The Toledo

30 F. Supp. 93, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1944
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedOctober 13, 1939
Docket15576, 15578
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 30 F. Supp. 93 (The Toledo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Toledo, 30 F. Supp. 93, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1944 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).

Opinion

CAMPBELL, District Judge.

By order of this Court, dated February 6, 1939, the two Admiralty causes Numbers 15,576 and 15,578 were consolidated under the title hereinbefore set forth.

This is a suit by the Isbrandtsen-Moller Company, Inc., a New York corporation, against the Norwegian Motorship Toledo, in rem, and Wilh. Wilhelmsen, alleged to be the owner, and against the Tankfart corporations, the actual owners, in personam. Wilh. Wilhelmsen is managing owner, but not the actual owner. The Tankfart corporations are the actual owners.

Respondents have appeared and security has been given to cover a decree against them, as well as against the ship.

The said respondents are Norwegian corporations, and do not have offices or places of business in the Eastern District *95 of New York, but had chattels ór personal property within the Eastern' District of New York consisting of the Norwegian Motorship Toledo.

The libellant is seeking recovery oh two distinct claims, (1) as time charterer of the ship and (2) as bailee and assignee of the cargo.

It is necessary to keep clearly in mind the two different capacities in which libellant sues, and I will, therefore, consider -them separately in their order. '

The charterparty, which was on the Government-New York Produce Exchange time form for the carriage of a “full'cargo on a single trans-Atlantic trip from ports north of Hatteras named by the charterer (Philadelphia, Chester and New York) to continental European ports in the Hamburg-Havre range (London, Antwerp and Rotterdam), governs the relations between the charterer and the shipowner.

The charterparty recites that “hull and machinery and equipment” are “in a thoroughly efficient state” and provides that the owners “agreed to let, and the charterers agreed to hire the said Steamship from the time of delivery for one transatlantic trip” as hereinbefore described. “Charterers to have liberty to sublet the Steamer for all or any part of the time covered by this Charter, but Charterers remaining responsible for the fulfillment of this Charter party”. The vessel is to be delivered North of Hatteras “being on her delivery * * tight, staunch, strong and in every way fitted' for the service * * *, to be employed in carrying, lawful merchandise, including petroléum or its products, * ' * * in such lawful trades, between safe port and/or ports * * * in the voyage described above.”

Paragraph 1 of the charterparty provides, among other things, that the owners shall “keep the Steamer in a thoroughly efficient state in hull, machinery and equipment for and during the service”.

Paragraph 15 provides: “That in the event of loss of time from deficiency of men or stores, fire, breakdown or damages to hull, machinery or equipment, grounding, detention by average accidents to ship or cargo, drydocking for the purpose of examination or painting bottom, or by any other cause preventing the full working of the' vessel, the payment of hire shall cease for the time thereby lost * *

Paragraph 16 provides: “The act of God, enemies, fire, restraint of Princes, Rulers and People, and all dangers and accidents of the Seas, Rivers, Machinery, Boilers and Steam Navigation, and errors’ of Navigation throughout this Charter Party, always mutually- excepted.”

Paragraph 19 of the charterparty, I will discuss.further on in my opinion.

There was, under the charterparty, a warranty that the Toledo was seaworthy both at the time of the making of the charter, and of the delivery of the ship to the libellant. The Caledonia, 157 U.S. 124, 15 S.Ct. 537, 39 L.Ed. 644; The Carib Prince, 170 U.S. 655, 18 S.Ct. 753, 42 L.Ed. 1181.

The evidence clearly shows that the ship was not seaworthy at these times.

The charterparty was, however, a private contract and not a contract of common carriage, and the relations between the dwner and the charterer are not altered if the charterer chooses to put the ship on the berth'and offer her to shippers as a common carrier. In this instante the parties were free to contract as they desired, and the agreement they made is not subject to . the considerations- of Public policy, which limits the -agreement, of common carriers. The Fri, 2 Cir., 154 F. 333; The G. R. Crowe, D.C., 287 F. 426, affirmed 2 Cir., 294 F. 506; The Oakley C. Curtis, 2 Cir., 4 F.2d 979; The Westmoreland, 2 Cir., 86 F.2d 96; The Nat Sutton, 2 Cir., 62 F.2d 787; The Elizabeth Edwards, 2 Cir., 27 F.2d 747; The Lawrence J. Tomlinson, D.C., 29 F.2d 797.

Considerable .testimony was offered in an áttempt to show a custom whereby if the interval between the delivery date and the cancelling date is a short one, an inference may arise that a fixed sailing date is contemplated and that therefore very likely the ship is going to be put on the berth on line service. It does not seem to me that the evidence offered sustains that contention, but, in any event, I do not think that this constituted notice to the owner that the ship was to be put on the berth, but even if it was the contract of charter • between the owner and libellant was a •private contract, and was not affected by the -fact that the time charterer might put the vessel on the berth as a general ship. Robinson.on Admiralty, page 467.

The charterparty did contain an exception in Paragraph 16, supra, which-provided “accidents of * * * machinery,- * *' * throughout this Charter Party al *96 ways mutually excepted”, but the parties of this suit. contend for. entirely different constructions of this paragraph.

Libellant contends that the exception last quoted does not eliminate or restrict the shipowners absolute warranty of seaworthiness, nor is it equivalent to the usual and clear clause “warranted seaworthy only insofar as use of due diligence can make the vessel seaworthy”.

Respondents contend that every provision of the charterparty is subject to the exception, including the agreement that the ship shall be seaworthy.

It is undoubtedly true that the implied warranty of seaworthiness will only be excluded by expressed terms in the contract, so clear as not to admit of any such construction.

It has likewise been held that where the exception is included with many others that relate to the ship during its operation, it will be held that the exception limits the implied contract of seaworthiness, only by accidents occurring after the making of the charter. The Caledonia, supra.

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