The Woodhill Corporation v. Federal Emergency Management Agency

168 F.3d 1025, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2667, 1999 WL 80754
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedFebruary 22, 1999
Docket98-2990
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 168 F.3d 1025 (The Woodhill Corporation v. Federal Emergency Management Agency) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Woodhill Corporation v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 168 F.3d 1025, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2667, 1999 WL 80754 (7th Cir. 1999).

Opinion

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.

Structures located in a “special flood hazard area” are eligible for federal disaster relief only if covered by insurance under the National Flood Insurance Program established under 42 U.S.C. § 4011. See 44 C.F.R. § 59.2. Borrowers have an additional reason to purchase flood insurance: 42 U.S.C. § 4012a prohibits federally-regulated lending institutions from making loans on the security of a structure in a special flood hazard area unless flood insurance has been secured for the life of the loan. These rules make a special flood hazard area designation costly for persons who own property there and lead to disputes about boundaries.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency designates as a “special flood hazard area” the portion of a floodplain that the fema believes has a 1% or greater likelihood of inundation in any given year. Flood-control projects can change this probability; so can owners, who may change the grade or elevation of their land. Accordingly, the fema offers land owners the opportunity to seek changes in the maps that designate special flood hazard areas. Our case involves 44 C.F.R. § 65.5, captioned “[rjevision to special flood hazard area boundaries with no change to base flood elevation determinations.” An owner proposing to increase elevation using fill may ask for a revision by submitting data specified in § 65.5(a):

(3) If a legally defined parcel of land is involved, a topographic map indicating present ground elevations and date of fill. fema’s determination as to whether a legally defined parcel of land is to be excluded from the area of special flood hazard shall be based upon a comparison of the ground elevations of the parcel with the elevations of the base flood. If the ground elevations of the entire legally defined parcel of land are at or above the elevations of the base flood, the parcel may be excluded from the area of special flood hazard.
(4) If a structure is involved, a topographic map indicating structure location and ground elevations including the elevations of the lowest floor (including basement) and the lowest adjacent grade to the structure. fema’s determination as to whether a structure is to be excluded from the area of special flood hazard shall be based upon a comparison of the elevation of the lowest floor (including basement) and the elevation of the lowest adjacent grade with the elevation of the base flood. If the entire structure and the lowest adjacent grade are at or above the elevation of the base flood, the structure may be excluded from the area of special flood hazard.

*1027 Woodhill Corporation, a residential developer, proposed to exclude an entire “legally defined parcel of land” under § 65.5(a)(3) by using fill to raise its elevation “above the elevations of the base flood”. But the fema said no, informing Woodhill that because documents included with the submission implied that structures eventually would be constructed on the land, the submissions had to conform to § 65.5(a)(4), and in particular had to show that “the elevation of the lowest floor (including basement)” would be above “the elevation of the base flood”. Woodhill resubmitted its request, omitting any hint that structures were in the offing. Once again the fema said no, this time asserting that because Woodhill’s first submission showed that “a structure is involved” in Woodhill’s plans, fema could not ignore this information when acting on the request. Woodhill then filed this suit under the Administrative Procedure Act and 42 U.S.C. § 4104, and the district court entered summary judgment for the fema. 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11621 (N.D.Ill).

Subsection (a)(3) applies when “a legally defined parcel of land is involved”, and subsection (a)(4) when “a structure is involved”. The passive phrasing (“is involved”) means that the distinction between the domain of § 65.5(a)(3) and that of § 65.5(a)(4) could be understood in at least four ways:

1. Whenever a structure is going to be built on the land, resort to (a)(4) is obligatory.
2. Whenever the fema has learned that a structure is planned for the land, (a)(4) supplies the exclusive avenue.
3. Whenever the application papers identify a structure to be built on the land, subsection (a)(4) controls.
4. Whenever the applicant seeks to exclude a structure rather than a parcel of land, subsection (a)(4) governs.

Woodhill prefers the fourth reading, though it would settle for the third. Both of its submissions sought to exclude a whole parcel; Woodhill does not want to exclude just the houses, yielding a Swiss-cheese map that would leave back yard swings in a “special flood hazard area.” What a mess for homeowners seeking financing from federally insured banks that would be! For its part, the fema apparently prefers the second reading.' By rejecting Woodhill’s initial application, it condemned the fourth, and by rejecting Woodhill’s revised application the fema ruled out the third. Acting on earlier applications from residential developers, including Wood-hill itself, the fema must have rejected the first reading-for the fema has removed many parcels of residential-subdivision size, recognizing (if only from the identity of the applicant) that housing would be built eventually. But we use the weasel word “apparently” because what the fema has not done is choose among these readings explicitly, or give reasons for preferring one over another: not when it promulgated and amended § 65.5, not when it acted on Woodhill’s applications, and, so far as we can tell, not anywhere else. Counsel from the Department of Justice representing the fema in this litigation professed confidence that reading two is right but conceded that the fema has never explained why it (as opposed to its appellate lawyer) selected this reading, and did not explain (either in the brief or on his feet) why reading two is preferable to reading one.

A court must accept any plausible understanding of a regulation adopted by the regulation’s author. Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 U.S. 87, 94-97, 115 S.Ct. 1232, 131 L.Ed.2d 106 (1995); Homemakers North Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408, 411-12 (7th Cir.1987). Sometimes it is enough if the interpretation is developed in litigation; a view of a text’s meaning is no less authentic just because the agency first sees the need for precision once controversy breaks out. See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221, 233, 241, 106 S.Ct.

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168 F.3d 1025, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2667, 1999 WL 80754, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-woodhill-corporation-v-federal-emergency-management-agency-ca7-1999.