The Susan

23 F. Cas. 440, 1 Sprague 499
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedOctober 15, 1859
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 23 F. Cas. 440 (The Susan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Susan, 23 F. Cas. 440, 1 Sprague 499 (D. Mass. 1859).

Opinion

SPRAGUE, District Judge.

This was a libel for salvage. 1 have no doubt that this vessel was in such peril as to be the subject of salvage-service, and that the libellants went on board from the shore, and aided in bringing her to. a place of safety. But it is insisted that they are not entitled to a salvage compensation, because it was understood between them and the master, before -and at the time the assistance was rendered, that it was to be merely pilotage.

This requires examination. It appears that, on the 6th of February, this vessel made sail from Holmes’ Hole, bound for Bos--ton. After proceeding about fifteen miles, her lumber ports were stove in by sheet ice, and in five minutes she was filled with water, and sunk as low as her cargo of lumber would permit. Her cabin and her rails were submerged, and only the extremities of the stern and bow, and the upper part of the •deck-load of lumber were above water. The •crew could have neither fire nor shelter, and most of their clothing was wet. The water flowed into her so freely, that no attempt was made to free her from it by the pumps •or otherwise. In this condition she made a signal of distress, and was soon afterwards taken in tow by the brig Rebecca, belonging to the same owner. The weather being mild for the season, and the wind moderate, some consultation was had between the masters of the two vessels, about proceeding to Boston; but it was concluded that the Susan should go into Monomoy Point. The master ■of the Susan was on board of the Rebecca, and her flag was then hoisted at the fore topmast head as a signal. Upon seeing this, eight of the libellants proceeded in- a boat toward the Rebecca; and as they approached her, the master of the Susan inquired if they had a pilot, to which one of them, James Colson, replied that he could take her in, referring to the Susan, then water-logged and in tow.

There is testimony that Captain Lowd, the master of the Susan, said that a pilot was all that he wanted, and that he needed no other assistance. But it is not stated that any response was made to this by any of the libel-lants, and I am not satisfied that it was said to them or made known to them, so that they understood or ought to have understood that whatever they should do would be only as pilots, and for mere pilotage compensation.

Immediately after getting on board of the Rebecca, she and her tow, by advice of Col-son, were taken into shoaler water, and there anchored as a place less in danger from ice, until the tide should favor her going into harbor. In the meantime, four of the libel-lants, at the request of Captain Lowd. took the steward of the Susan and the clothes of her crew on shore, and afterwards returned. While this boat was absent, the Rebecca departed and kept on her voyage. Soon after the return of the boat, with the aid of the libellants the anchor of the Susan was weighed, and she attempted to get into the harbor of Monomoy, steering partly by her rudder, and partly by her sails. Being very deep in the water she took the ground; thereupon a part of the libellants went in her boat to the light ship, half a mile distant, obtained a kedge anchor, and aided in hedging her off the shoal and into the harbor. These were, in their nature, salvage services. In weighing the evidence, with a view to determine whethér the libellants were by agreement restricted to the mere compensation of a single pilot, all the circumstances should be taken into consideration. No one of the libellants was a pilot by commission or appointment; and if they had been, the Susan was in such condition that they would not. by the general law, have been bound to go on board and aid in getting her into port, merely as pilots. The Hebe, 2 W. Rob. Adm. 247. The presumption, therefore, is, that the service was understood by the parties to be salvage, unless it be shown by satisfactory evidence that there was a different agreement. In The Haedwig, 24 Eng. Law. & Eq. 582, a vessel in a condition to be the subject of salvage service made a signal for a pilot, by hoisting her colors at the fore topmast head, as in the present case, and when a boat came alongside, the master of the vessel said he wanted one man as a pilot; and the boat’s crew— none of whom were commissioned pilots— aided in getting the vessel into port, it was held that they were entitled to salvage. Dr. Lushington, in giving his judgment, declared that he should hold a signal, under such cir-[442]*442cumstanees, to be a signal for assistance, and not for a pilot, and awarded salvage. He does not notice the fact, stated in. the protest which was in evidence, that the master of the vessel said to the boat that he wanted one man as a pilot, but construed the signal as a request for assistance; and, as the assistance needed and actually rendered was in its character salvage, and not mere pilot-age, he decreed a salvage compensation. It may, perhaps, be inferred, that in his view, the receiving of such assistance overruled the mere declaration that a pilot only was wanted. The cases Lea v. The Alexander [Case No. S,153], and Callagan v. Hallett, 1 Caines. 104, were decided not upon the general law, but upon the positive enactments of a New York statute. It is true, salvors cannot force themselves upon vessels in distress, against the will of the master. It is at his option to accept their services or not; and if he refuse them, compensation cannot be recovered for assistance subsequently rendered against his will. I am not speaking of cases in which the master fraudulently attempts to destroy his vessel; for in the present case there is no doubt of his good faith toward the owners and underwriters. If the aid of salvors be accepted only upon a clearly understood condition that it shall be deemed merely pilotage, they will be limited to mere pilotage compensation. But I hold, with Dr. Lushington, that a signal, made by a vessel in actual distress, and needing other assistance than pilotage, although it be the usual signal for a pilot, shall be deemed a signal for assistance.

In such case, the vessel has no right to make a signal merely for a pilot. Pilots are not bound, unless by statute, to take the hazards, or subject themselves to the labor of going on board, and aiding such a vessel, for mere pilotage compensation. But suppose such a signal is made, or an actual signal of distress is held out, and persons are thereby induced to go on board to render assistance, and then the master of the vessel, who has made the signal, refuses to accept their services, or will receive them only upon conditions to which they are under no obligation to accede, are they to be entitled to no compensation? This, I believe, is a new question, although such a state of facts has sometimes actually existed.

A signal of distress is a request for assistance. And. if competent persons, upon such request, subject themselves to labor and danger, and expense, to get on board of the vessel, and there offer their services for such reward as the law will give them, if such offer be rejected, it would seem that some compensation should be made for the labor, expense, and danger so incurred; at least, in cases where the vessel subsequently comes to a place of safety. .Several cases have heretofore been presented to me, where boats have put off from the shore to vessels making a signal of distress, with great gallantry and hazard to life, in launching through the surf, and where the subsequent service of getting the ship out of danger was comparatively trifling.

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Bluebook (online)
23 F. Cas. 440, 1 Sprague 499, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-susan-mad-1859.