The Vincennes

28 F. Cas. 1193, 3 Ware 171, 21 Law Rep. 616, 1858 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedJuly 17, 1858
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 28 F. Cas. 1193 (The Vincennes) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Vincennes, 28 F. Cas. 1193, 3 Ware 171, 21 Law Rep. 616, 1858 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23 (D. Mass. 1858).

Opinion

WARE, District Judge.

This is a libel on a-charter-party. Henry Jones & Co., merchants in Boston, chartered the brig Vincennes on the 22d of December, 1853, then lying in that port, for a voyage from Baltimore to Boston. The vessel was immediately to proceed to Baltimore, where the charterers agreed to furnish a full cargo, both under and on deck, of white-oak ship-plank, of the dimensions mentioned, with treenails for small stowage, and to pay freight at the rate fixed by the contract on the-delivery of the same at Boston. The lay days for loading were to commence two days after-the master reported his vessel ready to receive-[1194]*1194the cargo; and then that was to be delivered as fast as it could be received and stowed by the crew, and twenty dollars a day was to be paid by the charterer for every day's detention of the vessel for default in furnishing the cargo. Under this charter the brig arrived at Baltimore, and was ready to receive her cargo the 31st of December, and began to load Jan. 2d. The loading was continued to the Gth and 7th, when she was about or nearly one-half ready, and then Abbot, who furnished the cargo, and for whom the brig was chartered, refused to furnish any more on the ground that the vessel was unseaworthy. The real reason for Abbot’s refusal to proceed with the loading, it appears from the evidence, was the difficulty he found in getting insurance. The owners were informed, and negotiations were entered upon to obviate the difficulty with such success that the loading was renewed on the 20 th. but was again suspended on new misunderstandings, on the 22d, and not resumed after. Abbot demanded the re-delivery of the cargo, which was refused by the master, who was preparing to sail with what he had, when on the 11th of February, the vessel and cargo were taken into the possession of the sheriff on a writ of replevin sued out by Abbot against the master. The cargo was discharged by his officers, and the brig restored to the master on the 10th. The brig was then loaded with a cargo of coal and wood, by Mr. Cunningham, a commission merchant, and sailed for Boston, where she arrived on the 13th of March.

This suit is brought by the owner of the ship against the charterer, for a breach of the covenant of the charter-party. The first ground of defence relied on, is that the subject-matter of this suit has already passed in rem judica-tam in the replevin suit at Baltimore. The defense of res judicata, whether made in the form of a plea in bar, or offered as evidence on the general issue to avail this party, must be between the same parties, and the judgment must be on the same question or point that is sought to be litigated in the new action. That was a suit by Edwin A. Abbot against Allen Gatchel. The parties were not, therefore, the same. But it is said that though nominally different, there is a substantial identity between the parties to that suit and this; that Gatchel, as master of the ship, was the representative of the owner; and that between Abbot and Jones & Co., there was such a reía-tionship of principal and agent, that one was the legal representative of the other. But even admitting this to be the case, and this objection to be surmounted, there is another difficulty that appears to me to be not easily overcome. That was a suit by Abbot founded on the right of property, and claiming the possession on the ground of his proprietory right. Gatch-el pleaded, first, the general issue; secondly, a special plea denying the property to be in Abbot,' alleging that it was in Jones & Co., and he claimed the rights of possession as their agent. In a third plea he claimed property in himself. Issues were joined on these pleas, and found for the plaintiff. Nothing more appears by the record to have been necessarily decided in that case, than that the right of property was in Abbot. But this suit is founded on a contract, not touching the proprietory interest in the goods, but for their transportation; and the right of possession is claimed by the libel-lant under this as bailee; a right to detain and hold the goods by virtue of a lien for what was due to him on them under the contract of bailment. It does not appear that these rights of the libellant were necessarily decided in this suit. The pleading opens an entirely different ground of defence. But when a former judgment is relied on as a defence, whether presented as a plea in bar or as evidence only, I think it should appear from the record itself, that the very question, the precise title, which is the subject of litigation in the new action, was involved and decided in a former action; not that it might be, but actually was. The conelusiveness of a former judgment rests on this presumption, res judicata pro veritate ac-cipitur, Dig. 50, 17, 207, which all know is but a legal fiction. It may be true, but it may not, and is so far from being universally time that the uncertainty of judgment, the alea judiciorum, has passed long ago into a proverb. The thousands of overruled cases in the jurisprudence of the commercial law, collected in Mr. Greenleaf’s volume, it must be admitted give some countenance to the proverb. It appears to me, therefore, it is not enough to show that the title set up in this libel, might have been deerded in the replevin suit at Baltimore, but that the record itself, to be a bar, should show that it actually -was.

The second ground of defence is the unseaworthiness of the vessel. And this is presented under a double aspect. First, the in-competeney of the master, and secondly, the unfitness of the ship itself. There is no question but that by the covenant of the charter-party, the libellant was bound to have the brig manned- by a competent master and crew. The owner covenanted not only that the brig should be tight, staunch, and strong, but that she should be every way fitted for the voyage, and this includes a sufficient equipment, and a suitable master and crew. Abb. Shipp. The vessel began to receive her cargo on the 2d of January, and on the 6th, when a considerable part of the cargo had been taken in, Abbot informed tlie master that he should not complete her cargo on account of the unseaworthiness of the vessel. But from the evidence, the principal, if not the sole reason of his refusal at that time, was the difficulty he found in getting insurance on the cargo in Baltimore. The loading was suspended, the owners informed, and further negotiations were entered upon, and on the 20th this loading was recommenced, and again suspended on the 22d, and not resumed. Now, whatever objection to the master there might have been on the 6th and 7th, that was removed on the 10th by the [1195]*1195appointment of a new master, who is admitted to have been omni exceptione major. It is not, therefore, available in this suit. We are brought, then, to the actual condition of the brig in her hull, spars, and equipment. The objection in the answer is, that she was leaky, and her timbers rotten; in the technical language of the sea, that she was neither tight, nor staunch. The evidence against her as to leakiness I think fails. All vessels leak more or less, and there is a want of reliable proof that the Vincennes leaked more than vessels ordinarily do. The preponderance of proof is, I think, that she did not.

The whole question of seaworthiness, then, comes to the actual condition of the vessel. The owner covenanted that his vessel was tight and staunch, and if this is called in question on probable grounds it is incumbent on him to prove it. He only has the means of doing it as the ship is in his hands. In the matter of the seaworthiness of the ship, especially of the hull, her age is especially to be regarded.

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Bluebook (online)
28 F. Cas. 1193, 3 Ware 171, 21 Law Rep. 616, 1858 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-vincennes-mad-1858.