0227 DJC SCR P 28 (“Medley I”) at ECF No. 128. This case was severed from Medley I on May 5, 2025. ECF No. 2. 1 to be scheduled in accordance with this order. The undersigned also recommends that defendant 2 Samiinia be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). 3 MOTION TO FILE A SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADING 4 Plaintiff’s 118-page motion for judicial intervention includes a request to add several 5 defendants to this action: R. Morales, Warden, Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“SATF”); G. 6 Jones, Director of CDCR; J. Macomber, CDCR Secretary; Sgt. Moreno of California Health Care 7 Facility (“CHCF”); P. Garcia; Oscar Hallway, SATF; Dr. I. Galvese; and B. Peters. ECF No. 18 8 at 2. Plaintiff broadly alleges disability and transgender discrimination but pleads no specific 9 facts about any defendant. For support, plaintiff attached grievances and accommodation 10 requests filed throughout 2025. Id. 19-117. She requests injunctive relief, including an ADA 11 tablet, Glucerna 1.5 4x/day, and durable medical equipment (“DME”). Id. at 4. 12 The undersigned liberally construes this request as seeking leave to file a supplemental 13 pleading under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d). See United States v. Jackson, 21 F.4th 14 1205, 1216 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Pro se motions from prisoners are to be liberally construed.”) 15 (citation omitted). Rule 15(d) provides: 16 On motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event 17 that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented. The court may permit supplementation even though the original pleading is defective in stating a 18 claim or defense. The court may order that the opposing party plead to the supplemental pleading within a specified time. 19 20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). “The purpose of Rule 15(d) is to promote as complete an adjudication of 21 the dispute between the parties as possible by allowing the addition of claims which arise after the 22 initial pleadings are filed.” William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 23 Inc., 668 F.2d 1014, 1057 (9th Cir. 1981). Courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to 24 grant or deny leave to supplement under Rule 15(d). Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 25 1988). Leave to serve a supplemental pleading will be denied where the supplemental pleading 26 asserts a “separate, distinct and new cause of action” unrelated to the original complaint that 27 should be the subject of a separate lawsuit. Planned Parenthood of S. Arizona v. Neely, 130 F.3d 28 400, 402 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). 1 Plaintiff’s request to add new defendants also implicates the permissive joinder of parties 2 under Rule 20. A party may be joined as a defendant under Rule 20 if: 1) any right to relief is 3 asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the 4 same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and 2) any question of law 5 or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). The first prong 6 requires “factual similarity in the allegations supporting Plaintiffs’ claims.” Visendi v. Bank of 7 Am., N.A., 733 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir. 2013). The second prong requires more than “merely 8 alleg[ing] that Defendants violated the same laws in comparable ways,” and will not be met 9 where the new claims plaintiff asserts “each require particularized factual analysis.” Id. (citing 10 Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997)). 11 Even if the requirements of Rule 20(a) are met, district courts “must examine whether 12 permissive joinder would ‘comport with the principles of fundamental fairness’ or would result in 13 prejudice to either side.” Johnson v. High Desert State Prison, 127 F.4th 123, 134 (9th Cir. 2025) 14 (quoting Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1296 (9th Cir. 2000)). “This is because 15 Rule 20 . . . is designed to promote judicial economy, and reduce inconvenience, delay, and added 16 expense. It is therefore within the district court’s inherent power to deny joinder if it would 17 undermine the orderly and expeditious disposition of the case.” Id. at 134 (9th Cir. 2025) 18 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 19 Applying Rules 15(d) and 20(a)(2) here, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff’s 20 request to supplement her complaint be denied. The new allegations do loosely share the same 21 subject matter as the original complaint, i.e., access to medical care and disability 22 accommodations, but involve distinct claims that should be brought in a separate suit. For 23 example, the attached grievances involve requests for DME (e.g., ankle braces, inflatable 24 mattress, CPAP machine, etc.) that are not at issue in the original complaint. Further, the new 25 allegations occurred in 2025, primarily at SATF, whereas the complaint’s events happened in 26 2020-2023 at CHCF. See Gonzalez v. Mason, No. C 07-180 SI (PR), 2008 WL 2079195, at *2 27 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2008) (denying leave to file supplement complaint where new allegations 28 occurred at a different prison with different defendants), aff’d, 357 F. App’x 835 (9th Cir. 2009). 1 Moreover, given the new, later-occurring claims’ lack of temporal and geographic nexus 2 to those in the operative complaint, granting plaintiff’s motion would permit her “unfairly to 3 evade the strictures of the Prison Litigation Reform Act[.]” Wilkins v. California Dep’t of Corr. 4 & Rehab., No. CV 18-9116 VAP(E), 2020 WL 2544524, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2020). 5 “Supplemental pleadings are of particular concern in prisoner cases, where joining unrelated 6 claims could result in avoidance of a filing fee or circumvent the PLRA’s three strikes rule.” 7 Singleton v. Kernan, No. 3:16-CV-2462 BAS NLS, 2017 WL 4021536, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 8 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 16-CV-2462 BAS NLS, 2017 WL 4340420 9 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2017); cf. