The Vestris

38 F.2d 992, 1929 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1819
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedDecember 6, 1929
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 38 F.2d 992 (The Vestris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Vestris, 38 F.2d 992, 1929 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1819 (E.D.N.Y. 1929).

Opinion

INCH, District Judge.

Libelant sues the steamship Vestris to recover damages, alleged to have been sustained by a certain shipment of apples and pears from New York to Brazil, through the neglect of those in charge of the steamship in not maintaining a proper temperature and sufficient ventilation in the place where said shipment was carried;

Claimant’s answer admits receipt on board of the apples and pears, and sets forth in detail facts regarding the same. It also refers to the bills of lading, and asserts that it is not liable under the various clauses in said bills of lading which relate to stowage, effects of climate, etc., and further alleges that this fruit was cooled down to within the range of temperature agreed upon, and that reasonable efforts were used to maintain such temperature.

Some testimony was taken by deposition for the claimant, that of Boothby, third officer of the Vestris, and Ball, chief refrigerating engineer of said ship, while for the libelant there was deposition testimony of various consignees, fruit merchants at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, where the fruit was destined to arrive.

At the trial, additional testimony was given by members of libelant’s firm by certain experts for both sides and others.

I am satisfied from all the evidence that the apples and pears were in reasonably good condition when they were placed on board the ship. I am likewise satisfied that, when they reached Brazil, a, considerable amount, the exact amount not being here necessary to determine, was in a damaged condition.

The libelant shows that the various lots pf apples and pears had been purchased by them in this country, brought to New York and placed in cold storage, where they were duly inspected from time to time and found in good condition; that thereafter they were taken from cold storage, placed in refrigerated cars, loaded on refrigerated lighters, and, while there is some dispute about it, it seems reasonably clear to me that the fruit was, without undue delay, loaded on the vessel. During this time it was inspected, and those that did the inspecting were witnesses, and on their testimony my conclusion that the fruit was in reasonably good condition for the trip is based.

While claimant seeks to raise an inference contrary to this conclusion, I fail to find, in weighing the testimony, that the facts are otherwise.

The fruit was not purchased so long before the trip or kept in cold storage for such an unreasonable length of time 'as to support the suggestion made by claimant. All the circumstances, which include the inspections and testimony of eyewitnesses, indicate nothing more than a usual shipment of apples and pears at this port. However, the testimony does indicate, as well as common knowledge would suggest, that fruit of this character is necessarily of such a nature as to require special care.

It would seem that this is the very purpose of the various clauses in the contract of the carriage referring to refrigeration and chambers with special temperature.

Where such special care is indicated, reasonable care must be taken to see that it is exercised, and, if the carrier fails to exercise the care required, it may be liable for the damage, even where the nature of the damage, otherwise unexplained, is within an exception of the contract. The San Guglielmo (D. C.) 241 P. 969; Doherr v. Houston (D. C.) 123 F. 334, affirmed (C. C. A.) 128 P. 594.

As to the condition of the fruit upon arrival at Brazil, my conclusion above stated does not seem to me to be seriously controverted. The testimony of Galasso states that, [994]*994•when the fruit was ready for delivery, it was found that “the pears were all in a rotten condition some of them falling apart and all had soft rotten spots in them. The apples were in a slightly better condition but were spoiled.” He attributes this condition “to bad working of the refrigeration system and also to placing the boxes without adequate refrigeration.”

On cross-examination, this witness stati ed “that there was some apples and pears in good condition in each ease but about 65 per cent, of each ease were absolutely bad”; that he had gone aboard the ship the day .of arrival; that the damage was caused by heating or lack of refrigeration.

Marinho, another fruit merchant, says that his particular fruit was likewise damaged; that “the apples were in good condition, some of the pears were in damaged condition. The damaged pears were too ripe and some were rotten”; that those in bad condition were stowed in the center of the square of the hatch; that, when he went on board, “he felt no cold in the hold, that the stevedores were working in their usual clothing, that the temperature could not be cold enough, that he complained to the chief engineer of this and invited him to take a thermometer down to the center of the hold and take .the temperature with him, but he refused.”

On cross-examination, he stated that the cases in the center of the hatch did not get the same degree of cold as those stowed close to the refrigerator pipes.

It would also appear from the testimony taken by claimant that some sort of such complaint had been made.

I believe, therefore, that this conclusion as to the condition of the fruit upon arrival is justified by the evidence.

Consequently, we start with a case where the proof shows that the fruit had been received by the ship at New York in good condition and had been delivered at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in damaged condition. The Skipsea (C. C. A.) 9 F'.(2d) 887, 888.

With due regard to the burden of proof, this issue, in my opinion, still further narrows down to the single question, which is, bearing in mind the nature of the cargo and which must have been known to those in charge of the ship', Was it careless to carry this fruit in the manner in which it was carried?

It is evident that those in charge of the ship were seeking to put in her all the freight they possibly could.' In doing this they overlooked the nature of libelant’s goods, or at least gave little attention to it.

Boothby, third officer, testifies that all the fruit now in question was stowed in Ho. 2, an upper tween hatch. This hold, while it had some refrigeration, was not what may be termed a refrigerated chamber, of which the ship had several, and the outside walls of which chambers formed the walls of this trunk hatch or hold. When the fruit in question was loaded on the ship, apparently all other space was already occupied, as well as these refrigerated chambers. On reeross-examination this ship’s officer Boothby gave this significant testimony :

“Q. When you load refrigerated cargo into #2 upper tween deck trunk hatch you first load the chambers? A. Yes.
■ “Q. And after that you load the hatchway? A. Yes.
“Q. When you haven’t a large amount of cargo then no cargo is placed in the hatchway? A. That is right.
“Q. If you had a vacant chamber then you would not place this cargo in the hatchway ? A. Ho.”

In- other words, cargo of the character here under consideration is ordinarily expected to be carried in the refrigerated chambers, but, as every place was then filled, and they wanted to carry the freight, these boxes of apples and pears were placed in the hatchway around which there was some refrigeration.

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Related

Rhodes v. United States
8 F. Supp. 124 (E.D. New York, 1934)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
38 F.2d 992, 1929 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1819, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-vestris-nyed-1929.