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (denying 10 joinder of “[u]nrelated claims against different defendants” will ensure that prisoners pay filing 11 fees and remain subject to the limitations of section 1915(g)). 12 Finally, a district court may deny a motion to file a supplemental pleading when 13 supplementation would be futile, such as where the newly asserted claims would not survive a 14 motion to dismiss. San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. San Francisco Bay Assoc., 236 15 F.R.D. 491, 500 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th 16 Cir.1988)); see also Phillips v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 486 Fed.App’x 665, 666 (9th Cir. 17 2012) (holding court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to supplement complaint 18 where supplement would not have cured pleading deficiencies). Here, plaintiff’ motion does not 19 link any of the defendants to the alleged violations of her rights and thus would not survive 20 screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Although plaintiff attached voluminous records, “a court 21 is not required to comb through a plaintiff’s exhibits to determine if the complaint states a 22 plausible claim.” Kesling v. Tewalt, 476 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1083 (D. Idaho 2020). 23 Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that her motion to file a supplemental pleading 24 be denied. Plaintiff’s more recent motion for an extension of time (ECF No. 22), construed as a 25 duplicative request to file a supplement pleading, should also be denied. Given plaintiff’s new 26 allegations arose in 2025, and there are no statute of limitations concerns or other “technical 27 obstacles” to plaintiff bringing a separate action against the new defendants listed in her request 28 to file a supplemental complaint. See Planned Parenthood, 130 F.3d at 402. Therefore, plaintiff 1 is instructed that she may raise these allegations in a new action and will be provided a copy of 2 the prisoner complaint form used in this district. 3 MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 4 The undersigned also construes plaintiff’s motion for judicial intervention as requesting 5 the appointment of counsel on account of her developmental disabilities and other impairments. 6 ECF No. 18 at 2-3. Plaintiff points out that she was appointed counsel in another matter, Medley 7 v. Allison, No. 5:21-cv-0937 DOC MAR (C.D. Cal.). Id. at 3. Moreover, in a filing about a week 8 prior to the instant motion, plaintiff objected to the undersigned’s dismissal of the counsel for the 9 limited purpose of assisting plaintiff in filing her operative complaint.2 ECF No. 17. 10 District courts lack authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to require counsel to represent 11 indigent prisoners in section 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 12 (1989). In exceptional circumstances, the court may request that an attorney voluntarily represent 13 such a plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 14 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). The test for exceptional 15 circumstances requires the court to evaluate the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits and 16 the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal 17 issues involved. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986); Weygandt v. 18 Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). Circumstances common to most prisoners, such as lack 19 of legal education and limited law library access, do not establish exceptional circumstances that 20 would warrant a request for voluntary assistance of counsel. Wood, 900 F.2d at 1335; Riley v. 21 Franke, 340 F. Supp. 3d 783, 787 (E.D. Wis. 2018). 22 Beyond § 1915(e)(1), other sources of law may implicate a request for counsel. For 23 example, appointed counsel may be required in a civil proceeding as an accommodation for a 24 litigant who is disabled. See Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. 10-cv-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2013 25 WL 3674492, at *3-*9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013) (granting summary judgment to class of 26 2 The previously assigned magistrate judge in Medley I appointed counsel for the limited purpose 27 of investigating her claims and filing a fourth amended complaint. Medley I, ECF No. 89. The complaint in this action consists of the medical and disability-related claims that were severed 28 from that fourth amended complaint. See ECF No. 1. 1 mentally disabled individuals in civil immigration proceedings on their request for appointed 2 representatives under the Rehabilitation Act). Due process may also require appointment of 3 counsel in certain proceedings. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 444-45 (2011) (analyzing 4 request for appointment of counsel in civil proceeding under the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 5 319 (1976), procedural due process framework). 6 To ensure plaintiff’s meaningful participation in this action, see Franco-Gonzalez, 2013 7 WL 3674492, at *5, the undersigned finds the appointment of counsel is warranted for the limited 8 purpose of representing plaintiff at a settlement conference. The undersigned is convinced, based 9 on plaintiff’s recent, voluminous filings, as well as her inability to allege cognizable claims in 10 Medley I before the appointment of limited-purpose counsel, that she requires assistance to 11 meaningfully access the courts and prosecute this action. Robert L. Chalfant has been selected 12 from the Court’s Pro Bono Attorney Panel to represent plaintiff for this limited purpose and has 13 agreed to be appointed. 14 The undersigned refers this case to Magistrate Judge Chi Soo Kim to conduct the 15 settlement conference on a date to be scheduled in accordance with the directions below. The 16 settlement conference will also cover plaintiff’s civil rights action Medley I, and an order setting 17 a settlement conference before Judge Kim is being docketed concurrently in that case. 18 SERVICE OF DEFENDANT SAMIINIA 19 Finally, the undersigned recommends that defendant Samiinia be dismissed pursuant to 20 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), which provides: 21 If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court— on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action 22 without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must 23 extend the time for service for an appropriate period. 24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 25 Plaintiff’s complaint in this action was docketed on May 5, 2025, upon District Judge 26 Calabretta’s adoption of the undersigned findings and recommendation that her medical and 27 disability-related claims be severed from Medley I. ECF No. 1. On June 6, 2025, the 28 undersigned screened plaintiff’s complaint and determined that it stated, inter alia, a cognizable 1 Eighth Amendment medical indifference claim against defendant Samiinia. ECF No. 4. On July 2 29, 2025, plaintiff elected to proceed on the complaint as screened. ECF No. 8. 3 On August 12, 2025, the undersigned ordered the U.S. Marshal Service to serve the 4 complaint on all defendants. ECF No. 9. On September 15, 2025, process directed to defendant 5 Samiinia was returned unserved. ECF No. 13. On October 2, 2025, the undersigned ordered 6 plaintiff to provide additional informational to serve Samiinia within 60 days. ECF No. 14. 7 Plaintiff was advised that a failure to comply would result in the recommendation that defendant 8 Samiinia be dismissed from the action without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal 9 Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. 10 More than 60 days have passed, and plaintiff has not provided the additional information 11 needed to serve defendant Samiinia. Plaintiff did file a 107-page response to the court’s order 12 (ECF No. 17) and two other prolific filings (ECF Nos. 18, 21), but these filings do not address 13 defendant Samiinia. Accordingly, defendant Samiinia should be dismissed without prejudice 14 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). 15 CONCLUSION 16 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 17 1. Plaintiff’s motion for judicial intervention (ECF No. 18) is GRANTED IN PART 18 as follows: 19 a. Robert L. Chalfant is appointed as limited purpose counsel for plaintiff in the 20 above titled matter. This appointment is for the limited purpose of assisting 21 plaintiff with preparing for and participating in a settlement conference. 22 b. Robert L. Chalfant’s appointment will terminate fifteen days after completion of 23 the settlement conference, or any continuation of the settlement conference. 24 c. Appointed counsel shall notify ADR and Pro Bono Coordinator Sujean Park via 25 email at spark@caed.uscourts.gov if he has any questions related to the 26 appointment. 27 2. This case is set for a settlement conference before Magistrate Judge Chi Soo Kim. 28 The parties are directed to contact Sujean Park via email within 14 days of the date of this 1 order to arrange scheduling of the settlement conference. Instructions for the settlement 2 conference and an order and a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum will issue separately in due 3 course. 4 3. The action is hereby stayed to allow the parties an opportunity to settle their 5 dispute before the discovery process begins. Except as provided herein or by subsequent court 6 order, no other pleadings or other documents may be filed in this case during the stay of this 7 action. The parties shall not engage in formal discovery, but the parties may elect to engage in 8 informal discovery. 9 4. If a settlement is reached at any point during the stay of this action, the parties 10 shall file a Notice of Settlement in accordance with Local Rule 160. 11 5. The parties remain obligated to keep the court informed of their current addresses 12 at all times during the stay and while the action is pending. Any change of address must be 13 reported promptly to the court in a separate document captioned for this case and entitled “Notice 14 of Change of Address.” See L.R. 182(f). 15 6. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this order upon Robert L. 16 Chalfant, Robert Chalfant Law PC, 13620 Lincoln Way, Suite 325, Auburn, CA 95603. 17 7. The Clerk of the Court is also directed to send plaintiff a copy of the prisoner 18 complaint form used in this district. 19 In addition, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 20 1. Plaintiff’s motion for judicial intervention (ECF No. 18) be DENIED IN PART to 21 the extent it seeks leave to file a supplemental pleading pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d); 22 2. Plaintiff’s motion for extension of time (ECF No. 22), construed as a duplicative 23 motion to file a supplemental pleading pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d), be denied; 24 3. Defendant Samiinia be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 4(m); and 26 4. The Clerk of the Court be directed to terminate defendant Samiinia from the 27 Docket upon the adoption of these findings and recommendations. 28 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 1 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 2 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 3 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 4 | “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 5 || objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 6 || parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 7 || appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 8 || DATED: January 14, 2026 9 10 )
11 SEAN C. RIORDAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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